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Abstract 
This dissertation highlights some of the innumerable ways that 
participation in UN peacekeeping efforts became one of the central symbols 
employed in Canadian self-identification from 1956 to 1997. What emerges is a 
web encompassing forty or so years of continuity and change in how messages 
about peacekeeping and Canada were produced, disseminated, and received by 
Canadians. The strands which comprise this web are: the political rhetoric of 
peacekeeping, the use of peacekeeping in high school textbooks, National Film 
Board [NFB] documentaries about peacekeeping, newspaper coverage of 
peacekeeping, and editorial cartoons about peacekeeping. 
11 
Peacekeeping's growing adoption as a national symbol in Canada 
depended considerably on writers' and artists' abilities to discuss more than the 
successes and failures of individual missions or peacekeeping as a governmental 
policy. UN peacekeeping operations have not been universally successful; 
Canadians, therefore, did not become attached to peacekeeping through the 
actual achievements of their peacekeepers. Rather, what largely determined the 
content of each medium's messages were persistent discussions which 
foregrounded Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations, as well as the 
existence of three parallel discourses about peacekeeping which referred to the 
past, the present, or the future for audiences. The nostalgic and progressive 
discourses encouraged Canadians to see peacekeeping as a symbolic activity. The 
words and images associated with these temporal understandings of 
peacekeeping helped blunt the impact of any criticisms which were made using 
functional criteria in the present. 
111 
While internationalist in emphasis, peacekeeping was seen through 
domestic frames far more often. Individual missions mattered less than the idea 
of peacekeeping and Canada's part in its perpetuation. When missions went awry, 
the impact on Canada was discussed far more than the effects on the host 
nations. The domestic production and reception of messages about peacekeeping 
was therefore influenced by internationalism, but remained centred on the 
Canadian experience of peacekeeping. This domestic emphasis problematizes the 
Canadian attachment to peacekeeping while also providing answers to why so 
many Canadians strongly associate with peacekeeping. Or feel, as Stompin' Tom 
Connors put it, that "we are the Blue Berets." 
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Introduction 
Canada is a peacekeeping nation. This does not mean there is a singular 
Canadian character that manifests itself in a desire to prevent the escalation of 
conflicts. It could be argued, however, that Canada should be called a 
peacekeeping nation because of the cultural importance of peacekeeping to its 
history since 1956. To deny this importance is to deny the omnipresent litany of 
words, images, and objects about peacekeeping that can be found throughout 
Canadian society and culture. There are songs, monuments, buildings, images on 
Canadian currency, dramatic plays, and national days of recognition for 
peacekeeping. Canada is unique in this respect. This is not to say that other 
countries do not also value peacekeeping. Though peacekeeping has often been 
associated with other "middle powers" like the Scandinavian nations, only 
Canada has made peacekeeping a central part of its national identity. 1 
A song by one of Canada's best-known folk singers, Stompin' Tom Connors, 
provided the title for this dissertation. "We are the Blue Berets" is from the 
opening line of his song, "The Blue Berets," an ode to Canadian participation in 
United Nations [UN] peacekeeping operations.2 The song was written in 1993, 
when Canadians were involved in new peacekeeping operations in Somalia and 
Bosnia. Never one to criticize Canada, Connors extolled the virtues of Canadians 
for their service to the UN. In many ways, Connors' song was a Canadian 
1 Unlike Canada, the Scandinavian countries can draw upon much longer historical pasts for their national 
identities. They also take pride in their neutrality, not simply their support for the UN. See Cynthia 
Cockburn and Dubravka Zarkov, eds., The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International 
Peacekeeping: Bosnia and the Netherlands (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2002). 
2 Stompin' Tom Connors, The Blue Berets (Crown-vetch music, 1993). 
1 
2 
rejoinder to "The Ballad of the Green Berets," a pro-military song written by 
Robin Moore and Staff Sergeant Barry Sandler that became popular in the United 
States in 1966, and was also featured in the John Wayne film, "The Green 
Berets." In the Canadian version, there is no reference to the peacekeepers dying 
for Canada, as there was in "The Ballad of the Green Berets." Instead, the "Blue 
Berets" were said to soon be "marching home to say 'we love you all'." This 
altered conception of sacrifice enabled Connors to encourage Canadians to 
celebrate their national distinctiveness through their peacekeepers. The pronoun 
"we," employed throughout the song, further encouraged Canadians to see 
themselves in the deeds of their peacekeepers. Yet, the "we" Connors describes 
represents more than the peacekeepers themselves. It is this universality - the 
"we" who are "the Blue Berets" - that is the primary focus of this study. 
This dissertation highlights some of the numerous ways that participation in 
UN peacekeeping efforts became one of the central symbols employed in 
Canadian self-identification from 1956 to 1997. What emerges is a web 
encompassing forty or so years of continuity and change in how messages about 
peacekeeping and Canada were produced, disseminated, and received by 
Canadians. The strands which comprise this web are: the political rhetoric of 
peacekeeping, the use of peacekeeping in high school textbooks, National Film 
Board [NFB] documentaries about peacekeeping, newspaper coverage of 
peacekeeping, and editorial cartoons about peacekeeping. Because state and non-
state actors produced messages about peacekeeping, this study provides a 
3 
thorough investigation of these different voices. While it would have been 
possible to examine in more detail just one of the ways in which Canadians could 
have learned about peacekeeping, it would have prevented a more wide-ranging 
investigation of how an idea can be embedded in a national symbology. It was 
only through multiple mediated forms of expression that were contingent upon 
particular understandings of the nation that peacekeeping became a part of the 
system of symbols that Canadians mobilized to express their national identity. 
This dissertation argues that peacekeeping is more than a governmental 
foreign policy option. It has been linked to a Canadian national identity. The 
years 1956 to 1997 saw changing conceptions of Canada as a British, bilingual or 
multicultural nation, and differences between French- and English-Canadian 
understandings of the nation. What the sources examined for this study suggest 
is that there were considerable differences in how peacekeeping was attached to 
conceptions of the nation in both English and French Canada. In this regard, this 
dissertation follows Marcel Martel's work, which suggests that after the Second 
World War French Canada increasingly came to be identified with the physical 
borders of Quebec. 3 While peacekeeping found favour in Quebec when it was 
presented as an internationalist policy that countered British imperial efforts, it 
lost much of its efficacy as a symbol in French Canada as Quebec became more 
3 Marcel Martel, French Canada: An account of its Creation and Break-up, 1850 - 1967, vol. 24, Canada's 
Ethnic Group Series (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical Association, 1998), 25. 
4 
concerned with its own foreign affairs after the Quiet Revolution. 4 As this 
occurred, many English Canadians looked to peacekeeping as a unifying symbol 
of Canada's past, present, and future, and a counter-weight to what were seen as 
the divisive discourses coming from French Canada. 
Peacekeeping's growing adoption as a national symbol in Canada depended 
considerably on writers' and artists' abilities to discuss more than the successes 
and failures of individual missions or peacekeeping as a governmental policy. UN 
peacekeeping operations have not been universally successful; Canadians, 
therefore, did not become attached to peacekeeping through the actual 
achievements of their peacekeepers. Governmental support for peacekeeping was 
also intermittent between 1956 and 1997, and so the ideational attachment of 
peacekeeping to a Canadian national identity did not come about solely through 
the propagandistic efforts of successive political parties who held office, though 
to be sure they played a significant part. Each collection of sources used in this 
dissertation also demonstrates that those who produced messages about 
peacekeeping did not always care about the particularities of individual missions, 
preferring to espouse messages that linked their cultural products to political 
discourses about Canada's national identity. Accordingly, this dissertation 
examines not the government policies and policy-makers, but words and images 
used to describe peacekeeping. 
4 The idea that Quebeckers favour isolationism is refuted in Stephane Roussel and Jean-Christophe 
Boucher, "The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture," American Review 
of Canadian Studies 38, no. 2 (2008). 
5 
A fuller understanding of how French and English Canadians came to 
associate peacekeeping with Canada must begin with an examination of the 
political rhetoric accompanying peacekeeping, and determine whether such ideas 
were accepted or challenged by different media. The Canadian government 
played a foundational role in creating and disseminating the language and 
associations of peacekeeping with Canada's past, its present, and its future. But 
education systems and mass media, including films, newspapers, and editorial 
cartoons also communicated messages about peacekeeping to their audiences. 
Each successive chapter in this dissertation therefore examines a medium that 
had less formal governmental influence over the content of its messages than the 
one which preceded it. 
While the Canadian Government and the Department of External Affairs 
[DEA] paid close attention to the messages that were produced and disseminated 
about peacekeeping in Canada from 1956 to 1997, this dissertation asserts that 
there was not a direct correlation between how much influence the government 
had over a particular medium and the content of its messages about 
peacekeeping. Rather, what largely determined the content of each medium's 
messages was the existence of three parallel discourses about peacekeeping which 
referred to the past, the present, or the future for audiences. The producers of 
messages about peacekeeping investigated in each chapter made choices about 
which of these discourses to employ, often combining two or all three into a 
single text. Those media that discussed the past were likely to present 
6 
peacekeeping positively, though they did so by denying a considerable portion of 
the history of peacekeeping. This nostalgic imagining of Canadian peacekeeping 
consciously denied the shortcomings of operations while linking peacekeeping to 
an idealized version of Canada's past. In those sources which emphasized the 
present, authors either argued that Canada's peacekeeping efforts were helping to 
bring about a better world, or presented criticisms of peacekeeping that 
suggested that it was not a solution for global and Canadian problems. Such 
authors shared the language of functionalism, which led them to use similar 
appeals to audiences' "reason" and "common sense" to justify their arguments. 
The sources which hypothesized about the future through discussions of 
peacekeeping were more likely than not to present it in positive terms, and to 
imagine Canada's playing a large role in bringing about a better world. They told 
audiences that peacekeeping was part of a prog,ressive move towards a more 
peaceful planet, and their claims found widespread appeal among many 
Canadians. 
No study has ever posited the existence of these three different discourses 
about peacekeeping, or examined the effects of these discourses on how and what 
Canadians would have learned about peacekeeping, despite their central role in 
its adoption as a Canadian national symbol. The nostalgic, functionalist, and 
progressive discourses about peacekeeping co-existed for almost the entire period 
covered by this dissertation. Each discourse drew on particular constructions of 
the nation and peacekeeping for audiences. And while each discourse referred to 
7 
a different point in time - the past, the present, or the future - all were 
constructed and modified according to the cultural and political milieux of the 
time in which they were employed. The politicians, authors, filmmakers, 
columnists, and cartoonists examined in this dissertation rarely perceived such 
discourses as constraints, however, and moved freely among functionalism and 
progressivism or nostalgia. 
This study will demonstrate that as early as 1957, a discourse of nostalgia 
about peacekeeping was being employed by state and non-state actors. Strictly 
speaking, nostalgia refers to a concept of homesickness. Yet, historians since the 
1980s have used the term to represent the "juxtaposition of an idealized past with 
an unsatisfactory present."s In this sense, as Jeanelle Wilson has argued, 
nostalgia tries to bring a sense of continuity to people's lives and their sense of 
identity through selected memories and positive associations. 6 Discursive 
continuity is achieved through making the past appear static and knowable. This 
provides a discourse of nostalgia with a presumed ability to know the past and to 
explain it for audiences. For many people, this is a positive experience, though it 
is often unsatisfactory. This is because nostalgia is an ambivalent concept; "it is 
about the repetition of the unrepeatable, [the] materialization of the 
5 George K. Behlmer and Fred M. Leventhal, eds., Singular Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia, and Identity 
in Modern British Culture (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 7. 
6 Janelle L. Wilson, Nostalgia: Sanctuary of Meaning (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University 
Press, 2005), 10. 
8 
immaterial."7 Nostalgia calls on people to remember the past as a better time 
while acknowledging that the present cannot ever fully be that way. 
The propensity to recall the past nostalgically was always a response to 
contemporary events. Uncertainties and fears about current events and the future 
were, and are, the most common cause of nostalgia in the modern world. s The 
idealized past that Canadians drew upon when discussing peacekeeping was 
situated in the late 1950s. These were the years when Canada's international 
influence was considered to be at its peak, thanks largely to Lester Pearson's work 
at the UN. This apex in Canadian international diplomacy coincided with an era 
of economic prosperity for most Canadians. Later dissatisfactions caused by rapid 
changes in gender and class relations, divisions between French and English 
Canadians, and changing immigration patterns encouraged some Canadians to 
see the 1950s as a "Golden Age." Many writers and artists mobilized nostalgic 
feelings which erased past sources of societal conflict, and discussed an imagined 
past that was shielded from the actual experiences of ordinary people. David 
Lowenthal suggests that in these nostalgic feelings, "[p]eople tend to believe that 
life in the past was 'happier'- that families were closer, that pollution was absent, 
that peace and order prevailed."9 Hence, the nostalgic peacekeeping discourse 
focused on what came to be seen as a "Golden Age" for Canada to combat 
perceived shortcomings in the present. 
7 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York Basic Books, 2001), xvii. 
8 Fred Davis, Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 9. 
9 David Lowenthal, "Nostalgia Tells it like it Wasn't" in Christopher Shaw and Malcolm Chase, eds., The 
Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 28. 
9 
The second strand of peacekeeping discourse was framed around whether or 
not peacekeeping was a functional policy for Canada to undertake in the present; 
it commenced immediately in 1956. Functionalism was the term commonly 
employed by the DEA to describe Canada's foreign affairs policies and goals after 
the Second World War.10 The Mackenzie King government began to employ this 
term as it ventured into a more active external affairs policy for Canada during 
and immediately after the Second World War. 11 Functionalism's advocates sought 
new roles for Canada internationally, based on the principle that states should 
share in the responsibilities of governing the world in proportion to their ability 
to do so. Functionalist discussions employed the terms "power" and "influence," 
"alliances" and "interests" to evaluate peacekeeping's utility.12 Using these 
criteria, the functional value of peacekeeping was debated as soon as the first 
force was created. Peacekeeping was one of the longest-standing commitments of 
Canadian foreign policy to the belief that international institutions managed by 
interested powers could promote "peace through pieces."13 Despite this potential, 
functionalism was only intermittently advocated by the Canadian government 
throughout the Cold War, and this is evident in the critical interpretations of 
peacekeeping's value in the later 1960s and again in 1993. 
10 John W Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), 4. 
11 A.J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," International Journal 35, no. 2 
(1980): 309. 
12 J King Gordon, ed. Canada's Role as a Middle Power (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1966); Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957; Tom 
Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Costas Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 
- 1995 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998). 
13 Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," 325. 
10 
Discussions of functionalism tended to conflate national with international 
interests. This led its critics to rely on the "realist" theory of international politics. 
In foreign policy analyses, realism purports to explain the world as it really is, 
and is based on several assumptions, including one that nations do and should 
act in their own self-interests. Therefore, peacekeeping had to have tangible 
benefits for Canada for it to be considered a functional policy. Realism also 
evaluates nations through their ability to shape the outcomes of international 
events. From 1956 to 1997, Canada was often described as a "middle power," and 
its influence was seen to rise and fall according to how large its military was and 
the importance of its diplomats in bodies like the UN.14 However, realism also 
ignores or plays down the importance of culture, national identity, linguistic and 
gender issues, and racial prejudice.1s As a result, the functionalist discourse, 
while apparent in the sources used in every chapter of this study, did not 
encapsulate many of the domestic and international factors that played a 
considerable role in determining how Canadians understood peacekeeping as a 
symbol of their national identity. 
The progressive peacekeeping discourse was built upon a belief in a future 
without conflict that had been popular since the end of the Second World War. 16 
14 Gordon, ed. Canada's Role as a Middle Power; J.L. Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 
I 945: Middle Power or Satellite?, Third ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1969). 
15 An excellent study of the idea of "middle power" foreign policy and its assumptions is Mark Neufeld, 
"Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power," Studies in Political 
Economy 48(1995). 
16 For more on this, see Chapter One, "The Bomb" in Robert Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: 
Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009). 
11 
Changing the goal from a world without war to one in which there were more 
peacekeeping efforts broadened the appeal of this progressive discourse after 
1956. In Canadian politics, "progressive" has often referred to a rural-based 
reform movement. However, by the 1930s, left-centred politics in Canada were 
focused primarily around the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation [CCF]. 
The CCF concerned itself with anti-imperial struggles in the 1930s, and by the 
end of the Second World War had become a staunch advocate of the UN and an 
internationalist Canadian foreign policy. 17 This progressivism sought a strong UN 
able to intervene anywhere in the world through the use of an international police 
force. Such ideas were labelled utopian, primarily by those who espoused a 
"realist" conception of international politics. However, as Ian McKay's work has 
suggested, those who espouse progressive ideals base their ideas on "concrete 
utopias" which can be very modest versions of the world that are "better" in the 
future. 18 
While the Left is normally associated with the concept of progress, in the case 
of peacekeeping and Canadian foreign policy, progress was also central for 
Canada's centre-left and centre-right political parties, the Liberals and the 
Progressive Conservatives [PCs]. Within the DEA, there was considerable belief 
17 James Naylor, "Pacifism or Anti-Imperialism?: The CCF Response to the Outbreak of World War II," 
Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 8, no. 1 (1997): 237. 
18 Ian McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada's Left History (Toronto: Between the Lines, 
2005), 8. 
12 
in the power of the UN after the Second World War.19 Lester Pearson was among 
those who held this belief, and his time as the head of the Liberal Party reflected a 
progressive desire for more peacekeeping. Even the PC Party found cause to 
adopt peacekeeping as a major component of Canada's foreign policy. The legacy 
of the Second World War and the fears of a nuclear holocaust because of the Cold 
War stalemate in the ensuing decades encouraged all the major Canadian 
political parties, and many ordinary English and French Canadians, to see 
peacekeeping as a tangible first step that could bring about a more progressive 
and peaceful world. 
It is important to recognize that there were different moments in Canadian 
history that encouraged authors to discuss the past, present, or future (or some 
combination of the three) of Canada's peacekeeping efforts. This dissertation 
focuses on five time periods to demonstrate how peacekeeping became intimately 
tied to discussions of Canada's national identity. These time periods coincide 
with either the beginnings or the ends of many of Canada's major UN 
peacekeeping endeavours: 1956 and 1957 saw the introduction of the United 
Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] and Lester Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize win, 
respectively; 1960 saw Canada's participation in Operation des Nations Unies au 
Congo [ONUC] under John Diefenbaker's government; in 1964 Canada's forces 
played a large role in the United Nations Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]; 1967 saw 
the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt; and in 1993 the Canadian Airborne Regiment 
19 Doug Owram, Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996); Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of 
the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea. 
13 
was deployed to act as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
[UNOSOM] and other soldiers worked to keep the peace in the former Yugoslavia 
in the United Nations Protection Force[UNPROFOR]. These missions, which 
generated large amounts of media coverage among daily newspapers and their 
editorial cartoons, were included in NFB documentaries about peacekeeping, 
were commonly referred to in high school history textbooks, and were the 
missions that politicians would hearken to most in their rhetoric. 
As each chapter demonstrates, these periods also encouraged authors to 
develop specific arguments about peacekeeping. In 1956 and 1957, writers and 
artists were still inclined to discuss the promises of Canada's future as an 
international actor because of a progressive belief in the UN,20 while uncertainty 
about Canada's attachment to Britain promoted strong arguments for and against 
peacekeeping in discussions about the present. When the Liberals were defeated 
in the federal election of 1957, many people felt that Canada's prominent 
international presence would disappear. The long-standing Liberal majority in 
Ottawa was comforting for many Canadians who were largely satisfied with its 
policies.21 When the election forced the Liberals out of office, some Canadians felt 
an immediate longing for the certainties of the King and St. Laurent eras. 
Diefenbaker and his ministers attempted to maintain the priorities of the St. 
2° For more on Canadian attitudes to the UN in the early 1950s, see Chapter Five, ''Korea: From an 
Imperial Frying Pan into an American Fire," Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the 
United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea. 
21 Patrick H Brennan, Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal 
Years, 1935 - 1957 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1994), 120. 
14 
Laurent government, including supporting UNEF, but many newspapers were 
already lamenting the passing of Canada's "Golden Age" of diplomacy. 
By the mid-196os, the existence of a vibrant and subversive Quebec separatist 
movement and the Canadian government's inability to influence nations to stop 
waging war discouraged writers and artists from discussing the future. Instead, 
circumstances made it seem more appropriate to reminisce about Canada's 
peacekeeping past. Such discussions accompanied continuing debates about 
peacekeeping in the present that revolved around language politics and issues of 
decolonization. The end of the Cold War saw a flurry of positive and hopeful 
assessments of Canada's peacekeeping future. 22 However, by 1993 the tragedies 
of Somalia and mixed results of peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia engendered 
considerable debate in Canada. The spectre of Quebec separatism and cynicism 
about the Canadian government's ability to resolve economic and social issues 
also heavily influenced discussions about peacekeeping in the 1990s. The 
negative political climate once again encouraged authors to look to Canada's 
peacekeeping past, rather than to project a better future. This study concludes in 
1997, when attitudes towards the Canadian Forces were at their nadir owing to 
the release of a damning report by the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia. The 
report, when combined with the failure in Rwanda, the mixed results in Bosnia, 
and an unstable domestic political climate, made peacekeeping a less appealing 
22 Stuart Allan, "Challenging Canada's Nuclear Commitments: An analysis of defence discourse," British 
Journal of Canadian Studies 17, no. 1 (2004): 2; Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign 
Policy, 1945 - 1995, 144. 
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functional policy, and encouraged peacekeeping's proponents to rely primarily on 
the discourse of nostalgia. 
In contrast to these changes, much current scholarly thinking about Canadian 
foreign policy suggests that during the years 1956 to 2001 a consistent set of 
principles was applied by successive governments.2 3 One reason for this 
contention is the predominance of the Liberal party in federal politics during this 
era. The Liberals were the party in power from 1945 to 1957, and they espoused a 
policy of functionalism in international affairs. Particular attention was paid to 
enhancing the role of the UN in the fields of peacekeeping and aid distribution. 
The Diefenbaker years, 1957 to 1963, are recognized for a similar care for the UN 
and its peacekeeping activities, despite inconsistencies in relations with the 
United States over the Cuban missile crisis and the stationing of nuclear weapons 
on Canadian soil. 2 4 Pearson's tenure as prime minister is similarly viewed as a 
continued espousal of functionalist principles and the promotion of the UN. 
Pierre Trudeau's Liberal governments of 1968 to 1979 and 1980 to 1984 
rhetorically emphasized national interests over the promotion of the UN, but in 
practice his governments continued Canada's active peacekeeping participation 
in Cyprus and in the Middle East. 2s Brian Mulroney's PC government was in 
power from 1984 to 1993, and volunteered Canadian forces for the numerous 
23 Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1; 
Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995, 3. 
24 John F. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the "Pearsonalities": The Diefenbaker Government and the 
Conduct of Canadian External Relations," Historical Papers 19, no. 1 (1984): 166; Melakopides, 
Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995, 52. 
25 J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), xiv. 
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missions that were made possible by the easing of the tensions of the Cold War in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mulroney's last year in office was marked by the 
escalating scandal over the conduct of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 
Somalia. Jean Chretien's Liberals inherited this uncertain foreign policy climate, 
but emphasized the concept of "human security" that grew out of UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's work An Agenda For Peace (1992). They 
continued to promote Canadian peacekeeping, but remained cautious in the wake 
of the findings of the Somalia Commission. 
These domestic frames for peacekeeping were not isolated from international 
conceptions of the UN. In 1956, peacekeeping was seen by many as reviving a UN 
that had been plagued by Security Council veto use since the Cold War 
embittered relations between the United States, and the Soviet Union and their 
allies.2 6 By the mid-196os, the financial cost of peacekeeping threatened to 
bankrupt the UN. This, combined with the expulsion of UNEF in 1967, cast 
serious doubts over the future of peacekeeping. Such pessimism did not stop new 
missions from being undertaken in the 1970s. In the mid-to -late 1980s, under 
the Secretary Generalship of Javier Perez de Cuellar, numerous new missions 
were undertaken to places like Cambodia and Afghanistan. These renewed efforts 
resulted in the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 to UN peacekeeping as 
an institution. 
26 For more on this climate, see Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' 
Coalition of the Willing,from Hiroshima to Korea; Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: 
The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 
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The Cold War also influenced the policies and priorities of Canada's foreign 
affairs and had a considerable cultural impact from 1956 to 1989. Reg Whitaker 
and Gary Marcuse have argued that Canada was a strongly anti-Communist state 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and fears about Communist infiltrators within 
Canada led to purges in many governmental agencies, including the NFB. 2 7 
Robert Teigrob and Stephen Whitfield also suggest that the Cold War culture 
which pervaded the years following the Second World War encouraged people to 
accept foreign policy decisions undertaken by their government without 
question. 2 8 The Suez Crisis was a major break from such a tendency; it 
represented a shift in the degree of dissent permitted in Canada, and was 
indicative of a general thawing in the culture of the Cold War. Peacekeeping 
therefore had to be presented in such a way that it could endure the criticisms of 
it now made possible. Its supporters did so by employing a progressive discourse 
that promised a better world through peacekeeping, as well as arguing for 
peacekeeping's functional value in the present. 
The years between 1953 and 1980 were also more conducive than periods in 
the past to dissenting discussions because of a general detente between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Particularly after the 1960s, it became 
impossible for governments to try to exercise the same levels of control over 
27 Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957. 
28 While Whitfield's discussion is on the United States, I argue that a similar climate existed in Canada, 
based on the exhaustive work ofTeigrob and Whitaker and Marcuse. Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of 
the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 20. 
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media messages or popular culture. 2 9 Cold War tensions reappeared in 1980 with 
the bellicose rhetoric of American President Ronald Reagan. Increased fears in 
Canada about the possibility of nuclear war in the 1980s led to renewed calls for 
more UN peacekeeping, as well as a push for neutrality. The utility of 
peacekeeping as a symbol and its use in discussions of Canada's past, present, 
and future permitted a policy that was born out of Cold War politics to gain 
considerable cultural purchase for many Canadians and to outlive the 
international circumstances that facilitated its birth. 
Canada's governments, educational authors, NFB filmmakers, and newspaper 
writers and cartoonists transposed these ideas about the UN, the Cold War, and 
peacekeeping, and articulated them through nostalgic, functionalist, or 
progressive discourses for domestic audiences. While internationalist in 
emphasis, peacekeeping was seen through domestic frames far more often. 
Individual missions mattered less than the idea of peacekeeping and Canada's 
part in its perpetuation. When missions went awry, the impact on Canada was 
discussed far more than the effects on the host nations. Canadians and their 
governments also tended to remain more positive about peacekeeping than any 
other nation in the world. The domestic production and reception of messages 
about peacekeeping were therefore influenced by internationalism but remained 
centred on the Canadian experience of peacekeeping. This domestic emphasis 
problematizes the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping while also providing 
29 Bryan D. Palmer, Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009). 
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answers to why so many Canadians strongly associate with peacekeeping. Or feel, 
as Stompin' Tom Connors put it, that "We are the Blue Berets."3° 
Those who have written about Canadian foreign policy have by and large 
focused on the successes and failures of individual peacekeeping missions rather 
than address this broader issue.31 Prior to the middle years of the 1960s, there 
were few critical examinations of peacekeeping published in Canada. This quickly 
changed over the next few years. A number of works by political scientists such as 
James Eayrs and Donald Gordon and historians such as Jack Granatstein 
evaluated Canada's peacekeeping efforts in light of its failures to find permanent 
peaceful solutions to the world's problems.32 Most of these works were published 
by or emerged out of conferences held by the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs. Such works tended to focus on more "traditional" subjects of Canadian 
foreign policy, namely who made policy and how it was implemented. 
Government reports and diplomatic records formed the bulk of the sources used 
in these works, and as a result, there was little discussion of non-governmental 
interest in peacekeeping.33 As governmental interest in peacekeeping declined 
3° Connors, The Blue Berets. 
31 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945 - 1984 (Vancouver: USC Press, 
2007); Jack Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military? (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004); Granatstein, 
ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? 
32James Eayrs, "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada," ed. Canadian Institute oflnternational 
Affairs (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1969); Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign 
Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite; A.M. Taylor, David Cox, and J.L Granatstein, eds., 
Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs, 1968). 
33 This does not mean that these books did not do a thorough job of examining governmental policy. 
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during the Trudeau years, so did the work of political scientists and military 
historians on peacekeeping.34 
Renewed scholarly work on peacekeeping appeared in the waning years of the 
Cold War, when Canadian governmental interest was rekindled. These more 
recent works continued to focus primarily on peacekeeping as a state policy with 
positive possibilities and potentially negative drawbacks.3s When they addressed 
such topics as public opinion regarding peacekeeping, the authors of these works 
provided overly simplistic and unsatisfactory answers. Canadians were said to 
have associated with peacekeeping because they wanted to feel good about 
themselves, or to have listened uncritically to successive governments that were 
all too willing to praise Canada's peacekeeping tradition to score political points 
in the present. 
In the last decade, the study of peacekeeping has moved beyond the 
disciplinary boundaries of diplomatic history and international relations with 
positive results. Scholars such as Kevin Spooner have mined the archives, and 
employed a variety of sources in their examinations of Canada's peacekeeping 
past.36 Political scientist Sandra Whitworth is among those who have emphasized 
the gendered and racial constructions of peacekeeping operations which adds 
34 Eayrs' seminal series In Defence a/Canada, published in five volumes between 1964 and 1983, contains 
virtually no mention of peacekeeping at all. See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, vol. 1-5 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1964 - 1983). 
35 Some of the best examples are Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping (Washington 
DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994); Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: 
Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995. 
36 Kevin Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2009). 
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crucial new areas for study.37 Anthropologist Sherene Razack's work on post-
colonialism and the peacekeeping mission to Somalia addresses the importance 
of racial constructions to Canada's peacekeeping past.38 These authors all focus 
on single missions, providing their works with temporal and situational 
specificity. However, because peacekeeping has been such a long-standing part of 
Canada's foreign policy, a more comprehensive historical examination such as 
the one provided here can add considerably to the study of peacekeeping. 
While positive movements have been made by some individuals in the study 
of peacekeeping, others have continued to hold that examining government 
documents is the sole way to get at the "true" history of peacekeeping.39 There are 
several problems with how most historians and political scientists have 
approached peacekeeping. First, they assume a unified Canadian identity, and do 
not recognize regional and linguistic differences in how messages about 
peacekeeping were received. Second, these explanations do not account for the 
rapid support for peacekeeping that marked the Canadian political climate after 
1956. Third, they ignore changes over time in how peacekeeping was understood 
in Canada. Fourth, they make no attempt to deal with the periods between 1956 
and 1997 when the Government of Canada tried to dissuade Canadians from their 
infatuation with peacekeeping. Finally, and perhaps most critically, no author has 
37 Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis (Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 2004). 
38 Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New 
Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
39 Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military? 
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attempted to look systematically at any of the ways in which Canadians learned 
about peacekeeping. 
There has also been a tendency in the historiography and public discourse 
surrounding peacekeeping to emphasize the accounts of those who "were there" 
to help Canadians understand how "things really happened."4° Peacekeeping is 
not unique in this regard, and Jonathan Vance has noted that at least as far back 
as the First World War, veterans' voices and understandings have been privileged 
in Canada's external affairs.41 Such firsthand accounts provide thorough 
examinations of the conditions that were experienced on peacekeeping 
operations by the peacekeepers, which can educate and inform those who 
advocate for more Canadian participation overseas. While useful, these authors 
are guilty of ignoring the biases and weaknesses of individual accounts and 
government documents, as well as of advancing a political position that aims to 
celebrate the Canadian Forces and continue the rehabilitation of their image that 
began after the report on the peacekeeping mission to Somalia was released in 
1997.42 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift's recent work situates these tendencies as 
part of a broader militarization of Canada's past.43 This dissertation furthers 
McKay and Swift's contentions by arguing that unless we undertake a thorough 
40 An example of an author who states that peacekeeping must be seen without the politics or mythologies 
attached to it is Michael K. Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency 
Force, 1956-67(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 182. 
41 Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1997), 136. 
42 The Somalia report was titled Dishonoured Legacy and it contained a series of critiques and 
recommendations for the Canadian forces in the wake of the killings of several Somalis. 
43 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety (Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 2012). 
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examination of how peacekeeping was represented through the nostalgic, 
functionalist, and progressive discourses of peacekeeping, we cannot come closer 
to understanding why so many Canadians became enamoured with the idea. 
To better understand the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping it is first 
necessary to consider the hegemonic narrative about peacekeeping that held sway 
in Canada for most of the years since 1956. This narrative stated that Canadians 
were the world's preeminent peacekeepers, as evidenced by the fact that Canada 
was the only nation to participate in all UN peacekeeping operations from 1956 to 
a point in the 1990s. The motivation to engage in peacekeeping was expressed as 
a mixture of national interests and an altruistic desire to make a better world. 
Through peacekeeping, therefore, Canadians were said to be helping themselves 
and less fortunate nations who suffered from war. This record of consistent 
support was normally mentioned in the same breath as the name of Lester 
Pearson, Canada's first and only Nobel Peace Prize winner. Pearson was lauded 
for creating UN peacekeeping in 1956, and for being its biggest proponent for the 
duration of his life. 
There are distinct parallels between the hegemonic peacekeeping narrative 
and the peacekeeping discourse of nostalgia. Lester Pearson and his Nobel Peace 
Prize-winning work to create UNEF were the central foci of the discourse of 
nostalgia. The numerous acts of commemoration that are discussed in this 
dissertation were the most public and ceremonial ways that this discourse of 
nostalgia was presented to Canadians. Yet, the speeches, textbooks, and 
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newspapers that were systematically examined here all contained frequent and 
tedious re-statements of a simplified and bittersweet recollection of Canada's 
peacekeeping past. These nostalgic recollections demonstrate not only an 
increasing uncertainty about the directions being followed in the present by the 
Canadian government, but a willingness to continue employing peacekeeping as a 
symbol of a past time of achievement for Canada. 
There is a basis in fact for this narrative. Lester Pearson did introduce the 
motion to create a peacekeeping force in the UN in 1956, and while it was not his 
idea, 44 he was instrumental in seeing that it was successfully adopted. Canadians 
also partook in every UN peacekeeping operation from 1956 through to the 
1990s, though they only sent large numbers for a select few, including UNEF in 
1956 and UNFICYP in 1964. Many other operations involved small numbers of 
Canadians in minor administrative or technical support roles. 
Peacekeeping's association with a Canadian national identity also represented 
a modification of a long-standing association between the nation and its 
military.4s Ian McKay and Jamie Swift's Warrior Nation deconstructs these 
associations, and notes that peacekeeping found an equal footing with other more 
militaristic notions of Canadian national identity for most of the latter half of the 
twentieth century.46 In large measure, what differentiated peacekeeping's 
44 Pearson himself openly acknowledged this in 1956 during the special Parliamentary session authorizing 
the deployment of Canadian forces as part ofUNEF. Library and Archives Canada, Lester Pearson Fonds, 
MG26 N9, volume 11. "The Middle East Crisis and the Situation in Hungary," 1956. 
45 One of the best works on this topic is Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World 
War. 
46 McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety. 
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adoption from these earlier associations was the shift from celebrating particular 
battles to celebrating national values. The years following the First and Second 
World Wars found local communities and the federal government 
commemorating specific places and the names of those who had died, in addition 
to specific values. Peacekeeping's nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive 
discourses, and the small number of casualties, encouraged those same 
communities and governments to celebrate Canada as a nation. 
When Canadians felt an affinity for peacekeeping, they selectively chose the 
values they were celebrating in their peacekeepers and in Canada as a nation. 
These values were not permanent, but rather reflected the contemporary cultural 
and political climate in which they were being espoused. Some of the pliable 
values of peacekeeping that were contemporary to the 1990s in English Canada 
were moderation, communication, mediation, cooperation, caring, and sharing. 47 
Others included multiculturalism, tolerance, goodwill, respect for the individual, 
and collective rights. 48 Less discussed were Cold War political manoeuvrings, the 
desire to check Soviet power, a willingness to preserve the Commonwealth, a 
wish to assist in decolonization, or a desire to stop brush fires from spreading. 49 
All of these ideas had been associated with Canada's peacekeeping efforts at one 
47 Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995, 4. 
48 Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, "Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent world," 
International Journal 1, no. 2 (1995): 384. 
49This very common phrase was used by newspapers, textbook authors and politicians alike. One instance 
of its being used is LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 26. "Address at the United Nations Day 
Dinner," 1963. 
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point or another in the past. This change over time highlights the amorphous 
nature of Canadian attachment to peacekeeping. 
Like any representation of national identity, peacekeeping has been used as a 
rhetorical device for larger discussions of how the nation should be 
conceptualized. Many of peacekeeping's critics have sounded off against the 
values that have been attached to it because they do not think they are ones that a 
nation should celebrate.so Some who attacked peacekeeping found common 
cause with those who criticized multiculturalism for "feminizing" Canadian 
culture.s1 The predominantly male composition of Canada's military suggests that 
this is not an apt criticism. Peacekeeping was and is still undertaken by members 
of the Canadian Forces who, while trained to participate in peacekeeping, are 
ultimately still soldiers whose jobs are to kill if necessary.s2 Graham Dawson has 
argued that "[t]hose forms of manliness that have proved efficacious for 
nationalist endeavour have been approvingly recognized and furthered with all 
the power at the disposal of the state, while other subversive or non-functional 
forms (notably the effeminate man or the homosexual) have met with 
50 Many of these authors are refuted in the first chapter of McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding 
Canada in an Age of Anxiety. Some specific examples of attacks against the values of peacekeeping can be 
found in David Bercuson, Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the murder in Somalia 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1996), vi; Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military? , xix. 
51 Michael Adams, Unlikely Utopia: The Surprising Triumph of Canadian Multiculturalism (Toronto: 
Penguin Canada, 2007), 16. 
52Some scholars, all of whom are women, have examined the gendered relations of peacekeeping. Their 
works highlight the problematic practices of peacekeeping as well and ask audiences to question the 
commonly held assumption that peacekeeping is inherently good for all parties involved. See Charlotte 
Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics (New York Columbia 
University Press, 2001),4-5; Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis, 3; 
Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 93. 
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disaprobation and repression in explicitly national terms."s3 Peacekeeping's 
adoption as a national symbol by successive Canadian governments and the 
widespread acclaim which media authors showered on Canada's peacekeepers 
suggest that it was not seen as a subversive form of masculinity. Instead, 
peacekeeping's values have been melded together with the history and 
operational mandates of the Canadian Forces.s4 This contradiction once again 
illustrates the symbolic importance of peacekeeping. Different Canadians can, 
and have, seen peacekeeping differently. Understanding the nostalgic, 
functionalist, and progressive discourses of peacekeeping is necessary to 
comprehend the full implications of associating a gendered concept like 
peacekeeping with Canada's national identity. 
The domestic construction of peacekeeping as a symbol of Canada's national 
identity was also racialized. Citizenship and national identity are often about 
defining oneself in opposition to another as much as they are about finding 
common linkages among people.ss And while the hegemonic peacekeeping 
53 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imaging of Masculinties (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 1-2. 
54 The most detailed analysis of this is done in McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in 
an Age of Anxiety. 
55 See for example, Timothy J. Stanley "Whose Public? Whose memory? Racism, Grand Narratives, and 
Canadian History," in Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 
6; Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 167; Ryan Edwardson, ""Kicking Uncle Sam out of 
the Peaceable Kingdom": English-Canadian "New Nationalism" and Americanization," Journal of 
Canadian Studies 37, no. 4 (2003): 140; Daniel Francis, National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and Canadian 
History (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1997), 11; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds., Myths and 
Nationhood (New York Routledge, 1997), 28-35; Jose E. Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National 
Identities in English Canada, 1945-71 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 5-6; Eva 
Mackey, The House of Difference: Cultural politics and national identity in Canada (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 2-5; Ruth W. Sand well, ed. To The Past: History Education, Public Memory, and 
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narrative emphasized Canada's willingness to help all other nations find peace, it 
did so in part by marking out Canada as a special and superior nation. It will be 
shown throughout this dissertation that by separating the Canadian peacekeepers 
from the people they were sent to assist, different racial constructions of the host 
nation could be employed.s6 The constructions of Egypt and Cyprus saw them as 
places that needed modernization. Those depictions of the Congo and Somalia 
were more racially prejudiced and employed tropes from the colonial era.s7 The 
whiteness of the Canadians and their supposedly orderly homeland set the 
peacekeepers apart from the people they were to help. This racialization was 
expressed while the value of peace and international cooperation was being 
proclaimed. This contradiction further problematizes the construction of Canada 
as a peacekeeping nation. 
The inclusion and exclusion of certain elements from the peacekeeping 
narrative demonstrates clear tendencies in how some Canadians wanted to view 
their nation's past, present, and future. Despite the use of the term Canadian by 
many writers, it did not have equal footing in English and French Canada; French 
Canadians were far less likely to espouse this understanding of peacekeeping. 
Citizenship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 32-37; Rinaldo Walcott, ed. Rude: 
Contemporary Black Canadian Cultural Criticism (Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2000), 7; Whitworth, Men, 
Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis, 39. 
56The idea of peacekeeping creating ''us" and "them~' is evident in the work of Sandra Whitworth and 
Sherene Razack. See Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the 
New imperialism, 4; Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis, 15. 
However, neither of these authors has looked at the racial constructions of Egyptians, Cypriots or the 
Congolese. 
57 Kevin Spooner's excellent study of the Canadian participation in ONUC touches on this issue as part of 
its larger examination of the experiences of the Canadians there. Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, and 
UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 153. 
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This dissertation's examination of school textbooks, newspaper articles, and 
editorial cartoons shows that French Canadians immediately linked peacekeeping 
to Canada's independence from Britain and praised it as a worthwhile policy as a 
result. They did not, however, come to strongly associate peacekeeping with their 
national identity. As separatism and a distinct Quebecois identity came to 
dominate the political discussions within Quebec, Canada's dealings at the 
United Nations became less relevant to contemporary debates.ss This did not 
make the issue of peace disappear from Quebec's educational and journalistic 
milieux. Rather, distinct images and ideas about peace were presented to 
Quebeckers that demonstrate the existence of a cultural difference from those 
found in English Canada. These differences reinforce the need to examine 
Canada as a divided and changing entity, not as a singular and unified 
construction.s9 
In English Canada, the post-World War Two era saw a concerted effort on the 
part of the federal government and many ordinary Canadians to establish 
traditions and symbols that were Canada's own. 6o In large measure, this occurred 
58 Sean Mills' work on Montreal in the 1960s suggests that many Quebeckers looked to the decolonization 
movements from Africa and Asia for guidance. This international reading of their particular situation did 
not emphasize the role of the UN, but rather favoured the ideas of Frantz Fanon and others, who called on 
colonized peoples to take power for themselves. See Sean Mills, The Empire Within: Postcolonial Thought 
and Political Activism in Sixties Montreal (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 3. 
59 Himani Bannerji, "On the Dark Side of the Nation: Politics of Multiculturalism and the State of 
"Canada"," Journal of Canadian Studies 31, no. 3 (1996): 105; Bhabha, Nation and Narration, 2; Mackey, 
The House of Difference: Cultural politics and national identity in Canada, 2; Ian McKay, "After Canada: 
On Amnesia and Apocalypse in the Contemporary Crisis," Acadiensis 28, no. 1 (1998): 80; Ian McKay, 
"The Canadian passive revolution, 1840-1950," Capital and Class 34, no. 3 (2010): 374. 
60Eric Hobsbawm's work on the "invented traditions" of nations demonstrates how states and often citizens 
have consciously chosen to adopt certain markers as signifying a nation. He points to symbols like national 
anthems, flags, and cartoon representations as exemplars of how modem peoples come to adopt certain 
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because the federal government, and those who supported its policies, sought to 
create distance between Canada and Britain. Whereas at the turn of the century 
the Conservative Party in particular had encouraged Canadians to "remain 
nestled in the Union Jack behind the British lion,"61 by the 1950s, a different 
generation sought a Canadian identity that might fit within the British 
Commonwealth but that was distinctly Canadian. 62 The changing focus from 
Dominion Day to Canada Day, the flag debate, and the de-emphasizing of Empire 
Day are all indicative of this shift.63 Jose Igartua's work on English Canadian 
national identity argues that by the 1960s English Canada had undergone a 
transformation that saw civic values being espoused that made no reference to a 
British heritage.64 Peacekeeping's multiple discourses permitted its ready 
adoption to this new emphasis on Canadian symbols and values. 65 As each 
words and images to represent their nation in its totality. There are elements of the peacekeeping narrative 
that certainly fit his definition of an invented tradition: peacekeeping was used to symbolize social cohesion 
in Canada; it legitimized the Canadian Forces and their overseas role both during and after the Cold War; 
and it also served as a device to inculcate certain beliefs, values, and behaviours that were said to be typical 
of all Canadians. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), Introduction. 
61 Patricia K. Wood, "Defining "Canadian": Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's 
Nationalism," Journal of Canadian Studies 36, no. 2 (2001): 50. 
62 Some scholars posit that a strong attachment to Britain continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. See 
C.P. Champion, "Eminent Pearsonians: Britishness, Anti-Britishness, and Canadianism," Journal of the 
Canadian Historical Association 16, no. 1 (2005). 
63 Matthew Hayday, "Fireworks, Folk-dancing, and Fostering a National Identity: The Politics of Canada 
Day," The Canadian Historical Review 91, no. 2 (2010). 
64See Chapter Five, "When Tories Roar," in Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in 
English Canada, 1945-71. 
65These new symbols did not operate in a complete vacuum. The red-coated member of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, the Mountie, is perhaps Canada's best known national symbol, and its utility as a 
Canadian symbol endured through the middle decades of the twentieth century. Considerable work has 
been done on the ways in which Mounties have been used to symbolize Canada's past. The Mountie and 
the peacekeeper differed in that the former connoted peace and order within Canada, while the latter 
brought peace and order to other countries. The existence of the progressive discourse of peacekeeping was 
another difference between the two. Mounties represented a simplified and nostalgic imagining of Canada's 
past which froze gender relations in the Victorian era and separated white Canadians from ethnic 
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chapter demonstrates, the actual experiences of soldiers on these missions 
mattered little to those who used the narratives of the nostalgic past, functionalist 
present, or progressive future to create Canada as a peacekeeping nation. This 
abstraction made peacekeeping a more influential idea than might otherwise 
have been possible. 66 
As peacekeeping became a symbol of Canada largely through domestic frames 
that were nonetheless influenced by international events, so, too, did English 
Canadians try to define themselves in terms that nonetheless were influenced by 
anti-American sentiment. Perhaps the best-known example of this mode of 
thought is George Grant's Lament for a Nation. Appearing in 1965, Grant's book 
argued that Canada would be swallowed up by the United States in the near 
future if it did not take more control over its foreign policies. 67 Akin to these 
views, peacekeeping has been seen as a policy that separated Canada from a more 
aggressive American foreign policy. Historians such as Jack Granatstein have 
countered this by emphasizing that there would not be any UN peacekeeping 
"enemies." The peacekeeper was a figure that looked forward - into a future that was free of war. See 
Michael Dawson, The Mountie: From Dime Novel to Disney (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1998); Michael 
Dawson, ""That nice red coat goes to my head like champagne": Gender, antimodemism and the Mountie 
image, 1880-1960," Journal of Canadian Studies 32, no. 3 (1997); Mark Kristmanson, "Love your 
neighbour: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the National Film Board, 1948-53," Film History 
10( 1998); Mackey, The House of Difference: Cultural politics and national identity in Canada; Carolyn 
Strange and Tina Loo, "From Hewers of Wood to Producers of Pulp: True Crime in Canadian Pulp 
Magazines of the 1940s," Journal of Canadian Studies 37, no. 2 (2002); Keith Walden, Visions of Order: 
The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth (Toronto: Butterworth, 1982). 
66 Examining the views of Canada's peacekeepers could offer insights into how the members of the Armed 
Forces actively sought to distance themselves from these domestic narratives. This would be a worthwhile 
project that would add to our understanding of peacekeeping in Canada. 
67 George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1965), 4. For other examples of this attitude, see James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-
monkey: Canada's role in a revolutionary world (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1960); 
Palmer, Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era. 
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without the active support of the United States. 68 Again, this highlights the 
amorphous nature of the idea of peacekeeping. Those who wanted to separate 
themselves from US foreign policies have been able to do so through employing 
each of the three peacekeeping discourses. The nostalgic discourse emphasized 
Canada's acting as an independent broker at the UN, the functionalist discourse 
suggested that only "middle powers" like Canada could undertake UN 
peacekeeping, and the progressive discourse foresaw a day when no superpowers 
would be able to take aggressive international action without gaining the 
approval of the UN. 
The main purpose of this historical investigation is not to refute the 
hegemonic peacekeeping narrative. Like all national narratives, it has some basis 
in fact but is found lacking in accuracy when examined critically. Rather, this 
dissertation seeks to problematize the Canadian association with peacekeeping by 
exploring the ways in which messages about peacekeeping were transmitted to 
Canadians through a variety of different media. It also explores the variations in 
the peacekeeping narrative which occurred in each different format, as well as the 
presence of counter-narratives which sought to clarify what was obscured by this 
hegemonic understanding of Canada and peacekeeping. 
Each chapter of this dissertation examines a different set of sources to 
understand how politicians, textbook authors, NFB filmmakers, newspaper 
writers, and editorial cartoonists drew upon the nostalgic, functionalist, and 
68He is quite right in arguing that the US has significantly contributed to the financial cost of peacekeeping 
and has provided considerable logistical support on many operations. Granatstein, Who Killed the 
Canadian Military? , 23. 
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progressive peacekeeping discourses. As stated earlier, each chapter moves 
progressively further away from direct governmental influence over the content 
of authorial messages, and all five chapters address content that was intended for 
mass audiences. Knowing more about how each of these different media utilized 
the three peacekeeping discourses significantly increases our ability to 
understand why some Canadians would have adopted peacekeeping as a national 
symbol. 
The first chapter in this dissertation examines peacekeeping's use in Canadian 
political rhetoric from 1956 to 1997. Peacekeeping was a well-publicized part of 
Canadian foreign policy during those years. This chapter focuses primarily on the 
rhetoric of the Liberal and PC Parties, as they were the parties in power federally. 
This increased their ability to employ peacekeeping as a policy and a symbol. The 
Bloc Quebecois' views on peacekeeping are also examined to demonstrate how 
pervasive the three peacekeeping discourses had become after 1968.69 
The majority of the sources used in this chapter are political speeches. To add 
to the speeches of politicians such as Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, John 
Diefenbaker, Howard Green, Paul Martin Sr., and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 
Statements and Speeches, an official periodical published by the DEA, was also 
examined, as were government publications regarding foreign and defence 
policies released by the DEA or the Department of National Defence [DND]. In 
69 This source base, admittedly, leads to a bias towards the views of whichever party was in power 
federally, particularly after 1967. This also means that the political rhetoric examined is mostly drawn from 
urban politicians. There could potentially be different discourses used in Quebec and in rural Canada by 
backbenchers. However, given the availability of sources and the scope of this dissertation, such a project 
will have to be undertaken elsewhere. 
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addition, the Parti Quebecois' official party platforms as well as the literature it 
distributed before the referenda of 1980 and 1995, were examined. When 
combined, these examples of political rhetoric can tell us a great deal about how 
peacekeeping was engrained into Canadian culture. These conceptions were not 
static, and this chapter examines how changes in Canada's domestic political 
climate often had more of an impact on how peacekeeping was presented by 
politicians than the results of the peacekeeping missions themselves. 
Chapter Two examines the content of high school history textbooks from 1959 
to 1997. For this dissertation, an exhaustive study was undertaken regarding the 
peacekeeping discourses employed in over 99 textbooks. These texts were 
approved for use in high schools in French and English Canada during these 
years.7° Peacekeeping's integration into these texts occurred through the use of 
the nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive discourses by individual authors. 
Though history textbooks focused primarily on the past, contemporary politics 
also influenced the discussions within their pages. As well, because these works 
were aimed at a younger audience, they often sought to promote behaviours akin 
to peacekeeping to their readers that emphasized the future utility of 
peacekeeping. A glimpse into these processes is possible through letters to the 
Federal Government from students and teachers from 1956 to 1997. By focusing 
70 In education historiography, authors have often chosen to limit their studies to English Canada or 
Quebec, since the later went through changes in the 1950s and 1960s that were particular to its own 
circumstances decades after such changes took place in the other provinces. Quality studies that have 
looked at only English Canada include Northop Frye, Design for Learning: Reports submitted to the Joint 
Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and the University of Toronto (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1962); AB. Hodgetts and Paul Gallagher, Teaching Canada for the '80s (Toronto: OISE, 
1978); Hilda Neatby, So Little for the Mind (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1953). 
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on textbook contents and supplementing this with what was written in letters by 
students and teachers, it is possible to see how and why peacekeeping was 
included as a topic in these texts, though further insights remain elusive. 
The third chapter of this dissertation examines fourteen documentaries made 
by the NFB that either focused exclusively on Canadian peacekeeping efforts or 
had peacekeeping as a central theme. For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
films have been divided into two time periods: 1957 to 1965 and 1980 to 1994. 
Those from the earlier time period employed functionalist and progressive 
language and imagery to link peacekeeping to a contemporary Canadian identity. 
Later films maintained their functionalist emphases but offered more critical 
evaluations of peacekeeping. In this later period, the peacekeepers were 
presented as exemplary professionals, not a synecdoche for Canada as a whole, 
suggesting that filmmakers were uncertain about the directions of Canada's 
foreign policy. 
The NFB films about peacekeeping examined in this chapter demonstrate the 
utility of the progressive, functionalist, and nostalgic peacekeeping discourses. In 
a visual medium, they remained the preferred manner in which to frame 
peacekeeping. They also permitted filmmakers to employ narrative techniques 
that linked the images that appeared on screen about peacekeeping to Canada's 
national identity. 
Chapter Four examines major articles, editorials, and letters to the editor in 
eleven daily newspapers to explore how authors employed and influenced the 
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three peacekeeping narratives. These sections contained the opinions of each 
paper as well as the selected opinions of Canadians who chose to write to a 
newspaper about peacekeeping. A considerable sample of newspaper and reader 
opinions has been accumulated, and from this, larger conclusions can be drawn 
about how meanings surrounding peacekeeping were created and negotiated. 
In the late 1950s, the combined circulation of all daily newspapers was higher 
than the number of households in Canada, and while these numbers would 
decline, newspaper sales remained strong through to the 199os.71 Perhaps the 
two most important centres for newspaper publishing in Canada were, and 
remain, Toronto and Montreal, and from these cities, the Toronto Star, the Globe 
and Mail, Le Devoir, La Presse, and the Montreal Gazette were all examined. 
Other important regional papers used are the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, the 
Winnipeg Free Press, the Calgary Herald, the Vancouver Sun, the Regina Leader-
Post, and the Ottawa Citizen. The date ranges examined for each newspaper 
match those described earlier in this introduction, and are related to the 
beginnings or conclusions of Canada's major peacekeeping involvements. 
Through these papers, taken as a whole, it is possible to ascertain whether or not 
there were differences of opinion among newsmakers in English and French 
Canada regarding peacekeeping and whether the same language about 
peacekeeping was to be found across the country. 
71 Paul Rutherford, The Making of the Canadian Media (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 84. 
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By producing and disseminating the three peacekeeping discourses, the news 
media carried an import that they were not often eager to admit.72 However, the 
use of the three discourses of peacekeeping by newspapers helped Canadians to 
make sense of the messages they received and to link peacekeeping to Canada's 
national identity.73 
The editorial cartoons that appeared in the newspapers used in Chapter Four 
form the set of sources for Chapter Five. The cartoons are examined in a 
chronological manner, within the same date ranges.74 Presenting conceptions of 
peacekeeping visually rather than through written narratives allowed these 
cartoons to offer divergent ideas about peacekeeping. The satirical nature of the 
editorial cartoon genre also meant that they were a source of considerable 
criticism of the functionality of peacekeeping from 1956 through 1997. 
Early editorial cartoons helped create and disseminate visual forms for 
peacekeeping to their audiences in an era when access to television was restricted 
for some Canadians. 75 The cartoons that appeared throughout the forty-year 
period that spans this dissertation attempted to make connections with viewers 
72 For a discussion on why the news media tend to think of themselves as reflections of the societies in 
which they exist, rather than active agents in the creation of those societies see Robert Karl Manoff and 
Michael Schudson, eds., Reading the News: A Pantheon Guide to Popular Culture (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986). 
73 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York: Verso, 1991); John N. Thompson, The Media and Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1995), 8. 
74 1 November-31December1956;14-19 October 1957; 1 July-15September1960; 15 February-15 
May 1964; 15 May - 15 June 1967; 1 March - 1 June 1993; 1 June - 31 July 1997. The date range from 30 
September - 2 October 1988, when UN peacekeeping was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, did not lead to 
any editorial cartoons. 
75 Paul Rutherford, When Television Was Young: Primetime Canada, 1952 -- 1967 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1990), 49. By 1956, just over half of all Canadian households had access to a television set, 
a remarkable feat considering that the first CBC broadcast was in 1952. 
by employing particular images that were drawn from the functionalist and 
progressive discourses about Canada and peacekeeping. Through their single 
panels, cartoons helped many Canadians understand that peacekeeping was 
more complex than it was often presented as being, and created a space where 
Canadian attachment to peacekeeping could be challenged. 
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This dissertation demonstrates that the nostalgic, functionalist, and 
progressive peacekeeping discourses allowed for the creation of a language and 
imagery that Canadians used to associate peacekeeping with their national 
identity. This makes these discourses central to how and why so many Canadians 
came to think of themselves as the world's "Blue Berets." The sources examined, 
governmental or otherwise, were often more than willing to criticize the actual 
performance of Canadians on peacekeeping operations. These discussions could 
lapse into negative over-simplifications of race and citizenship, and this rather 
dark part of peacekeeping's history in Canada should be remembered as an 
equally important element in the history of peacekeeping in Canada. It was, 
instead, these sources' willingness to separate peacekeeping from the operations 
themselves that permitted peacekeeping's continued symbolic relevance. 
Peacekeeping, therefore, was not something that politicians "sold" to 
Canadians, nor was it an example of Canadians' naively believing that they were 
better than other peoples. Instead, peacekeeping became a concept that could 
symbolize a longing for a particular vision of Canada's past, a belief in the policies 
of a government in the present, or a desire for a better future. Until we recognize 
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that this was occurring as a process of negotiation among particular politicians, 
book authors, filmmakers, newspaper columnists, political cartoonists, and their 
audiences, we will fail to understand why peacekeeping was so important to so 
many Canadians from 1956 to 1997, and why it remains a contested part of 
Canada's identity today. 
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Chapter One 
"We Want Our Own Kind of Peace"76: The Political Rhetoric of Peacekeeping, 
1956 - 1997 
Figure 1.1 Time-Screenl.Thought-Space, Charles Gagnon, 197 5. 
In the lobby of the Lester Pearson Building in Ottawa, home to what is now 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT], previously 
the Department of External Affairs [DEA], there hangs a three-panel mural 
painted by Montreal-based abstract expressionist Charles Gagnon. Titled Time-
Screen/Thought-Space, it was commissioned in 1972 as part of the Public Works 
Fine Art Programme which brought contemporary art into government 
buildings.77 The subject of the mural is the life and career of Lester Pearson. The 
presence of such a large a~d abstract work in a government building seems at 
odds with the image that the DEA often strove to project throughout the post-
World War Two period. It acts, however, as a visual reminder of how Pearson and 
76 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 13. "The Four Faces of Peace," 1957. 
77Catherine Anderson-Dolcini, "One-Percent for Whom? Canada's Public Works Fine Art Programme, 
1964-1978: Its Rise and Demise" (Carleton University, 2000), iii. 
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his most celebrated creation, United Nations peacekeeping, have taken on 
symbolic meanings in Canada. Beyond simply the functional, Time-
Screen/Thoug ht-Space expresses abstract understandings of peacekeeping which 
link it to Canada's national identity in the past, present, and future. 
This artwork is massive; its three panels stretch over twelve metres in length. 
The mural is covered with words and phrases that imagine Canada's past by 
highlighting the diplomatic triumphs of the Pearson era, assess the value of 
Pearson's ideas about peace and peacekeeping in the present, and call for 
Canadians to do everything possible to make the future more peaceful. Signposts 
from Pearson's public life, including the words "Nobel Peace Prize nineteen fifty-
seven" in the first panel and "Korea and Suez" in the second, invite the viewer to 
recall Canada's "golden age" of diplomacy between 1945 and 1957 and realize that 
no Canadian since has received similar international recognition. These words 
are intermixed with those intimating the continued relevance of Pearson's ideas 
in the present such as: "Misunderstanding arising from fear remains the greatest 
enemy of peace." Gagnon's work also speaks to the future relevance of Pearson's 
thinking by using a quotation from French existentialist Albert Camus which 
states: « La vraie generosite envers l'avenir consiste a tout donner au present. » 78 
These words offer hope for a modestly better world if the UN were allowed to 
intervene to end conflicts around the globe. All this appears on a canvas that is 
painted in varying shades of grey, creating a camouflage effect in the background. 
78 This phrase was known to be one of Pearson's favourites and he spoke it often to colleagues at the DEA. 
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That Pearson's legacy in Canada could be open to such an abstract and 
temporally multifaceted interpretation demonstrates the importance of the three 
modes of peacekeeping discourse that are central to this dissertation. 
The mural's history has largely been forgotten, in both a literal and 
metaphorical sense, by the contemporary DFAIT. As recently as the spring of 
2012, Time-Screen/Thought-Space was not labeled in the lobby of the Pearson 
Building. Official records identified it as the "Lester Pearson Memorial," but not 
by its proper name.79 In addition, it is no longer possible for the public to 
photograph this mural. Instead, official photos must be requested and 
bureaucratic action taken to gain any glimpse of Gagnon's work. The lack of 
concern for this mural also indicates a departure from peacekeeping and the 
Pearsonian legacy by Canada's government in recent years.so 
At its unveiling in 1975, however, this mural was celebrated. Pearson passed 
away in 1973 and two years later, in June, Time-Screen/Thought-Space was 
placed in the lobby of the Pearson Building. Those in attendance agreed that it 
was a fitting tribute to the late Prime Minister. Mitchell Sharp, the former 
External Affairs Minister, spoke to an audience that included Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau, Pearson's wife Maryon, and Pearson's PC rival John Diefenbaker. 
Like the piece of art he was there to unveil, Sharp's words spanned a long-ranging 
79This is from the author's correspondence with Amy Miville from Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 25 April 2012. 
8° For more on the current government's movement away from peacekeeping as a policy, see McKay and 
Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety. 
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period, making reference to events from the 1920s through to 1975. 81 He recalled 
how Pearson had been the "architect of Canada's multilateral diplomacy." Despite 
his own government's hesitations about peacekeeping, Sharp averred that most of 
the current Liberal government's foreign policy initiatives were based on 
Pearsonian ideas, if only "in a germinal state." He further argued that Pearson 
had been committed to a progressive vision of the future. He believed that 
Pearson saw "the whole international community" embracing a unified 
movement for peace. 
Gagnon described Time-Screen/ Thought-Space as a "spiritual telegram" to 
Lester Pearson. 82 This implies that he believed all Canadians should continue to 
think about Canada's irenic role as Pearson did. It also implies that for Gagnon, 
the Liberal vision of Canadian foreign policy continued to be the most salient. 
Quotations taken from, and about, Pearson's life ascribed distinct characteristics 
to the former Prime Minister and to Canada as a nation. Because he was a key 
member and later leader of the Liberal Party, Pearson's words and ideas could 
not be fully separated from his political career. Despite this strong attachment to 
Pearson and the Liberal Party, peacekeeping managed to transcend partisan lines 
and become a symbol of Canada's national identity. 
Time-Screen/Thought-Space and its unveiling provide an entry point into 
understanding how peacekeeping was expressed in Canada's political rhetoric 
from 1956 to 1997. This rhetoric was often responsive to, and not responsible for, 
81 Department of External Affairs, "A Monument More Enduring Than Bronze," Statements and Speeches 
75, no. 23 (1975). 
82 Eric Bergbusch, "Time-Screen, Thought-Space," Ottawa Citizen, 27 August 2000. 
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the language and imagery used to describe peacekeeping. Mass media, 
particularly the newspapers that will be examined in Chapter Four, were quicker 
to link Canada's peacekeeping action to the country's national identity. But the 
statements and speeches made by politicians to various Canadian audiences lent 
their words an air of legitimacy. Hence, when they talked of a Canadian "golden 
age" of foreign policy, the present value of peacekeeping, or a desire to use the 
UN to bring about a better world, Canadians often voiced their agreement. More 
cynically, politicians often used peacekeeping as a vote-getting tool. But certain, 
though by no means all, prime ministers and their governments conveyed a 
genuine commitment to the possibilities that peacekeeping offered the world, and 
Canada as a "middle power." It is therefore crucial to first know how politicians 
described peacekeeping before delving into how mass media shared or deviated 
from these descriptions. 
This chapter examines five different periods between 1956 and 1997 to 
demonstrate how politicians made symbolic links between peacekeeping and a 
Canadian national identity. It argues that they did so by employing nostalgic, 
functional, or progressive language to describe peacekeeping to their Canadian 
audiences. The successes or failures of specific peacekeeping operations and their 
impact on the host population were regularly ignored in favour of larger 
discussions that centred on peacekeeping's value to Canadians. And while 
criticisms could be found in the political rhetoric of peacekeeping, politicians' 
willingness to reminisce about Canada's past peacekeeping glories, or opine 
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about the possibilities of peacekeeping creating a more peaceful world in the 
future permitted them to tell their audiences that Canadians were a nation of 
"Blue Berets." These claims found widespread acceptance, particularly in English 
Canada. 
One speech about peacekeeping cannot provide sufficient insight into how the 
term was used by politicians in Canada or why certain messages were better 
received by audiences than others. This is because political discussions of 
peacekeeping invested considerable symbolic meaning into the term. 83 Political 
speeches are delivered orally; but the records examined for this dissertation often 
remain silent about the numbers of people in attendance and the physical spaces 
in which the speeches were given. Political messages are also delivered through 
official government publications on a subject as well as in radio or television 
addresses. Rather than seeing these messages as part of a peacekeeping myth, 
this chapter argues that these discourses employed language designed to elicit 
specific responses from their audiences. In other words, by looking at a large 
body of speeches, public addresses, and government publications we can glean 
the political rhetoric of peacekeeping. 84 Messages that were consistent over long 
periods of time or found multi party support are used throughout this chapter to 
demonstrate how the three peacekeeping discourses blended with discussions of 
83 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1985), 6. 
84 The value of examining a wide array of speeches and publications is expressed in Kenneth Burke, A 
Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950); George N. 
Dionisopolous and Steven R. Goldzwig, ""The Meaning of Vietnam": Political Rhetoric as Revisionist 
Cultural History," Quarterly Journal of Speech 78(1992). 
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Canada's national identity at different times. This lends these words considerable 
rhetorical value regarding why and how peacekeeping came to be seen as a 
marker of a Canadian national identity. 
Kenneth Burke saw rhetoric as an instrument used by members of a social 
group to try to promote social cohesion.as He felt that audiences were the key to 
understanding why certain messages were well received and others were rejected. 
By emphasizing the messages contained in political speeches, government 
publications, and radio or television addresses and their reception, rather than 
the speaker, this chapter argues that "trivial repetition and dull daily 
reinforcement" were often more effective methods of conveying political 
messages than "exceptional rhetorical skill."86 Canadian who listened to or read a 
political message about peacekeeping had to consider "what they fe[lt] about 
themselves before, [and] how it fit into their understandings of themselves and 
the world around them."87 The rhetoric of peacekeeping presented Canada as a 
nation of "Blue Berets." To identify oneself with this nation required very little; 
some people volunteered to join the Canadian Forces and actively participated in 
UN peacekeeping, while the majority of Canadians affirmed their self-conception 
as part of a nation of "Blue Berets" by supporting the UN and Canada's 
peacekeeping efforts through voting for a major political party that endorsed 
peacekeeping. 
85 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, xiv. 
86 Ibid., 26. 
87 Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Quebecois," The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 73, no. 2 (1987): 138. 
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But Canadians were not a singular audience. English Canadian audiences 
were far more likely to hear politicians discuss peacekeeping than were French 
Canadians. This was partially owing to the Liberal Party's belief that Quebec was 
a stronghold of theirs that did not require discussions of foreign policy. 88 All the 
major political parties were also hesitant to discuss international interventions to 
Quebecois audiences because of continued fears stemming from the Mackenzie 
King era about the province's preference for isolationism. 89 This lack of 
discussion did not mean that the people of Quebec were ambivalent about 
peacekeeping. As the Bloc Quebecois found when they released their party 
platforms, UN peacekeeping was a popular policy across French Canada as well. 
However, peacekeeping's support as a policy and its relationship to a Canadian 
national identity were different in English and French Canada, as this chapter 
will show. 
The frequency of messages about peacekeeping from 1956 to 1997, as well as 
the shared use of language among politicians and mass media, helped 
peacekeeping to become part of Canada's national symbology. What this suggests 
is that audiences constructed themselves and the Canada they remembered and 
desired as a peacekeeping nation in part because of what their politicians said 
during these years. It also suggests that symbolic conceptions of Canada's 
interests in peacekeeping were a powerful constitutive force in Canada during 
88 Lester Pearson notes as much in his memoirs. See Lester Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right 
Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 16. 
89 This view was not exclusive to politicians. See Roussel and Boucher, "The Myth of the Pacific Society: 
Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture," 165. 
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this period, allowing peacekeeping to remain a useful rhetorical tool that 
politicians could employ despite the failings and shortcomings of many actual 
peacekeeping operations. 
Peacekeeping's Rhetorical Beginnings, 1956 to 1957 
In 1956, politicians were among the earliest groups of people to discuss 
peacekeeping. Lester Pearson's speech to the United Nations on 2 November 
1956 explaining his government's abstention from voting to censure the British, 
the French, and the Israelis regarding their invasion of the Suez Canal zone in 
Egypt was not the first political speech about peacekeeping, though it was 
arguably the most significant. Pearson had been an important part of Canada's 
UN delegation since 1945, including serving as the President of the General 
Assembly in 1952. Accordingly, he was very familiar to the diplomats assembled 
at the UN that night. Pearson stood up in the Assembly in New York in the early 
hours of the morning and told his audience that the world needed action, "not 
only to end the fighting but to make peace. "9° He then pleaded his case for the 
creation of an international peace and police force which Canada would help to 
supply with troops and equipment. It was a timely solution to an international 
situation that was growing more tense by the hour as the United States and the 
Soviet Union found common cause to denounce the British and the French 
despite their mutual Cold War antagonism. 91 Pearson spoke again the following 
90 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 11. "Middle East," 1956. 
91 For more on these events and their importance, see John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester 
Pearson Volume If: 1949 - 1972 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1992); Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of 
the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3. 
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day as the proposal for a peacekeeping force was debated in the General 
Assembly. When a resolution was unanimously passed calling for the creation of 
UNEF, an act of inspired diplomatic manoeuvring became a reality. 
Pearson's dramatic speeches at the UN set the initial framework for 
governmental discussions of peacekeeping. But daily newspapers across Canada 
quickly came out either for or against Pearson's proposal and Canada's lack of 
support for the British and French invasion of Egypt. For the next three weeks, 
the press seemed in control of the rhetoric of peacekeeping. They were eager to 
use UNEF as a symbol of Canadian independence or of Canada's having turned 
its back on its "mother countries." These were not new ideas. The flag debate, 
arguments over the celebration of Victoria Day, and changes to Canadian 
immigration laws had all provoked similar divisions among Canadians since the 
Second World War. 92 Peacekeeping therefore became another symbolic battle for 
Canada's national identity. 
This conceptual framing meant Pearson and St. Laurent's Liberal Government 
were attacked by the Opposition PCs despite the international acclaim that 
Pearson was receiving for his actions. On 26 November, the House of Commons 
met in an emergency session to discuss the funding of the Canadian peacekeeping 
contingent. Over the next few days, the PCs, led by leadership candidate John 
Diefenbaker, vehemently attacked St. Laurent and Pearson. By 1956, Diefenbaker 
was a long-serving member from Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, and he saw an 
92 See lgartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945- 7 1. 
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opportunity to improve his chances of becoming the leader of his party, 
something he had failed to do since 1942. He accused St. Laurent of betraying 
Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden and for not recognizing the threat that 
the "new Hitler,'' Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, represented to the safety 
and security of the world. 93 Diefenbaker was a fiery political speaker and his 
accusations echoed through Parliament, challenging the government to respond. 
It was St. Laurent who responded to these attacks. The Prime Minister had 
been in office since 1948 and had developed the image of a kind "Uncle Louis" on 
the campaign trail; he was a seasoned lawyer and a strong if formal public 
speaker. However, St. Laurent did himself and his party no favours by telling his 
PC critics that he had been scandalized by the larger powers of the world, "who 
have all too frequently treated the Charter of the United Nations as an instrument 
with which to regiment smaller nations." 94 He went on to suggest that "the era 
when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world is coming pretty 
close to an end." While few observers of the international scene could object to 
his words themselves, they were anathema to some English Canadians who clung 
to an older conception of Canada being a junior partner in the British Empire. 
UNEF, therefore, became a serious test for Canada's foreign policies, though 
Canada's leading political figures chose to employ terms like "independence" and 
93 Eden was vociferous in his condemnations of Nasser and often invoked Hitler and the 1938 Prague 
appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain as a cautionary tale for how not to deal with a leader. These 
sentiments were echoed in the House of Commons by Diefenbaker during the 29 November session in the 
House of Commons. See LAC, John Diefenbaker Fonds, volume 12 F451, "The Middle East Crisis," 1956. 
94 
"Painful Departure," Montreal Gazette, Wednesday 28 November 1956, 8. 
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"mother country" more than they described the actual needs of the peacekeepers 
or the Egyptians. 
Canadian politicians had been discussing the possibility of a UN police force 
since that international body was created in 1945.95 Many Canadians saw the 
soldiers they committed to the UN force that had been sent to Korea from 1950 to 
1953 as being akin to a police force though it was actually a United States-led 
army. 96 UNEF, unlike the Korean Force, was introduced in order to separate two 
sides that had been in a conflict but had declared a cease-fire. Both parties 
acknowledged Canada's prior commitments to UN action, and Diefenbaker noted 
that UNEF was a "step in the right direction."97 Because the post-World War Two 
belief in the value of the UN was shared by all of Canada's major political parties, 
Diefenbaker would have had to challenge Canada's foreign policy priorities if he 
had chosen not to support UNEF. Instead, he stated that something akin to 
UNEF "has been the dream and hope of mankind." This allowed many Canadians 
who listened to the political speeches of the Liberal and PC Parties in the fall and 
winter of 1956 to place this new peacekeeping action conceptually within a longer 
tradition of Canadian action through the United Nations. 
Diefenbaker tried to steal some of Pearson's newly acquired international 
credit for himself by pointing out that he had suggested a UN police force be sent 
95 Pearson notes that Louis St. Laurent discussed the idea at the first assembly of the UN in 1946. See 
Library and Archives Canada, Lester Pearson Fonds, "The Middle East Crisis and the Situation in 
Hungary," 1956. 
96 For more on Canadian attitudes towards the Korean force, see Chapter Five, "Korea: From An Imperial 
Frying Pan into an American Fire" in Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United 
States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea. 
97 LAC, John Diefenbaker Fonds, "The Middle East Crisis," 1956. 
52 
into the Middle East on 31January1956. In the Commons, he quoted from 
Hansard and proclaimed that "if what was done on November 2 had been 
brought back before the United Nations earlier the tragic beginnings of this 
situation as Israel marched might have been averted." 98 Pearson readily 
acknowledged Diefenbaker's proposal while pointing out that many people had 
called for such a force in the past but that no one had been able to bring about its 
creation until UNEF was formed in November. Though ostensibly discussing the 
Middle East during this debate, these politicians were clearly prioritizing what 
was taking place in Ottawa instead of the events in Egypt that precipitated the 
creation of UNEF. 
When Nasser and the Egyptians would not permit the Queen's Own Rifles to 
be the Canadian contingent in UNEF because their name and uniforms were 
identical to those of the British, the PCs quickly judged that the present value of 
UNEF could be debated and that claiming conceptual ownership was not where 
they were going to score political gains. PC MPs wondered why Canada had 
betrayed its ally and then allowed its participation in UNEF to be dictated by a 
man who Diefenbaker felt wanted to "take over the Middle East and then, having 
done that, to take over Africa, [and] to mobilize the people of the Moslem [sic] 
world."99 They accordingly centred their attacks on the Prime Minister and 
Pearson for not supporting Canada's "mother country," Britain, focusing on St. 




Igartua has described as "a litmus test of Canada's sense of place on the 
international scene, of Canadian values, and of national unity."100 
Pearson was accused of having become a "chore boy" for the Americans, an 
old Tory tactic employed to attack Liberal opponents.101 The PCs also made 
appeals to Canada's British heritage. Diefenbaker and company shook their heads 
at how Pearson had "condemned" the British at the UN as though they were no 
better than the Soviet Union. Pearson, it should be noted, never voiced more than 
"regret" over the use of military force in his public statements about the Suez 
Crisis. This exaggeration of what Pearson stated eventually made the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs angry enough to respond openly in the House and 
attack those who would have had Canada say, "ready, aye, ready," whenever 
Britain engaged in foreign adventures, however ill-conceived. Instead, Pearson 
stated that the Canadian hope at the UN and in UNEF was to play "as 
constructive a role as possible."102 Though UNEF was not actually Pearson's idea, 
and he needed the support of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to make it 
100 Iga1tua's work on this topic is the most thorough to date. He combines a discussion of the political 
speeches about the Suez Crisis with an examination of Canadian daily press editorial opinions. See Igartua, 
The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71, 118. Earlier studies in the 
1960s made regular mention of the Parliamentary debate on 26 November but have rarely looked beyond 
this date. See Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century, 1867-1967 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 
1970); Blair Fraser, The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1967); 
Gordon, ed. Canada's Role as a Middle Power; Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: 
Middle Power or Satellite; Taylor, Cox, and Granatstein, eds., Peacekeeping: International Challenge and 
Canadian Response 
101 For a discussion of these tactics during the 1896 election, see Wood, "Defining "Canadian": Anti-
Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism." 
102 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 11. "The Middle East Crisis," 1956. 
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work, the claims that Pearson was in the pocket of the Americans regarding 
UNEF were unfounded politicking.103 
The debate over Canadian independence became one of the larger issues 
during the 1957 federal election. 104 Arguments over the construction of the 
Trans-Canada oil pipeline in June of 1956 framed it as a struggle for Canadian 
independence, with the PCs questioning the Liberal choice of routes for the 
pipeline and how it was to be financed. C.D. Howe, the Minister of Trade and 
Commerce, was widely criticized for pushing the Liberal plan for having 
American-owned companies control a large share in the pipeline. When the 
government imposed closure on the pipeline debate, the PCs called St. Laurent 
and his government arrogant and subservient to the Americans. The creation of 
UNEF was linked to the pipeline debate and the Liberals were faced with similar 
attacks about relying too much on the Americans in their handling of the Suez 
Crisis. 
St. Laurent was seventy-five years old and his energy on the campaign trail 
often lagged. Pearson, despite the tensions that had surrounded his efforts to 
create UNEF, became a valuable speaker for the Liberals thanks to his high 
profile. The Secretary of State for External Affairs often spoke about foreign 
policy during the campaign, though it was rarely the only topic in his speeches. 
Instead, UNEF was used as the latest example of the strong Liberal record in 
103Pearson openly acknowledged that the idea was not his own. See Library and Archives Canada, Lester 
Pearson Fonds, "The Middle East Crisis and the Situation in Hungary," 1956. 
104 The CCF was a strong suppo11er of Canada's efforts through the UN. Because they did not form the 
government or the official opposition, the speeches of their leaders have not been included in this chapter. 
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improving the lives of Canadians. Pearson focused on the gains made since 1945 
in Canada's international standing from its engagement in the United Nations. 
His primary tactic when discussing peacekeeping was to sell Canadians a 
functional understanding that contradicted the PC portrayal of UNEF as an anti-
British policy. He noted that the PCs were being hypocritical by criticizing the 
Liberals for "knifing our best friends in the back" while also supporting UNEF, 
since the latter would not have come into existence without the former. 1os 
There were also progressive elements to Pearson's discussions of 
peacekeeping. He argued, "Canada stands today respected among nations, as a 
country which has played a good part in the search for peace and good relations 
between all peoples."106 He further averred that Canada was a "strong, united, 
and forward-looking nation." Pearson commonly centred his discussion on 
Canada's independence as a nation and its loyalty to the Western alliance system. 
Peace was the ultimate goal for what he described as his government's "Canadian 
considerations, Canadian values and Canadian interests."107 
St. Laurent did a healthy share of campaigning, and his words to Quebecois 
audiences were particularly important, given Pearson's lack of eloquence in 
French. St. Laurent took to the Radio-Canada airwaves repeatedly to discuss 
campaign issues for Quebeckers. His discussions of foreign affairs normally came 
near the end of his addresses, when he would reassure listeners that the 
Government of Canada was doing everything possible to prevent another world 
105 Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3, 18. 
106 Ibid. 
107 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 12. "Canadian Foreign Policy," 1957. 
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war. He called Canada's external policies« independante et responsable, selon 
laquelle nous nous reconnaissons les droits de differer d' opinion. »108 St. Laurent 
was also strongly anti-Communist, and his appeals normally conflated Canada's 
actions at the UN with efforts to check the spread of the Soviet Union abroad. 109 
Canada's peacekeeping role was therefore situated as part of the struggle between 
democracy and communism as well as a marker for Quebec voters of Canadian 
independence. Though English Canadian audiences would have also heard about 
Canada's efforts to check the spread of Communism, the Liberals trusted that in 
Quebec appeals to anti-Communism would be a sounder basis for justifying the 
use of Canadian troops overseas than making appeals to Canada's international 
obligations because of the continued belief that most Quebeckers held isolationist 
views.n° Quebec audiences by and large accepted this understanding of 
peacekeeping as a policy and embraced Canada's "adult" foreign policy choices if 
their overwhelming support for the Liberal Party in the 1957 election is any 
indicator. 
While voters in Quebec supported the Liberals, elsewhere St. Laurent's party 
had to contend with repeated PC attacks during the campaign. Because of its use 
as a point of attack by the PCs, "[c]ontemporary observers and politicians alike 
believed that the Liberals' stand on the Suez crisis cost them votes in the 1957 
108 LAC, Louis St. Laurent Fonds, MG26-L, volume 294. "Deuxieme programme television et radio a etre 
enregistre le vendredi 10 mai 1957," 1957. 
109 For more on St. Laurenfs anti-Communism, see Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making 
of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957. 
110 Roussel and Boucher, "The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture," 
165. 
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election."111 Yet, when the PCs won the most seats in the June 10 election, 
Diefenbaker wasted little time in stating his support for the constructive work of 
UNEF and for Canada's efforts to bring about a more peaceful future through the 
UN. While at the General Assembly on 23 September 1957, less than one year 
removed from Pearson's diplomatic triumph there, Diefenbaker took the 
opportunity to let his audience know that Canada had supplied 1200 of the 6,ooo 
total troops for UNEF, as well as mentioning the pride many Canadians felt that 
one of their compatriots, Major- General E.L.M. Burns, was the head of UNEF. In 
no way did his speech set out the roles that the Canadians were performing; only 
the large number of Canadians and their success at promoting the cessation of 
hostilities were deemed worthy of inclusion in this address. 112 Diefenbaker's 
continued attempts to take credit for the idea of UN peacekeeping demonstrate 
that he wanted to place himself at the centre of Canada's peacekeeping narrative. 
In so doing, Diefenbaker was articulating a vision of Canada as an international 
actor who was playing a valuable role on the world stage. By stating that Canada 
would not alter its international course, Diefenbaker was not asking Canadians to 
re-think their foreign policy. Instead, Canadians were encouraged to celebrate the 
achievements of UNEF and to hope for a better world in which more peace 
among nations would exist. 
When Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, it was a 
major news story, and his speech in Oslo was widely reported and was later 
111 Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71, 130. 
112 LAC, Progressive Conservative Fonds, MG 28 IV2, volume 111. "Statement to the United Nations 
General Assembly," 1957. 
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published under the title The Four Faces of Peace. In discussing UNEF during 
this speech, Pearson emphasized its bringing a modicum of respite to the Israeli-
Egyptian border, suggesting that UNEF "may have prevented a brush fire from 
becoming an all-consuming blaze at the Suez last year, and it could do so again in 
similar circumstances in the future." n3 Pearson's overall assessment of the future 
was dreary, and he appealed to the people of the world to choose peace or 
extinction. Speaking to the entire world, Pearson dwelt less upon Canada-centric 
issues, focusing more on the problems of the Cold War. Upon returning from 
Norway, Pearson was celebrated by Liberal supporters and well-wishers in 
Toronto on 18 December. Two thousand guests gathered at the Queen Elizabeth 
building of the Canadian National Exhibition to eat a dinner and listen to people 
praise Pearson and Canada's actions the previous year. By this time, 
peacekeeping had been debated and discussed by the Liberals and PCs from one 
end of the country to the other. In conjunction with the reports of the press, these 
political addresses forged many of the linguistic and symbolic links that would 
remain in use for the following forty years. 
Political Consensus in an Era of Enmity, 1958 to 1967 
During his term as Canada's Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker did not 
win many positive contemporary assessments of his government's foreign 
policy. 114 Nor have many scholars since tried to alter such views, though some 
113 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, "The Four Faces of Peace," 1957. 
114 Fraser, The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967; Peter C Newman, Renegade in Power: The 
Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963). 
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have sought to make Diefenbaker's decisions more understandable.11s A climate 
of discontent emerged soon after the Liberal defeat in 1957. Much of this arose 
out of a perceived lack of connection between Diefenbaker's words and his 
actions. Diefenbaker's campaigns centred on him and contained messages about 
"One Canada," a "New National Policy," and a "Canada of the North." Peter C. 
Newman described Diefenbaker's approach to foreign policy as "outdated" and 
overly concerned with "sloganeering."116 He believed that Diefenbaker planned 
and exploited his foreign policies for domestic political gain rather than working 
to sustain "the notion Canadians so long cherished that their country counted as 
an influential power in world affairs." Regarding his government's stance on 
peacekeeping, Diefenbaker continued to advance a progressive vision about the 
UN creating a "world police force" that would prompt the "settlement of 
international differences and disputes."117 Despite such grand pronouncements, 
he took few steps to see this vision realized. 
When the time came for Diefenbaker's government to support a new 
peacekeeping operation after unrest broke out following the Congo gaining its 
independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, there was considerable hesitation 
on the government's part. As the province of Katanga seceded, and violence 
against whites in the Congo escalated, Operation des Nations Unies au Congo 
[ ONUC] was begun.118 Diefenbaker did not wish to commit Canadian troops, and 
115 The best work on this subject is Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64. 
116 Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, 249. 
117 LAC, Burt Taylor Richardson Fonds, MG30 02896, file 57. "A Formula for Peace," 1958. 
118 See Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64. 
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at first offered to send surplus milk and pork to the Congo instead. When his 
government did finally decide to provide a contingent of bilingual signallers, 
Diefenbaker took the opportunity to travel down to New York to address the UN 
General Assembly yet again. 119 Though his audience consisted of representatives 
from around the world, Diefenbaker centred his speech on Canada. He conflated 
the Canadian experience of working towards independence with what was 
occurring in Africa in 1960 and suggested that "there are few here that can speak 
with the authority of Canada on the subject of colonialism."120 Despite the large 
differences between Canada, a white settler colony, and the newly independent 
nations of Africa, Diefenbaker made the rhetorical connection for his audience. 
Whether they scoffed at such platitudes is not clear, but Newman argues that the 
international community eventually came to see that Diefenbaker's "promises 
meant nothing more than an expression of what he would like to see happen -
not what he intended to do."121 
The PCs also maintained their constructive emphasis when discussing 
peacekeeping. Diefenbaker noted in 1960, as he had in 1957, that Canada would 
assume "an equitable share" of the burden of international peacekeeping. He also 
felt that Canada could serve as a model for other nations because of its policy of 
119 Diefenbaker described this address as his "most impo1tant statement on Canadian external relations." 
This may have been because he spoke immediately after a fiery diatribe had been delivered by Soviet 
General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Diefenbaker took considerable time in his speech to denounce 
Communism before addressing UN peacekeeping. John Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right 
Honourable John G. Diefenbaker: The Years of Achievement, 1957 - 1962 (Toronto: Macmillan 1976), 
121. 
120 LAC, Burt Taylor Richardson Fonds, MG30 D2896, file 58. "Congo Speech," 1960. 
121 Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, 250. 
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having a battalion of its armed forces on standby for use in UN operations. Such 
policies received the support of the Liberal Party in part because they were 
continuations of those undertaken while they were in office. This made 
peacekeeping a foreign policy with consensus support in an era of considerable 
political enmity. Framing peacekeeping in such a manner is also a reminder that 
for all his rhetorical flourish, Diefenbaker and his government did commit 
Canada to UN peacekeeping because they regarded it as a useful policy.122 
Lester Pearson's Liberals strengthened the symbolic links between 
peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. Pearson wrote in his memoirs that 
he was reluctant to exploit his Nobel Peace Prize for political gains, but his 
campaign speeches, as the leader of the Liberal Party in 1958 and afterwards, 
often contained references to his role in the Suez Crisis. 123 During a CBC 
television broadcast, Pearson stated that the question of whether there would be 
peace "depends on our personal as well as our national identity."124 Linking 
Canada's national identity with the world's irenic struggle, Pearson wanted 
audiences to remember that his party had created peacekeeping. He argued that 
Canada needed to support UN peacekeeping with "sober realism" as well as 
"unflagging zeal," linking the functional and the progressive. 
By making peacekeeping exemplar of an independent and adult Canada, 
Pearson continued to tie Canada's foreign policies to its domestic maturity. The 
122 Spooner argues as much in his study of Canada and ONUC. See Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, 
and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64. 
123 Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3, 28-29. 
124 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 14. "CBC address," 1958. 
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Liberals had been defeated in 1957 thanks in part to many English Canadians' 
unwillingness to see Canada as an independent actor rather than a British 
associate. But Pearson felt his government's past actions could still be employed 
to rally support in Quebec. He therefore called on his audience to see 
peacekeeping as a worthwhile policy in the present for an independent nation, as 
well as a sound policy for a more peaceful Canadian future. 
When Pearson's Liberals lost the 1958 election and gave the PCs what was 
then the largest majority in Canada's federal history, serious rebuilding seemed 
necessary. But for those who still supported the Liberals, peacekeeping became a 
means to nostalgically discuss a different way of governing Canada. Along with 
media voices such as Maclean's magazine correspondent Blair Fraser, Pearson 
began to introduce into his speeches a longing for what his government had been 
able to accomplish in the past. 12s Pearson argued that because of the self-
aggrandizing tactics Diefenbaker was employing in his conduct of foreign affairs, 
Canada was losing its place of prominence at the UN, and he openly wondered 
whether Canada might ever recover that position.126 Such calls became more 
frequent as Diefenbaker's time in office continued. At the Liberal nominating 
convention in 1962, Pearson described the need for his party to reverse a period 
of "uncertainty, doubt, [and] division."127 He outlined his desire to see Canadians 
once again taking pride in their international role as exemplified during the Suez 
125 Fraser had long been a supporter of Pearson and the Liberals and their internationalist foreign policies. 
See Brennan, Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 1935 
- 1957, 164. 
126 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 17. "Interview with Dick Batey, CJVI," 1959. 
127 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 22. "Notes for Nominating Convention," 1962. 
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crisis. He spoke of a "return again to the days when our friends spoke of Canada 
in tones of envy and admiration rather than doubt and disappointment." He 
knew that his audiences would recall the international acclaim that had resulted 
from his efforts at the UN, and he told one in Sackville, New Brunswick that a 
Liberal government could reinvigorate "Canada's influence and position in the 
world." 128 
Using peacekeeping as a means to compare the glories of the past with the 
inadequacies of the present put further distance between the political rhetoric of 
peacekeeping and what was actually taking place in the Middle East or the Congo. 
All three peacekeeping discourses would be employed often by Pearson, along 
with his Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin, upon becoming the 
head of successive minority governments in 1963 and 1967.129 Martin was an 
experienced politician who had unsuccessfully run for the leadership of the 
Liberal Party against Pearson in 1958. He took this loss in stride and accepted the 
External Affairs post, hoping to play a key role in international affairs, as Pearson 
had done in the 1950s. This commitment was articulated in the 1964 White Paper 
on Defence. Recognized for mandating the unification the Canadian Forces, this 
document formally identified international peacekeeping as a primary role for 
Canada's military. 13° A major opportunity to demonstrate this came in February 
and March of 1964, when the situation in Cyprus worsened. As Greek and 
128 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 22. "Issues in the Forthcoming General Election," 1962. 
129 This was formalized in the 1964 White Paper on Defence. For a discussion of it, see "The White Paper 
and Canada's Peacemaking Role," Montreal Gazette, 2 April 1964, 8. 
130 Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping, 12. 
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Turkish Cypriots openly clashed, tensions between Greece and Turkey escalated 
as well; the two members of NATO seemed poised to engage in open warfare 
against one another. Martin worked with then-UN Secretary General U Thant to 
organize a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]. 
Unlike Diefenbaker's reaction to the events in the Congo, Pearson and his 
ministers did not seem to hesitate about committing Canadian troops. They sent 
over the Royal 22nd Regiment, better known as the VanDoos, as the initial 
Canadian contingent. 
Rather than dwell on the structural causes of the conflict in Cyprus, Martin 
spent most of his speeches on the subject discussing Canada. During one speech 
at the Canadian Club in Brantford, Ontario, Martin told his audience that Canada 
would support peace in the Mediterranean, but that he was "deeply conscious 
that a disunited Canada cannot be as strong a force in international affairs as we 
would wish." 131 By 1964, the Liberals had undertaken the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which sought to create a more equitable 
relationship between English- and French-speaking Canadians.132 The Quiet 
Revolution in Quebec that had been dramatically changing the province's social 
and economic climate, particularly since Jean Lesage's Liberals came to power in 
1960, also influenced the federal Liberal thinking on Canadian unity. 133 Pearson's 
131 LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 306. "UN Peace-Keeping Operations in Cyprus," 
1964. 
132 Leslie Pal, Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). 
133 Michael Behiels, Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960 
(Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985). 
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government had acknowledged the discontent that many Quebeckers faced when 
they examined their relationship to Canada. In Brantford, Martin called on his 
audience to work for a strong and united Canada so that his government would 
be able to exert more of Canada's now "traditional" role as a "policeman for 
peace." By making such an appeal in southern Ontario, Martin was asking his 
English-speaking audience to recognize that they were equally responsible for 
keeping Canada together. By linking peacekeeping to Canadian unity, the 
Liberals sought to create a bond which all Canadians could share. As in 1956, the 
events that precipitated the introduction of this peacekeeping force were far less 
important a topic than peacekeeping's value for Canadians. 
Martin was also quick to note that peacekeeping represented a Canadian 
belief in "high international ideals" that could not be defeated by those cynics . 
who questioned its value.134 He spoke of the "obvious willingness of Canadians to 
contribute to the cause of international peace" through peacekeeping. 13s Idealism 
was not a bad word, as far as Martin was concerned; he felt that Canada's foreign 
policies needed a touch of idealism to complement their more practical bases. He 
also expressed his hope that "Canadians [would] never be indifferent or 
insensitive to the sufferings of peoples, no matter how remote geographically the 
situation [might] be from Canada." 136 Support for UN peacekeeping was a "sober 
and realistic" policy as well as a necessary policy if Canadians were to be "true to 
134 LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, "UN Peace-Keeping Operations in Cyprus," 1964. 
135 LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 306. "Speech to the Toronto Empire Club," 1964. 
136 LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 307. "Speech to Ottawa UN Association," 1964. 
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ourselves, our country to the international community." This was both a 
progressive and a functional role, as far as Martin was concerned. 
In 1967, the expulsion of UNEF from the Sinai region at the request of Nasser, 
prior to another round of Arab-Israeli conflict in May, presented a great challenge 
to the contemporary value of peacekeeping.137 Nasser believed that Canada was 
too closely linked to imperial powers such as Britain, and was too supportive of 
Israel's foreign policies. That the Canadians had been singled out by Nasser as the 
part of UNEF that should be removed first bothered many in Canada. In 
response, Pearson spoke of the need for Canada to cautiously volunteer for new 
peacekeeping missions. Yet, he remained firmly convinced of its utility for 
policing an armistice.138 Martin remained adamant that the best solution to the 
problems of the Middle East was the re-introduction of a peacekeeping force, 
with Canada playing a significant part. Downplaying the inadequacies that had 
just been revealed, Martin reminded an audience that "it was the leadership of 
Prime Minister Pearson that first introduced this imaginative concept to a tense 
and worried world."139 Canada also still had future responsibilities to advance the 
campaign for world peace since, according to Martin, "no country on earth [ wa]s 
more dedicated to the cause of peace than Canada." 14° By linking peacekeeping 
and Canada's national identity, the Pearson Liberals hoped to connect all 
137 For a discussion of these events, see Chapter Eight, "Goodbye, Farewell, and Amen: The Withdrawal of 
UNEF, May-Jun 1967," in Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency 
Force, 1956-67. 
138 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 43. "Canada and the Middle East," 1967. 
139 LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 812, volume 316. "External Affairs Stand on UNEF," 1967. 
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Canadians symbolically to the idea of peacekeeping. And while Martin and 
Pearson equated Canada's domestic unity with a larger goal of international 
peace, the failure of UN peacekeeping to achieve lasting peaceful solutions in the 
Congo, Cyprus, and the Middle East challenged peacekeeping as a policy. 
A Functional Decline, 1968 to 1984 
Thanks in part to the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt, peacekeeping quickly 
went from being portrayed as a symbol of Canada's past, present, and future 
national identity to a failing part of its foreign policy. Like Diefenbaker's 
government, the Trudeau Liberals put more of an emphasis on peacekeeping's 
potential to relieve tensions between two warring nations than its uses as a 
symbol of Canada's national identity. Unlike Diefenbaker's government, 
Trudeau's re-thought the value of peacekeeping for Canada as part of a thorough 
examination of all Canada's foreign commitments between 1968 and 1970. 
Trudeau had campaigned as a man of change and an advocate for a "just society." 
His image as a world traveller made it more likely that he would offer alternate 
understandings of foreign policy for an age in which the Vietnam War brought 
many people out to protest against the United States, one of Canada's closest 
allies during the Cold War. 141 
In 1968, Trudeau told audiences that Canadians as a whole found cause to re-
examine themselves and their country because of the centennial a year earlier. He 
noted, "[W]e found ourselves wondering whether in the world of tomorrow, 
141 For more on this see Chapter Five, "Celebrity and Audacity: Marshall McLuhan, Pierre Eliot Trudeau, 
and the Decade of the Philosopher King," in Palmer, Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a 
Rebellious Era. 
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Canada can afford to cling to the conceptions and role-casting which served us in 
our international endeavours of three decades or more."142 The financial and 
emotional costs of peacekeeping seemed to be more than Trudeau and his 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp felt Canada should bear.143 
Sharp was a self-professed "amateur" in the field of foreign policy.144 But like 
Trudeau, he felt that Canada's policies needed to be re-evaluated. While not 
overtly attacking the policies of the Pearson years, this Liberal government 
believed that Canada had changed, and new policies were needed. Sharp 
remained adamant: "Canada is ready to act as mediator or to provide 
peacekeeping forces when called upon to do so, but there must be some real hope 
that the operation will be effective."14s Trudeau further stated, "Our need is not so 
much to go crusading abroad as to mobilize at home our aspirations, energies and 
resources behind external policies which will permit Canada to play a credible 
and creditable part in this changing world."146 
This trepidation would manifest itself in Foreign Policy for Canadians, the 
Trudeau government's comprehensive foreign policy publication released in 
1970. This publication contained six pamphlets on various subjects, including one 
on the United Nations, as well as a master summary. The overall focus of the 
programme laid out in these pamphlets stressed that Canada's foreign policies 
142 Department of External Affairs, "Canada and the World," Statements and Speeches 68, no. 17 (1968). 
143 Sharp expressed a similar viewpoint in Department of External Affairs, "Canada Reviews its Foreign 
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should serve Canada's national interests. This meant providing economic benefits 
for Canada and/ or advancing the cause of social justice in the world. 147 The 
document had a considerable pragmatic emphasis as did the language coming out 
of Trudeau's government at this time. He and his ministers recognized that 
Canada could play an important, if limited, role in future peacekeeping 
operations but that indefinite missions and Canada's automatic participation in 
every peacekeeping operation needed to end.148 Instead, peacekeeping, like 
Canada's commitment to NATO, had to be viewed with a critical eye. 
Trudeau's government did not want to make predictions about what types of 
roles Canada would have to assume in the future. But there remained a 
substantial idealistic side to the rhetoric surrounding peacekeeping during these 
years. Foreign Policy for Canadians talked about peacekeeping's stimulating "a 
deep-seated desire in this country to make a distinctive contribution to human 
betterment."149 They noted that this "altruistic aspiration" seemed to be popular 
across the country with all Canadians. The document also acknowledged the 
"special brand of Canadian expertise" regarding peacekeeping, but vowed to 
employ this "judiciously" and not to make Canada a "helpful fixer." 
Despite this cautious use of language to describe peacekeeping, the Canadian 
government continued to participate in UNFICYP throughout Trudeau's time in 
power. And when a new UNEF was proposed after the Yorn Kippur War between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1973, Canada joined that force. The Liberals 
147 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, 33. 
148 Department of External Affairs, "Foreign Policy for Canadians," (Ottawa, 1970). 
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were the head of a minority government at the time, and their foreign and 
domestic policies had to find support within the New Democratic Party. In the 
House of Commons, Mitchell Sharp reminded MPs that the concept of 
peacekeeping owed much to "a great Canadian, our former Prime Minister and a 
Member of this House, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson."1so By 
hearkening back to 1956 and Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy, he drew 
links between the present action of the Liberals and the efforts of 1956 that had 
brought Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize, and lifted Canada's international stature, 
arguably, to its highest point ever. But Sharp remained committed to portraying 
peacekeeping as something that was viable only when conditions were placed on 
an operation. He noted that Canada had not sought participation in UNEF II, but 
that it had accepted a role only once the operational mandate was made clear. 
The minister ended his speech with a look into the future, arguing that Canada 
had "a responsibility to the world community and to all the people of the Middle 
East to do what we can to give them another chance to achieve a peaceful 
settlement when the fighting has stopped." The New Democrats accepted such a 
formulation of Canada's peacekeeping role, and they supported this action. 
Domestic policies were of a higher priority during the Trudeau years, 
particularly regarding Quebec's place in Canada.1s1 Pearson and Martin had 
expressed the desire for Canada to participate in UN peacekeeping to serve as a 
common bond between English and French Canadians, and as something that 
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could alleviate tensions between the groups. By the late 1960s and the early 
1970s, such appeals were ineffective. The creation of the Parti Quebecois [PQ] in 
1968 formalized the separatist movement. Under the leadership of Rene 
Levesque, the PQ created a political platform for a future Quebec state. It 
included descriptions of what foreign policies the new state would undertake. At 
the second congress of the PQ in October of 1969, a platform was adopted that 
called for Quebec to become« une nation pacifiste en adoptant le principe du 
rejet du recours a la guerre comme solution aux differends internationaux, en 
favorisant le desarmement international et en s' opposant aux experiences et a 
l'utilisation d'armes nucleaires et bacteriologiques. »1s2 Rather than form a full 
military and be part of the Western alliance, the PQ sought to have only a small 
«corps de paix pouvant utiliser le materiel disponible a d'autres fins que celles de 
la guerre, en cas de conflagrations, feux de forets, etc. »Despite their desire to 
separate themselves from the Canadian government, the PQ saw value in 
peacekeeping as a policy. Part of this was speculative, as the Quebec they 
envisioned had not yet come into being. But by making peacekeeping a central 
part of their foreign policy platform, the PQ was also trying to capitalize on the 
contemporary attraction that peacekeeping held for many Quebeckers. 
When the PQ gained office in 1976 they set about preparing a provincial vote 
on separation. As the vote approached, the PQ put out new platforms that were 
designed to placate some Quebeckers, but also to alleviate the possible fears of 
152 Le Parti Quebecois, "Programme 1970," (Quebec City, 1970). 
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some foreign governments.153 Whereas the initial PQ platform had called for a 
pacifist state, a revised platform in 1979 stated that Quebec would become a 
member of NATO and NORAD once independence was realized. The emphasis 
remained on having a small peace force that would work primarily through a UN-
peacekeeping apparatus, but this shift was noticeable. 154 As the possibility of a 
Quebec state became more real, the progressive rhetoric of the PQ was toned 
down in favour of slight changes to the current Canadian foreign policies. 
The defeat of the Quebec sovereignty referendum on 20 May 1980 permitted 
the Canadian government to shift its focus away from trying to keep the country 
intact. By 1983, Trudeau had also succeeded in getting a Canadian Constitution 
passed, satisfying his other primary domestic concern. Despite his limited 
interest in foreign policy in his last years in office, Trudeau maintained an active 
desire to advance the cause of peace in the world. 15s This was best exemplified by 
his international peace tour in 1983. Trudeau announced his intention to travel 
across the world and visit the leader of any government - whether democratic or 
communist -who was seriously interested in discussing nuclear disarmament. 
Trudeau talked to many leaders and found a polite reception, though few tangible 
results came out of the tour. Despite this, he was more optimistic than he had 
been before about Canada's irenic role. After travelling around the globe, 
153 Stephane Roussel, Charles-Alexandre Theoret, and Susan M. Murphy, "A "Distinct Strategy"? The Use 
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Trudeau spoke to a Montreal audience and stated, "If our future depended on 
Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound."1s6 Peace was 
central to this tour, not peacekeeping, a reflection of the lack of governmental 
interest in Canada's "helpful fixer" role. 
By the time he left office, Trudeau's foreign policies had come around, as 
Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein have argued, in a full pirouette. The Prime 
Minister had shown little interest in maintaining Canada's peacekeeping role 
when he assumed office, but Canada remained one of the world's leading 
peacekeepers throughout the 1970s. Despite this lack of contemporary 
enthusiasm for peacekeeping, the Liberals were often willing to remind audiences 
of Pearson's, and Canada's, great triumph in 1956. They also sought a more 
peaceful world, and recognized that peacekeeping might play some small part in 
bringing such a world into existence. 
Peacekeeping's Revival, 1988 to 1993 
After Trudeau left office in 1984, Brian Mulroney's PC government made 
concerted efforts to reinvigorate Canadian enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping. 
Mulroney was a former lawyer who had won his party's leadership from Joe 
Clark, despite Clark's having been prime minister briefly from 1979 to 1980. 
Mulroney was also from Quebec, which added to his appeal compared to the 
Liberal Party's John Turner in the 1984 election. Mulroney happened to be in 
office for the end of the Cold War when for a few years peacekeeping became a 
156 Department of External Affairs, "A Global Initiative to Improve the Prospects for Peace," Statements 
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vital part of the "New World Order" that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Despite this new international climate, many of the appeals for Canadians 
to act as part of the UN that Mulroney's government made hearkened to Canada's 
"golden age" of foreign policy, while arguing that circumstances permitted 
Canada to regain its past position of influence. 
Clark was Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1984 to 
1991. Despite this demotion from his earlier leadership role, he approached 
Canada's external affairs with enthusiasm. In 1990, speaking in Ottawa to the 
Canadian-American Committee of the C.D. Howe Institute, a conservative think 
tank devoted to economic and social policy in Canada, Clark told his audience, 
"[t]he Canadian experience proves that solutions lie not in grand schemes and 
blueprints, but in processes that work and produce results."157 This statement 
explained how domestic compromises between English and French Canadians 
made Canada encourage other nations to pursue mediation through 
peacekeeping. Clark was hopeful that other nations would make the principles of 
Canadian foreign policy their own, lending a progressive element to this speech. 
Clark and Mulroney also spoke on numerous occasions about Canada's 
illustrious peacekeeping past. In 1991, Clark told the Standing Senate Committee 
on National Finance that peacekeeping was invented by Lester Pearson because 
he and others like him sought a more peaceful world.1ss While trying to sell 
157 Department of External Affairs, "Canada in the World: Foreign Policy in the New Era," Statements and 
Speeches 90, no. 11 ( 1990). 
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Canadians on the value of Operation Desert Storm, the United States-led 
coalition to remove Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, Clark 
always made mention of Canada's peacekeeping history. Speaking to the House of 
Commons, he stated that if Canada did not participate in the force, it would be 
"betraying the efforts of Louis St. Laurent, of Lester Pearson."1s9 While his PC 
predecessors had sought to distance themselves from the actions taken by 
Pearson at the UN, Mulroney's PCs used them as a nostalgic focal point that 
could be emotionally appealed to whenever Canadians were called upon to act 
internationally. The Canadian government's attempts to sell all Canadian military 
action as peacekeeping intimates that working as UN peacekeepers was now the 
most accepted way the Canadian Forces would be used internationally. Canada's 
status as a nation of "Blue Berets" therefore changed how the government 
discussed Canada's armed forces, though this rarely clarified what was taking 
place on a given mission. 
Mulroney's government also officially commemorated Pearson on several 
occasions during his time in office. On 26 September 1990 the Lester Pearson 
statue was unveiled outside Parliament in Ottawa. Mulroney gushed over Pearson 
at the unveiling: "He was a man who embodied our country more than any who 
preceded him, and perhaps any who will follow." 16° This was likely a direct jab at 
Pierre Trudeau, Mulroney's predecessor, meant to undermine his public image 
159 Department of External Affairs, "Notes for a speech in the House of Commons by Joe Clark on the 
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and the favour which Trudeau still held among many Canadians. Despite these 
political undertones, Mulroney also called Pearson's actions during the Suez 
Crisis his "finest hour" and credited him with advancing a foreign policy in which 
Canada's voice would not simply be heard, but would also impress. Parallel to 
this commemoration of Pearson were Mulroney's words which spoke of the 
"realities of power" that Pearson knew better than anyone. He also felt that a true 
community of nations would come about only if more people acted as Pearson 
had. By employing the three peacekeeping discourses in many of his addresses, as 
he did at this unveiling, Mulroney was rhetorically consistent with earlier Liberal 
governments. 
Though the situation in the Gulf was reaching a climax when this statue 
was unveiled, Mulroney's words also had relevance to Canada's domestic politics. 
Since 1987, his government had been trying to amend the Canadian constitution 
through the Meech Lake Accord process. By the summer of 1990, tensions 
between English, French and Aboriginal Canadians had made the new 
constitutional formula one that many in Quebec and elsewhere could not accept. 
To counter such divisions, Mulroney often cited Lester Pearson and Canada's 
commitment to peacekeeping as an example of how Canadians could work 
together. At the unveiling of the Pearson statue, Mulroney spoke of Pearson's 
"deep commitment to his country" and his belief that Canada would become a 
better and more whole nation through its foreign policies. He also repeatedly 
stressed Pearson's knack for compromise as a central element of Canada's 
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success in the past. By making such a link, the Prime Minister called on his 
audience to see how peacekeeping could help heal Canada's internal divisions 
between English- and French- speakers, a tactic that Pearson's government had 
employed often during the 1960s. 
This domestic emphasis continued when Mulroney spoke at the unveiling of 
the peacekeeping monument, "Reconciliation," in Ottawa on 8 October 1992. In 
front of an audience of thousands, Mulroney spoke of the "courage and 
patriotism of generations of Canadians who have been willing to risk their lives to 
preserve, for them, for us, and for others, that which is most precious for all of 
humankind: liberty and peace."161 He spoke of Canada's peacekeeping past while 
marking it as a "Canadian idea, pursued in the midst of conflict, and now 
recognized globally as pivotal to world peace." But he frequently reminded the 
audience that Canada was able to become a world leader in peacekeeping because 
it stood "united." Ignoring the deep domestic divisions that accompanied the first 
year of peacekeeping in Canada, Mulroney believed that the only way Canada 
could continue its peacekeeping role, which he averred all Canadians supported, 
was to stay together. This monument was unveiled less than three weeks before 
the country was set to vote on yet another constitutional formula agreed upon in 
Charlottetown. Though he did not explicitly state that peacekeeping should be a 
motivating factor in why people should vote yes, the Montreal Gazette reported 
that Mulroney used "the pomp-filled ceremony to pitch subliminal messages for a 
161 Brian Mulroney, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Unveiling of the Peacekeeping 
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Yes vote."162 Such appeals were not ultimately successful, but they do 
demonstrate the wider political influence that peacekeeping was seen to possess. 
Mulroney's PCs, like Pearson's Liberal government in the 1960s, were 
enthusiastic in their deployment of Canadians on UN peacekeeping operations. 
Where Trudeau's Liberals had called for caution with regard to Canadian 
involvement, the PCs pushed for more UN peacekeeping. In 1988, they 
volunteered Canadians to participate in missions to Iran, Cambodia, and 
Afghanistan. And when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeeping 
as an institution, many Canadians, including the government, took special pride 
in the part Canada had played.163 In 1992, they signed up Canadians for duty in 
the Balkans as well as in Somalia. These two missions were new kinds of 
peacekeeping operations. In Bosnia, the Canadians took part in the United 
Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] that intervened among Bosnian Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosnian Muslims without any effective peace treaty operating. The 
peacekeepers found themselves unable to control the violence there, and ethnic 
cleansings occurred despite their best efforts. In Somalia, the Canadian Airborne 
Regiment was sent to be a part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
[UNOSOM] in December of 1992. They were based in the town of Belet Huen. 
162 Terrance Willis, "PM, Hnatyshyn make pitches for Yes at unveiling of statue to peacekeepers," 
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Members of the Airborne executed several Somalis, including Shidane Arone, a 
teenager who had been lured onto their base and subsequently tortured. 164 
Details about the killings in Somalia were first announced to Canadians by 
New Democrat MP John Brewin in the House of Commons. Brewin was told by 
the wife of Barry Armstrong, a doctor stationed in Somalia, that members of the 
Airborne were responsible for the "deliberate homicide" of an unarmed Somali 
man.16s These allegations led to sustained Opposition attacks against the PCs. In 
the midst of a leadership campaign to replace Mulroney, Kim Campbell, then 
Minister of Defence, became a target for attacks. Rather than focus on what was 
actually taking place in Somalia and trying to help those who had been affected 
by the actions of the Airborne, the Opposition emphasised how Campbell would 
make a poor prime minister for Canada. Campbell was accused of spending all 
her time on the campaign trail rather than dealing with what Liberal MP Lloyd 
Axworthy described as "the serious problems affecting us in Somalia."166 
The Canadian government changed its discussions of peacekeeping in light of 
these events. Barbara McDougall, who had taken over from Joe Clark as 
Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1991, spoke vaguely of the tragedies of 
Somalia in many of her speeches. The situations in the former Yugoslavia and 
Somalia were described as being more complex than those which had been 
experienced on earlier peacekeeping missions. She also noted, « il regne un 
164 A detailed examination of these events in Somalia can be found in Razack, Dark Threats and White 
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atmosphere de pessimisme et d'inquietude au lieu de l'optimisme de 1990. » 167 
Few would deny such an assessment, but the government also preferred not to 
discuss what had actually taken place on those missions. The Somalis who were 
killed were not the central foci of the speeches of the PCs, nor were the people of 
Bosnia who were being killed despite the best efforts of the peacekeepers. 
Instead, the focus stayed on Canada and how peacekeeping remained part of its 
national character. Peacekeeping, despite the terrible actions of the Canadian 
Airborne, remained something which reflected proper Canadian values like « [la] 
paix et securite, [le] respect des droits de la personne et des libertes 
democratiques et [!']influence sur les decisions qui fa<;onnent le monde. »168 
Throughout their time in office, the PCs emphasized Canada's peacekeeping 
past in an attempt to bring the nostalgic peacekeeping discourse to the fore. As in 
the last years of Pearson's time in office, the early years of the 1990s saw high 
levels of governmental support for peacekeeping but serious flaws in actual 
peacekeeping operations. Mulroney and his ministers spoke of the present value 
of peacekeeping in broad language that belied the underlying issues that had 
been exposed in Canada's participation in Somalia and Bosnia. As a result, the 
vision of a world in which Canada would participate in more and more 
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peacekeeping missions that had been spoken of so often just a few years earlier 
largely disappeared from the political rhetoric of the PCs.169 
A Revised Peacekeeping Rhetoric, 1993 to 1997 
The PCs would not remain in office long after the tragedies in Bosnia and 
Somalia took place. Under the leadership of Jean Chretien, the Liberal Party 
swept to power after the PCs managed to win only two seats in the House. 
Chretien had been an influential cabinet minister in Pearson and Trudeau's 
governments. Like Trudeau, Chretien seemed cautious to engage Canada in any 
future peacekeeping operations. And given the recent record of Canada on those 
peacekeeping missions, he cannot be blamed for holding such views. 
Despite these hesitations, there were continuities in how peacekeeping was 
discussed by Chretien's government. His first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre 
Ouellet, spoke in the House of Commons about Canada's proud peacekeeping 
past, giving credit, as per usual, to the actions of Lester Pearson. 17° When he 
spoke of peacekeeping in the present, however, Ouellet stated: "Canada cannot be 
everywhere, and do everything." He called on his fellow politicians to understand 
that Canada did not have the resources to participate in every peacekeeping 
mission and to recognize that often Canadians were better suited to 
administrating roles than to providing the central contribution to a force. This 
169 This discussion of the Canadian government's rhetoric about peacekeeping is limited by the lack of 
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was a discreet admission that the decision to send the Airborne to Somalia had 
been a mistake. 
Like Trudeau's, Chretien's government also focused more upon domestic 
concerns than upon its foreign policies. The Quebec separatist movement 
reached its apogee during the narrow defeat of the 1995 sovereignty referendum, 
and the desire to drastically reform the economic relationship between the 
federal government and the provinces took up much of the Chretien Liberals' 
focus.171 Defence spending was also slashed as part of the Government's attempts 
to balance the budget. But Chretien's Liberals were not immune to changing 
ideas about peacekeeping that emerged in the middle years of the 1990s. "Peace-
building" and "Human Security" became the buzz words at the UN and among 
the DEA. These terms were supposed to reflect more accurately the varied tasks 
that a UN force might be asked to perform on any given operation. The terms 
acknowledged that peace was a process that could be encouraged before conflicts 
began, necessitated certain steps while conflicts were openly being waged, and 
required justice and demobilization to be at the heart of efforts when those 
conflicts came to an end. 172 The Liberals therefore remained interested in 
discussing peacekeeping, while expressing a reluctance to actually send more 
Canadians abroad. 
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In their publication Canada and the World, the Liberals set out such ideas for 
Canadians. This document openly discussed the "shortcomings in UN 
capabilities" in the 199os.l73 However, it mentioned only the delays in deploying 
personnel in Somalia and Rwanda, rather than addressing the more serious 
issues at the hearts of these operations.174 Canada in the World also contained 
language which talked of Canada's "strong values, strong institutions, strong 
traditions and a committed and knowledgeable public." The Liberals believed 
that the Canadian commitment to tolerance, democracy, equality, and the 
peaceful resolution of differences, among others, made it able to do its "fair share 
for the world" in terms of peacekeeping. 
Speaking at the UN in 1996, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy 
stressed that the world needed to show itself "capable of restoring the spirit of 
1956 when, in the deepest freeze of the Cold War climate, the UN gave birth to 
peacekeeping, and changed international relations forever."17s As with earlier 
Canadian addresses at the UN, these words were meant as much for a domestic 
Canadian audience as they were for the peoples of the world. Axworthy was trying 
to motivate his compatriots to not give up on the UN and on peacekeeping, 
despite the disastrous outcomes of Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. By making an 
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appeal to 1956, he hoped to remind his audience of Canada's once great position 
in international affairs and to pledge his government's support for trying to find 
useful solutions in the present that might, however unlikely, recapture that role. 
The Liberals would continue to talk about peacekeeping, but the findings of 
the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia begun in November of 1994 to 
investigate what had taken place on UNOSOM discouraged the sending of 
Canadian troops abroad. This Commission condemned the systemic racism and 
sexism in the Canadian military, called for the dissolution of the Airborne 
Regiment and for significant changes in the institutional culture of the Canadian 
Forces.176 Chretien's government shut down the investigation before the issue of 
Arone's death could be investigated which was well in advance of what the 
Commissioners desired, and before claims that the Canadian Forces had perjured 
themselves or obstructed the Inquiry could be fully explored. m This tense 
political climate made peacekeeping far less appealing as a functional policy. 178 
The present therefore held numerous obstacles that needed to be overcome for 
Canada to continue its peacekeeping role. 
Conclusion 
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As the Chretien government dealt with the fallout from the Somalia 
Commission's report, peacekeeping appeared to have lost much of its discursive 
value for Canada's politicians. That it had remained a powerful rhetorical tool as 
long as it did was largely because of the symbolic connection between 
peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. This connection was made early on 
in the events of the Suez Crisis. The prevalence of domestic debates about 
Canada's independence from Britain encouraged discussions of peacekeeping to 
be similarly framed. This meant politicians focused upon peacekeeping's effects 
on Canada, not on the host nations or the UN forces. At the same time, neither 
the Liberals nor the PCs questioned the necessity of Canada's commitments to 
the UN which had been a central part of Canada's foreign policies since 1945. But 
where people stood on the Suez issue said more than whether or not they 
approved of the UNEF - it was a statement about whether or not they saw 
Canada as a British nation. 
Under Pearson's Liberal government after 1963, peacekeeping became a more 
symbolically Canadian activity. The domestic uncertainty regarding Quebec's 
place in Canada permitted many people, including Pearson and Martin, to look 
back to Canada's "golden age" of international action, when French-English 
concerns seemed to pale in comparison to the importance of making the UN a 
success. By hearkening to a past that saw great Canadian success under a Liberal 
Government, Pearson and Martin encouraged Canadians to forget the domestic 
debates over Canada's relationship to Britain. Instead, they positioned 
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peacekeeping as a once, present, and future method of restoring, achieving, and 
promoting a strong and unified Canadian identity measured in international 
influence. During the middle years of the 1960s, therefore, peacekeeping became 
more than a constructive policy or a way to dream about a more peaceful future. 
It became a way to discuss an unchanging Canadian past as well, making it an 
increasingly symbolic concept that was detached from the outcomes of individual 
operations. 
In making these links to both the past and the future, politicians played a vital 
part in causing peacekeeping to become adopted into Canada's national 
symbology. This temporal malleability permitted many Canadian politicians and 
their audiences to envision peacekeeping as a part of Canada's interests despite 
intermittent governmental support, particularly during the Diefenbaker and 
Trudeau terms, and the shortcomings of many missions. What I have termed the 
nostalgic discourse of peacekeeping saw politicians consistently recalling the 
work of Lester Pearson in creating UNEF. Times of uncertainty about Canada's 
identity in the present, like the middle years of the 1960s as well as the late 
1980s, encouraged the use of this language more than others. Mulroney and his 
ministers were particularly prone to recalling the deeds of Lester Pearson with a 
glowing nostalgia that erased the past conflicts and shortcomings of the actual 
peacekeeping operations. They promoted Pearson's time as a knowable and more 
stable era that should be celebrated and envied. 
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Politicians' use of a progressive discourse about world peace in the future also 
remained centred around the perceived value of the UN as an organization. In the 
1960s, Paul Martin spoke often of the need for idealism in Canada's foreign 
policies and his fondness for peacekeeping because it could provide an outlet for 
such thinking. However, international peacekeeping failures in the late 1960s and 
the early 1990s made this rhetoric more hollow than hopeful. The failures of 
UNPROFOR and UNOSOM, in particular, necessitated new thinking about 
peacekeeping. 
PC and Liberal politicians used similar language to describe peacekeeping, 
suggesting not only a consensus on foreign policy during these years, but a shared 
desire to symbolically link Canada and UN peacekeeping. This support further 
immunized peacekeeping from much effective criticism from 1956 to 1997. 
Trudeau's government came closest to re-thinking Canada's peacekeeping role, 
but in practice, if not in thought, it maintained Canada's position as a world 
leader in UN support. It was only after the events in Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda that Jean Chretien's Liberals began to speak less of peacekeeping than of 
peace-making. 
In light of these factors, the political rhetoric of peacekeeping provides 
important insights into why and how so many Canadians associated their 
national identities with peacekeeping between 1956 and 1997. Though politicians 
made their appeals regularly, their voices did not exist in a vacuum. Non-state 
actors also influenced how Canadians understood themselves as a nation of "Blue 
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Berets." How their messages deviated or stayed similar to these "official" 
discourses is equally crucial for understanding why so many Canadians identified 
themselves with peacekeeping. 
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Chapter Two 
"Wasted Hours and Abject Boredom": Peacekeeping in Canadian High School 
History Classrooms, 1959-1997 
Politicians were not solely responsible for "official" discussions of 
peacekeeping which situated it as part of a Canadian national identity. While 
federal leaders took to the national stage to address various audiences, individual 
Canadians also learned about their country's peacekeeping acumen in their 
homes and their school classrooms. The adoption of peacekeeping as a national 
marker would not have been possible without sites like the classroom reinforcing 
messages that were produced by politicians and newspaper authors. The texts 
used within those classrooms required approval from the various ministries of 
education which discouraged students and teachers from challenging their 
versions of the past. Textbooks also sanitized the version of Canada's past which 
students were taught. This erased many of the conflicts and ambiguities 
surrounding Canada's peacekeeping role and promoted young people's taking on 
the methods and goals of peacekeeping in their daily lives. While the reception of 
these messages is difficult to ascertain, these textbooks provide clear evidence of 
an important way that messages linking Canada's national identity to 
peacekeeping were disseminated from 1959 to 1997. 
For those who entered high schools in Canada any time after 1959, their 
approved teaching materials often included discussions about peacekeeping and 
Canada's role in its creation. Until 1997, peacekeeping in some high school 
textbooks and other audio-visual materials increased from perhaps a paragraph 
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to several chapters; however the actual amount of history that was taken by most 
students in Canada shrank considerably. 179 By examining changes in the contents 
of high school textbooks, the form in which they delivered that information, and 
how students and teachers used that language when writing to the federal 
government, this chapter presents a major way in which messages about 
peacekeeping were transmitted to Canadians. 
School classrooms have been perceived as crucial sites where ideas about 
national and self identity are formed in children, adolescents, and teachers. Not 
surprisingly, given its high level of support from politicians, filmmakers, and 
newspaper authors, peacekeeping came to garner a place in classroom materials 
that was disproportionate to the successes achieved in any operation. Equally 
unsurprising were individual authors' emphases on the Canadian role in UN 
peacekeeping and their lack of content about the host nations. Unlike numerous 
other media, a predominant number of history textbooks disregarded the 
controversies that surrounded the creation of UNEF because this did not fit with 
their positive narratives of Canadian history. Most textbooks symbolically linked 
peacekeeping to Canada's national maturity and independence, particularly 
during the first twenty years it was mentioned. Some texts were more critical of 
Canada's later peacekeeping endeavours, but few failed to praise Lester Pearson 
and his actions in 1956. In the 1980s, progressive language was increasingly 
179 In Ontario, for example, the percentage of history classes taken out of the total for all high school classes in 
1964 was 11.4% while in 1981 it had dropped to 6.6%. Bob Davis, Whatever Happened to High School 
History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-95 (Toronto: James Lormier and Company 
Limited, 1995), 48. In Quebec, on the other hand, history became a regularly-taught subject but the emphasis of 
such classes was the history of Quebec 
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employed as a means to encourage young Canadians to adopt peace in their lives 
and authors devoted whole chapters of their works to peacekeeping. Accordingly, 
the symbolic attachment of peacekeeping to Canada's national identity permitted 
it to be a subject that could be used for a number of educational purposes. This 
encouraged its inclusion in high school history courses where young Canadians 
could learn about themselves as part of a nation of "Blue Berets." 
This chapter is divided into four sections which describe how the 
peacekeeping discourses accorded with textbook requirements across Canada, 
though the emphasis will be on Ontario and Quebec. 18° In each section, the 
similarities and differences between English and French Canadian textbook 
discussions about peacekeeping will be apparent, particularly after the 1960s. 
Many historians believe that examining approved textbooks provides a way to 
glean the "official ideologies regarding identity, community and citizenship" that 
a country endorses.181 In Canadian education historiography, authors have often 
chosen to limit their studies to English Canada or Quebec, since the latter went 
through changes in the 1950s and 1960s that were particular to its own 
180 Looking at Canadian history textbooks across the provinces is simplified by almost all textbook production 
during this time period coming from either Toronto for English-language history texts, or Montreal for French-
language history texts. In 1960, Montreal accounted for 21 % of the entire printing industry in Canada and 
Toronto 31 %; textbooks in particular were centrally located in these urban areas for their historical links to the 
publishing industry, as well as Ontario and Quebec being by far the largest market for texts. Hence, the books 
that were approved in the West or the Maritimes were almost always the same as those that were approved in 
Ontario. Guy P.F. Steed, "Centrality and Locational Change: Printing, Publishing and Clothing in Montreal and 
Toronto" Economic Geography 52, no. 3 (1976); George S. Tomkins, A Common Countenance: Stability and 
Change in the Canadian Curriculum (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 410. 
181 Amy Yon Heyking, Creating Citizens: History and Identity in Alberta's Schools, 1905-1980 (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2006), 5. 
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circumstances decades after such changes took place in the other provinces. 182 
More often, Quebec and its education system are treated as a separate topic of 
study in books, and Ontario is allowed to represent English Canada.183 In looking 
at the time period 1959 to 1997, however, comparing English and French 
Canadian textbooks provides insight into why authors used specific language to 
discuss Canada's peacekeeping role during a particular era. 
The form of the history text allows the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
topics to become quite transparent. Since classroom materials are under the 
purview of the provinces and not the federal government, there was not always a 
strong correlation between federal attitudes towards peacekeeping and what 
appeared in a given text. However, the choice of mandatory subjects, what was 
taught or omitted from course curricula, and what information was included or 
excluded from textbooks, all required an exercise of authority by authors, 
publishers, and government officials regarding the broader goals of an education, 
as well as an insistence on the value of certain topics over others. Textbooks can 
therefore help demonstrate what a nation recognizes as legitimate and truthful 
stories about itself and its past. 184 A glimpse into these processes is possible 
through letters written to the federal government by students and teachers from 
1956 to 1997. Several dozen of these letters have been preserved, and their 
182 Quality studies that have looked at only English Canada include Frye, Design for Learning: Reports submitted 
to the Joint Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and the University of Toronto; Hodgetts and 
Gallagher, Teaching Canada for the '80s; Neatby, So Little for the Mind. 
183 This is not altogether a bad idea, since Quebec is very much deserving of its own studies. As well, Ontario 
seems to be the testing ground for most educational policies in Canada, and the home of most educational 
materials for use in classrooms, so giving it priority in books is justified. 
184 Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian Smith, eds., The Politics of the Textbook (New York: Routledge, 
1991), 4. 
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language and understandings of Canada as a peacekeeping nation suggest that for 
some students, the "official" messages contained in their textbooks were a part of 
their historical education. 
The 99 history textbook authors whose works were examined for this chapter 
told the whole story of Canadian history while highlighting certain themes in 
order to gain approval by the various provincial Ministries of Education. In these 
texts, the pronouns "our" and "us" were commonly used in describing Canada's 
past.18s Peacekeeping and other topics were taken to be reflections of "our" 
history that were worthwhile for "us" to remember. Historian Timothy Stanley 
has argued that the use of such pronouns cannot help but lead to racial exclusion 
because, "[i]f certain people and things are thought to be Canadian and others 
not, it is because lived histories have associated particular representations and 
particular physical characteristics with being Canadian."186 The figures depicted 
as "our" peacekeepers are white men, selectively excluding most of Canada's 
population from being one of its national symbols. At the same time, by using 
such pronouns, these textbooks consciously attempted to make students 
associate themselves with Canada and its past in order to further what Benedict 
Anderson calls an "imagined community."187 
The narratives of Canada's past that included peacekeeping also served to 
reinforce symbols of national identity. Education historian Ian Grosvenor has 
185 Linda Lesvik in Peter N. Steams, Peter Sexias, and Sam Wineburg, eds., Knowing, Teaching, and learning 
History: National and International Perspectives (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 290. 
186 Sandwell, ed. To The Past: History Education, Public Memory, and Citizenship in Canada, 34. 
187 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
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looked at ordinary people's conceptions of what it means to be British and found 
a correlation with ideas in textbooks, posters found in classrooms, and the films 
that were shown to students. 188 New symbols of national identity are rarely 
created in the school classroom, owing to the wide variety of learning styles that 
teachers can employ, the time lag between events and their inclusion in teaching 
materials, and the classroom's being a site of consensus-building, rather than 
innovation, in the teaching of history. 189 As a result, the narratives about 
peacekeeping that were presented in textbooks had to resemble the dominant 
discourses being used by other state and non-state actors. Textbooks are 
therefore best viewed as disseminators of the nostalgic, functionalist, and 
progressive peacekeeping discourses, and not their creators. 
State control over educational content must be tempered with the 
understanding that it is impossible to know what occurred in every history 
classroom across Canada during this time period. Individual teachers and 
students played an active role in shaping what was learned in their Canadian 
history classes. 19° Undoubtedly, there would have been those who read every 
word of the prescribed textbooks, believed what they said about peacekeeping, 
and remembered that information for many years to come. Yet, there would also 
have been students who were simply not interested in learning about Canadian 
188 Ian Grosvenor, "'There's no place like home': education and the making of national identity," History of 
Education 28, no. 3 ( 1999): 238 .. 
189 Jocelyn Letourneau, a scholar who works on Quebecois educational history, has suggested that "[i]f the 
teacher says something that is not reinforced by other information outside the class, or something that does 
not belong to a dominant common way of seeing, then it might well be cast aside.'' See Sandwell, ed. To The 
Past: History Education, Public Memory, and Citizenship in Canada, 80. 
190 Paul Axelrod, "Beyond the Progressive Education Debate: A Profile of Toronto Schooling in the 1950s," 
Historical Studies in Education 17, no. 2 (2005): 240. 
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history, or read for their tests, and quickly forgot all that they had learned. Some 
teachers also likely skipped over the sections of the texts that included 
peacekeeping, or chose to add their own emphasis on topics that strayed from the 
official textbook accounts. Standardized provincial examinations were also 
eliminated from high schools in some Canadian provinces in the 1960s, which 
helped to free up what was taught to a considerable extent. Many students and 
teachers alike no longer had to focus primarily on learning for these exams, 
which could allow for different topics of study to be encountered in some history 
classes. 
In the last decades of the century, however, teachers became more bound to 
the guidelines of the various education ministries. In the 1990s in Ontario, the PC 
government instituted a number of reforms, including the return of standardized 
report cards and province-wide curricula, and reduced the number of school 
boards by one half. 191 Such reforms occurred across the country in the wake of 
parents and politicians raising concerns about students not receiving a "proper 
education." 192 As a result, teachers were pushed to rely upon textbooks to a 
greater extent, which makes their contents an even more valuable topic of study. 
Peacekeeping's symbolic association with Canada's national identity proved 
useful for satisfying the desires of "progressive" reformers, as well as those 
parents, teachers, and policy-makers who held fast to more traditional techniques 
191 George J. Bedard and Stephen B. Lawton, "The Struggle for Power and Control: Shifting Policy-Making 
Models and the Harris Agenda for Education in Ontario," Canadian Public Administration 43, no. 3 (2000): 250. 
192 Michael Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada," Journal 
of Canadian Studies 26, no. 4 ( 1991 ); J.L Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History? (Toronto: Harper Collins 
Publishers Ltd., 1998). 
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for learning. As an almost universal experience for young people, the classroom 
was a significant site for learning about Canada's peacekeeping past, its present, 
and its future. The events, names, themes, and images about peacekeeping that 
were to be taught (and hopefully learned) by students shed considerable light on 
how the state and ordinary Canadians negotiated Canada's identity as a nation of 
"Blue Berets" from 1959 to 1997. 
Peacekeeping and Canadian Independence, 1959 to 1967 
Owing to the time lag between when events occurred and when they were 
included in history textbooks, the first descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping 
efforts were not published until 1959. By that time, as shown in Chapter One, the 
PCs and the Liberals expressed bipartisan agreement about peacekeeping's 
functional and progressive value. This section describes how peacekeeping was 
narrated in English- and French-Canadian textbooks by examining individual 
textbooks and their authors. These authors made choices about what to include 
and what to omit from their works, significantly influencing the contents of later 
texts. 
Peacekeeping was first discussed in the 1959 textbook, Canada: A Political 
and Social History by Edgar Mcinnis. Originally written for students in Grade 10 
history classes in 1947, this text had Canada, the United States, and Great Britain 
in the twentieth century as its focus. This is significant because Grade 10 would 
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have provided many students' last exposure to Canadian history, as a large 
proportion left school for work at the end of the tenth grade. 193 
Mclnnis' work was a linear narrative of Canadian history. In a later chapter 
dealing with Canada and the Cold War, three text-only pages detailed the 
Canadian role at the UN. A little more than one of these pages covered the Suez 
Crisis by focusing upon Lester Pearson's role in solving the threat to world peace. 
Mcinnis' book noted that Canada had acted on its own during that fall: "[t]he 
Canadian government shared Washington's opposition to the use of force, but 
went further than the American administration in its desire not merely to end the 
fighting, but to strive for a new approach to a permanent solution instead of 
merely returning to the status quo ante."194 Independent action was emphasized 
through descriptions of Canadian efforts that led to the creation of UNEF, as well 
as Canadians who provided the largest part of the forces sent to the Canal 
region.195 By giving Canada credit for solving this international problem and by 
placing it in a very positive light, contrary to how many PCs had understood the 
actions of Pearson and the Liberal government in 1956, Mcinnis' text exposed 
Canadian adolescents to a particular version of the events of the Suez Crisis. This 
account did not dwell on the rifts that had been caused between those who felt 
Canada should support Britain and those who felt that the cause of world peace 
193 Paul Axelrod notes that in 1950, most students in Ontario left high school for work after Grade I 0, but that by 
1960, this number had dropped dramatically. Axelrod, "Beyond the Progressive Education Debate: A Profile of 
Toronto Schooling in the 1950s," 232. 




was of higher import. Nor did it note that the Liberals had lost a considerable 
number of votes because of how the Suez Crisis was handled. Instead, its version 
of the events gave Canada the starring role as world peace broker. 
In Quebec, mention of peacekeeping first appeared in the 1960 textbook 
La civilisation catholique etfran<;aise au Canada by Gerard Filteau. Filteau's 
texts, including this one, were criticized by Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain in 
their report to the Bilingual and Bicultural Commission for being "rarely realistic, 
sometimes heroic (reading like a fairy tale or a succession of miracles), and 
sometimes rancorous or vengeful."196 Chapter 28, "Le canadien frarn;ais 
d'aujourd'hui," included the subsection, "Regard sur le monde," in which 
peacekeeping received a brief mention in one paragraph. In discussing 
peacekeeping, Filteau's text took a different tone than Mcinnis'. Instead of 
applauding Canada's commitment to world peace, he wrote «Ainsi a-t-il applaudi 
avec ardeur son premier ministre lorsque celui-ci, en 1956, a !'occasion de la crise 
de Suez, fit savoir a la Grande-Bretagne que le Canada ne la suivrait pas dans sa 
politique. » 197 In a text designed for a Quebec audience, Canada's refusal to go to 
war alongside Britain was highlighted, and students would have understood that 
this decision was in contrast to what took place in the First and Second World 
Wars as issues of conscription were covered at length in this text. While both 
Filteau's and Mcinnis' texts applauded Canada's independence, in the Quebec 
196 Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain, Canadian History Textbooks: A Comparative Study, Studies of the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 16. 
197 Gerard Filteau, la civilisation catholique et franr;aise au Canada (Montreal: Centre de psychologie et de 
pedagogie, 1960), 459. 
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text peacekeeping became something that could be praised for keeping Canada 
out of a war rather than something that actively led to world peace. 
Filteau's and Mcinnis' texts represented the beginning of a wave of textbooks 
that would make their way into Canadian classrooms throughout the 1960s. 
These newer works were commissioned after repeated criticisms were levelled 
against older works that tended to focus more on heroes in history and contained 
overtly racist language.198 These newer texts, however, maintained their emphasis 
on the political and military history of Canada by making wars, rebellions, and 
prime ministers their central figures. Canadian external affairs also received 
significantly less space in the history texts for Quebec schools than in their 
English counterparts, as the former spent more time on the internal history of 
Quebec.199 In both cases, the Suez Crisis was condensed into a small number of 
actors, a few dates, and facts that could be memorized and tested easily. 
Peacekeeping was therefore considered a useful topic in Canadian history 
textbooks because it could be part of what was traditionally emphasized in 
history classrooms. 
Throughout the 1960s, many of the leading writers in Canadian history 
produced works that were used in high school classrooms. 1963 saw the 
publication of two texts co-authored by Ramsay Cook: Canada and the United 
198 For examples of these texts, see Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 
1945-71. 
199 The standard format for a Quebec history text in this time period was three sections: the first dealt with 
European contact to 1763; the next, from 1763-1867; and the third, from 1867 to the present. In each section, 
chapters would normally include a brief description of what was happening in Canada generally, and then spend 
the bulk of the text on what was occurring in Quebec. 
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States: A Modern Study with Kenneth McNaught, and Canada: A Modern Study 
with John C. Ricker and John Saywell. That same year, J.M.S. Careless' Canada: 
A Story of Challenge was published, and he would also write The Canadians: 
1867-1967four years later. Many authors, including Ramsay Cook, had links to 
the Liberal Party, and their texts were overwhelmingly positive in their 
discussions of peacekeeping and Lester Pearson's conduct during the Suez Crisis. 
Cook was well-known for publicly supporting Pierre Trudeau's 1968 campaign to 
become Prime Minister, and was a Liberal supporter prior to that as well. His 
works treated peacekeeping as an issue in which a consensus had been reached; 
dissenting voices were not included. 
These newer works were intended for use in upper-year history courses that 
had Canada in the twentieth century as their focus. As with Mcinnis' text, they all 
included between one and five pages of text about Canada's peacekeeping efforts. 
In Canada and the United States: A Modern Study, peacekeeping was described 
as an appropriate foreign policy for a "middle power" like Canada, and Pearson's 
efforts were applauded as being contrary to the actions of the British, which were 
"unquestionably a violation of the United Nations Charter."200 In Careless' work, 
Canada was given the leading role in the Suez affair, and also a newfound 
independence; he wrote, "[a]s she had not previously followed the United States 
in bristling antagonism to Communist China, so now she did not endorse Anglo-
French armed intervention at Suez. Instead she sought once more to find a means 
200 Ramsay Cook and Kenneth McNaught, Canada and the United States: A Modern Study (Toronto: Clarke, 
Irwin and Company, Ltd., 1963), 479. 
101 
of peaceful adjustment through the United Nations."201 These authors preferred 
to downplay the tensions that the creation of UNEF had caused by emphasizing 
its initial success at separating Israel and Egypt, the awarding of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to Pearson, and by suggesting that this was a sign of Canada's independent 
foreign policy. 
In 1963, W.L. Morton's The Kingdom of Canada was published and included 
two text-only pages discussing peacekeeping. Morton was a supporter of the PC 
Party, though as Carl Berger has suggested, this had more to do with his revulsion 
at the tactics of the King-era Liberal government and its handling of Parliament 
and the national symbols of Canada, than a PC set of beliefs. 202 Despite this, his 
description of the Suez Crisis relied upon a language similar to that found in the 
books of more Liberal-minded authors. Lester Pearson's actions were called 
"brilliant," and the efforts of Canada to solve the Suez Crisis were applauded, 
though Morton did note that some people in English Canada were angered by the 
Liberal handling of the Suez Crisis.203 Thanks to his Nobel Peace Prize and 
because of the perceived utility of peacekeeping as a policy, Pearson seemed to be 
beyond reproach from both Liberal and PC authors. 
All of these authors were respected university professors who helped to 
disseminate a positive narrative about peacekeeping to students in the 1960s. 
They represented a generation of university-level scholars who took an active role 
201 J.M.S. Careless, Canada.A Story of Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 423. 
202 Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English- Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-
1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 251. 
203 W.L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada: A general history from earliest times (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart Ltd., 1963 ), 511. 
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in writing for younger Canadians, following the paths of Donald Creighton, 
Arthur Lower, and others. Their works were also, in part, an answer to the call 
put out by Northop Frye in his introduction to his 1962 work Design for 
Learning, which asked the question "does teaching in the schools, or at least the 
secondary schools, reflect contemporary conceptions of the subjects being 
taught?"204 Frye's work answered with a resounding no, but the publication of 
high-school level textbooks by leading historians during the middle years of the 
1960s suggests that some authors tried to bridge the gap between high school and 
university history. These authors did this in part by making their works positive 
narratives of Canadian history. The reverence for Pearson was a significant part 
of many texts which celebrated Canada in the 1950s as the culmination of 
decades of advancement in numerous fields, including international affairs. In so 
doing, they sought to cultivate a national consciousness in young Canadians that 
might lead them to greater achievements in this field. 
Despite a proliferation of positive messages about peacekeeping, such works 
did not entirely control how the events of the fall of 1956 were taught in Canadian 
history classrooms. A.B. Hodgetts' 1960 work Decisive Decades: A History of the 
Twentieth Century for Canadians, which would be revised in 1973 and remain in 
print for almost two decades, took a more critical tone. Hodgetts was a high 
school teacher in Port Hope, Ontario, and his voice would remain one of the 
loudest calling for reform in the teaching of Canadian history through the 1980s. 
204 Frye, Design for learning: Reports submitted to the Joint Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and 
the University of Toronto, 3. 
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He spread his discussion of the Suez Crisis over ten pages and included a small 
photo of Pearson, as well as a larger image of Nasser, in his text. Hodgetts noted 
that there was "bitter controversy" over the Suez Crisis and "[a]lthough Pearson 
received wide overseas acclaim and a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, his failure 
to give unquestioning support to Great Britain at the time of the Suez crisis 
undoubtedly helped to defeat the Liberal Party in the Canadian general election 
of 1957."20s This text recognized that the Suez Crisis had caused domestic discord 
and that Pearson's winning the Nobel Peace Prize did not make this disappear 
entirely. However, Hodgetts' text approved of peacekeeping as a policy and 
argued that Pearson deserved his international recognition. This allowed his 
narrative not to stray too far from the other books in use at the time. 
Hodgetts did not end his narrative complimenting Canada on how far it had 
progressed.206 He called for Canada to do more to bring about a more peaceful 
planet, but he doubted Canada's commitment to such a cause. This foreshadowed 
some of the texts approved for use later in the decade, when the limitations of 
peacekeeping became more widely known, and optimism about Canada's 
international standing began to wane. 
By 1961, the Canadian role in ONUC could also be mentioned in textbooks, 
though discussions of it often remained absent. After 1965, UNFICYP also began 
to be briefly mentioned in many textbooks. These missions could be fit into 
textbooks with little difficulty, since they showcased Canada's exerting itself in 
205 A.B. Hodgetts, Decisive Decades: A History of the Twentieth Century for Canadians (Toronto: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons (Canada) Limited, 1960), 547. 
206 Ibid., 548. 
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the international community in the name of peace. Those authors who mentioned 
ONUC did not find it necessary to go into much detail or depth about the mission 
to the Congo or its causes. Instead, phrases like "chaos in the Congo" and "the 
need to go and establish order" were employed.207 This emphasis on Canada's 
role was indicative of the discourse that surrounded the Congo at the time. 208 The 
whiteness of the Canadians and the inferiority of the Black Congolese was also 
expressed in a limited number of texts.209 These texts made the Congo into a 
place that was un-modern, since it required vast Canadian efforts to overcome 
the "immense Congo jungle."2 10 
The longest description of ONUC appeared in Lucien Brault's 1965 textbook 
Le Canada au XXe siecle. Brault's work contained eight pages of text about 
Canada's peacekeeping role, the longest description of peacekeeping operations 
in any Quebec-approved work to that point. Generally espousing a functional 
narrative, the description of ONUC was accompanied by pictures on three full 
pages. These photos showed white Canadian soldiers helping out the Congolese 
in a variety of ways, including setting up a radio station while several civilians 
looked on. 211 In the photos, the white Canadians were listed by name and place of 
birth (with most coming from Quebec), while the Congolese remained nameless. 
207 Hugh W. Peart and John Schaffter, The Winds of Change: A History of Canada and Canadians in the 
Twentieth Century (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1961 ), 444. 
208 See Colin McCullough, '"No Axe to Grind in Africa': Violence, Racial Prejudice and Media Depictions of the 
Canadian Peacekeeping Mission to the Congo, 1960-1964," in New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping 
ot a Global Consciousness, ed. Karen Dubinsky et al. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009). 
2 9 Gerald W.L. Nicholson, H.H. Boyd, and R.J. Rannie, Three Nations: Canada, Great Britain and the United 
States in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Mcclelland and Stewart Limited, 1962), 373-74. 
210 Peart and Schaffter, The Winds of Change: A History of Canada and Canadians in the Twentieth Century, 
444. 
211 Lucien Brault, Le Canada au ,,\Xe siecle (Scarborough: Nelson, 1965). 
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Though the photos that were used may have been issued by the Canadian military 
and hence included information only about the Canadians, such details made the 
Canadians the more important figures in the photos and the text, and suggested 
to students that Canadians were more important as peacekeepers than the people 
whom they were sent to help. 
All the textbooks used at this time combined positive descriptions of Canada's 
peacekeeping efforts with the valorization of Lester Pearson and his work to bring 
about world peace. In Mclnnis' 1959 work, Pearson was said to "embody" 
Canada's foreign policy, due to his role in drafting and implementing Canada's 
international actions.212 Most texts also mentioned Canada's increased 
international reputation because of Pearson's actions in founding UNEF. Indeed, 
if there was one fact in a textbook about peacekeeping, it was that Pearson won 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Additionally, if there was to be a photo relating to 
peacekeeping, then it was most likely one of Pearson receiving his Nobel Prize.213 
The language used to describe peacekeeping and making Lester Pearson its 
personification intimates strong approval for peacekeeping in these years. 
Whether expressed by J.M.S. Careless as "constructive achievement,'' or by Edgar 
Mclnnis as "a new self-confidence," this independent thinking in foreign policy 
212 Mcinnis, Canada: A Political and Social History, 530. 
213 A picture of Pearson winning the Nobel Prize appears in Paul Cornell et al., Canada: Unity in Diversity, 
English Edition ed. (Toronto, Montreal: Holt, Rineheart and Winston of Canada, Ltd, 1967); D.M.L. Farr, J.S. 
Moir, and S.R. Mealing, Two Democracies (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1963); John C. Ricker, John T. Saywell, 
and Elliot E. Rose, The Modern Era (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1960). 
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was done with a purpose.214 And while in English-Canadian texts friendly 
relations with both Britain and the US were seen as vital, in French texts, echoing 
the ideas of Filteau, what was most admired was Canada's ability to refuse 
outside interference in its politics. 21s 
Including peacekeeping as part of a general discussion of "Canada in the 
1950s" presented it as part of a narrative of growth and independence, 
culminating in the successes of the 1950s and hope for Canada's future. 216 Such a 
narrative, authored as it was by both Liberal and PC voices, demonstrates 
peacekeeping's adoption as an activity that suited Canada as an independent 
nation. A former high school teacher, Bob Davis, described the books produced in 
this period as having realized that "this new conception of our own nationhood 
had also given us a new conception of our role in international affairs, a role 
many people associate with Lester B. Pearson."217 By linking Pearson, 
peacekeeping, and a new national identity, these texts furthered the symbolic 
attachment of many Canadians to peacekeeping. 
Remaining Functional, 1967 to 1980 
The expulsion of UNEF from Egypt in 1967 forced many Canadians to re-
examine their country's commitment to international peacekeeping. While 
peacekeeping's value as a foreign policy declined after Pierre Trudeau became 
214 Careless, Canada.A Story of Challenge; Edgar Mcinnis, The North American Nations (Toronto: J.M. Dent 
and Sons (Canada) Limited, 1963). 
215 Robert Lacour-Gayet, Histoire du Canada (Paris: Fayard, 1966), 546. 
216 J. Bartlett Brebner, Canada: A Modern History (Ann Arbor Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 
I 960), 544. 
217 Davis, Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-
95, 34. 
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Prime Minister in 1968, such a shift never took place in Canadian history texts. In 
English works, the Suez Crisis remained the focal point of any discussion of 
peacekeeping and it was still presented as evidence of Canada's independence 
and maturity as a nation. Descriptions of peacekeeping continued to be positive, 
though newer texts more frequently addressed the limits of peacekeeping as a 
policy, and some came to express a longing for the 1950s. In French works, the 
post-Quiet Revolution period saw Quebec's history courses centred on the history 
of Quebec, which left little space to discuss peacekeeping's history or its present 
value. Peacekeeping'~ symbolic nature permitted its continued inclusion in most 
textbooks during this period though the overall educational goals of each 
province affected its use in a given text. 
From 1968 to 1980, new curricula introduced in English Canadian high 
schools allowed students more elective courses, fewer mandatory history ones, 
less reliance on textbooks, and the use of more audio-visual materials.21s In 
Alberta, "value issues" such as "Is war a legitimate means of settling disputes 
among nations?" were central in the Department of Education's Program of 
Studies for Senior High Schools.21 9 In Quebec, conversely, a decided increase in 
the state control of education occurred after 1963, though the new Ministry of 
218 Two important examples of this shift are the Parent Report released in Quebec in 1963 and the widely-
influential 1968 report, Living and Learning for the Ontario Ministry of Education. These reports, and the 
many others that were submitted to various Ministries of Education across the country, led to the end of 
standardized examinations at the end of high school in some provinces, which freed teachers to explore 
new topics in their classrooms. In English Canada, Canadian Studies Classes became mandatory in grades 9 
or 10. In Quebec, more history courses were required, though many of these were during the elementary school 
years. Ibid; George Martell, ed. The Politics of the Canadian Public School (Toronto: James Lorimer and 
Company, 1974). 
219 Von Heyking, Creating Citizens: History and Identity in Alberta's Schools. 1905-1980, 204. 
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Education did share many of the same policy goals as its English counterparts. 
Textbooks published during these years reflected these goals by getting students 
to examine primary source materials, evaluate bias, investigate themes, and come 
to their own conclusions. 220 
As part of these units, peacekeeping was now more often described using 
language that centred upon Canada's contribution to world peace. One teacher, 
Mrs. R.A. Proulx of Chateauguay, Quebec, sent a letter to the Department of 
External Affairs in the spring of 1968 asking for resources for her class to use to 
meet these standards. She noted in her letter that the class would be using the 
"inquiry method" to understand Canadian history, and asked for "information on 
Canada's role in the UN especially in peace keeping endeavours."221 The DEA sent 
back several speeches and two books on Canada and the UN to assist Mrs. Proulx 
with her course construction. Teachers like Mrs. Proulx demonstrate how 
peacekeeping continued to be employed by teachers to satisfy educational goals. 
Many changes to history curricula came in response to criticisms of high 
school history which appeared in the second volume of the Bilingual and 
Bicultural Commission and in works such as A.B. Hodgetts' 1968 What Culture? 
What Heritage?222 Though a textbook author, he chastised teachers for relying 
too heavily on texts to help tell the story of Canadian history. This suggests that 
220 Davis, Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-
95, 48. 
221 LAC, Mrs. R.A. Proulx, RG 25-A-3-c, file 3. "Gentlemen," 1968. 
222 Trudel and Jain found that "all teaching is centred on them [textbooks]; it is their content rather than the 
teacher's commentary which is retained by the student." Trudel and Jain, Canadian History Textbooks: A 
Comparative Study, xi. 
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the content of the textbooks in Canadian history to this point remained relevant 
in most classrooms. Hodgetts called the teaching of Canadian history defective 
because for him, "the countless hours wasted by the students each week, going 
through the mechanical motions of attempting unsuccessfully to find purpose in 
so many Canadian studies classrooms, sitting in abject boredom, and developing 
with each passing forty-minute lesson a deeper apathy, is a condition that should 
be tolerated no longer in our schools."223 For Hodgetts, the positive narrative of 
Canadian history that appeared in most textbooks to describe topics like 
peacekeeping was not helping young people learn about their country. And, with 
the disappearance of some provincial exams in subjects like history during the 
1960s, such adherence to a textbook seemed far less necessary than in the past. 
One text which addressed these concerns was Canada: Unity in Diversity, 
a collaboration among French and English authors Marcel Trudel, Paul Cornell, 
Jean Hamelin, and Fernand Ouellet, approved for use in classrooms in 1967.224 
Their book took Anglo-French relations to be the central theme of Canadian 
history, not the progressive narrative common to most English texts, or La 
Survivance, common to most French texts. Approved for use in both English and 
French classrooms, and remaining in use throughout the next decade, this text 
was a highly-regarded attempt to break down the barriers between English- and 
French-Canadian history. Peacekeeping was included in a large part of the 
chapter, "Canada in the post-war World." There were four pages of text about 
223 A.B. Hodgetts, What Culture? What Heritage?: A Study of Civic Education in Canada (Toronto: Ontario 
Institute for Studies in Education, 1968), 16. 
224 The French title was Canada: Unite et diversite. 
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Canada's peacekeeping role, accompanied by a chart which listed all of the UN 
peacekeeping missions in which Canada had served, as well as photos of Pearson 
at the UN and peacekeepers in the Sinai and Cyprus. 22s By including pictures that 
matched the text that appeared on the page, the authors appealed to what was 
often seen as an increasingly visual adolescent culture. Canada: Unity in 
Diversity covered peacekeeping in a favourable manner, and the authors noted 
that "[h]aving no territorial ambitions and never having had colonies, Canada's 
advice has been acceptable on occasion to Afro-Asian countries deeply suspicious 
of most European nations."226 They also lauded Pearson and the Liberals for 
trying to advance the cause of world peace, and emphasized Pearson's being 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a key event. Therefore, those students who took 
the minimal Canadian history requirements continued to encounter positive 
descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping role in their texts. 
Another way peacekeeping could be taught was through the use of audio-
visual materials. One example was The Tenth Decade: The Diefenbaker-Pearson 
Years series co-produced by the CBC and the National Film Board. This eight-
part film offered one-hour-long segments about the years 1957 to 1967. Made in 
1971, the films primarily consisted of interviews with some of the larger figures of 
the time in Canadian politics, including Lester Pearson and John Diefenbaker. In 
looking at the Suez Crisis, the theme of "international applause versus domestic 
225 The inclusion of pictures also forced this text, and many others, to increase in size and length to cope 
with the increased amount of information. 
226 Cornell et al., Canada: Unity in Diversity, 478. 
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divide" for Pearson's actions was of central concern. 227 While the textbooks of the 
early 1960s rarely spoke of such divides, they could be presented in the 1970s 
because new leaders and issues had come to the fore. 
Additional resources included audio cassette interviews with Lester Pearson 
and John W. Holmes, a leading Canadian diplomat. The former was part of the 
Canadian Public Figures on Tape series made by the Ontario Institute for 
Studies in Education [OISE], in 1972. The latter, titled Diplomacy and Foreign 
Policy, was also produced by OISE in 1974. As one can expect, these tapes 
suggested that "nothing is more important for Canada than a peaceful world. "22 8 
Peacekeeping was presented as something that was, and remained, an important 
Canadian international role. Despite peacekeeping's waning popularity with the 
Trudeau government, these materials continued to espouse positive assessments 
of peacekeeping and Lester Pearson as the central figure in peacekeeping's 
creation. 
Elective upper-year classes in Canadian history often offered alternative 
conceptions of peacekeeping. One of the best texts available was Jack 
Granatstein's 1969 edited work Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle 
Power or Satellite? This work contained excerpts from speeches by Lester 
Pearson, articles by diplomats and members of the Department of External 
Affairs, as well by academics like Granatstein himself. These academics doubted 
the present and future utility of Canada's peacekeeping role. Though all the 
227 
"Prologue to Power," (Canada: CBC, National Film Board, 1971 ). 
228 Arthur Andrew and John W Holmes, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy (Toronto: OISE, 1974), audio cassette 
recording. 
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authors lauded the 1950s as a "golden age" of foreign policy, they called 
peacekeeping the "most attractive and idealistic" opportunity for Canada after the 
Second World War in the realm of foreign policy.229 Such assessments were in 
line with the thinking of the Trudeau government, and tried to separate 
peacekeeping as a policy from its more symbolic connotations. 
Donald Creighton's Canada's First Century: 1867-1967was also available to 
use in these classes. Then one of the foremost names in Canadian history, 
Creighton was also an adamant PC critic of the Liberal government's actions in 
1956. Creighton titled his chapter on the 1950s "Point of no return," and 
lamented Canada's turning away from Britain and, in his eyes, embracing the 
United States. In his attacks, Creighton chose to aim his words at former Prime 
Minister Louis St. Laurent rather than at Pearson. He noted that "St. Laurent 
shared this characteristically American suspicion of 'British imperial interests' in 
the Middle East; and nothing could irritate his prickly French-Canadian 
susceptibilities faster than the operations of British diplomacy."23° In this single 
phrase, Creighton degraded French Canadians, attacked the Liberal Party, 
questioned the future survival of Canada, and expressed his desire for a return to 
closer ties between Canada and Britain. Pearson, however, seemed to be above 
his attacks, and received credit for solving the Suez Crisis, as well as for winning 
the Nobel Peace Prize. Like the PC politicians in 1956, Creighton did not question 
229 Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?, 149. 
23° Creighton, Canada's First Century, 1867-1967, 298. 
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the value of peacekeeping as a policy, though he could not accept its more 
symbolic associations with a less Anglophilic Canada. 
Quebec-approved texts did not try to change how peacekeeping was perceived 
by students because they had domestic politics as their primary concern. But 
texts that had come into use in the previous decade continued to discuss 
peacekeeping as a constructive step towards Canadian independence. Canada-
Quebec: Synthese Historique, approved for use in 1969, contained two pages of 
text on peacekeeping, along with photos of Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson. 
It remained a popular textbook through to 1980, along with Trudel et al Canada: 
Unite et Diversite. A 1979 revision of Michel Brunet's 1963 work Histoire du 
Canada par les Textes, Tome II (1855-1960) also contained a discussion of the 
Suez Crisis as one of its last issues covered. Brunet included St. Laurent's 
speeches in Parliament in 1956 about the crisis, as well as a speech by Raoul 
Poulin, an independent member from Beauce, Quebec. Poulin was quoted as 
saying« J'approuve egalement, non par plaisir mais par devoir, ce geste penible, 
tragique et douloureux par lequel l'ONU a du reprouver la conduite de nos allies, 
l'Angleterre et la France. »2 31 Because this text was updated from a decade earlier, 
it still presented peacekeeping as being compatible with the Quebecois desire for 
isolationism. 2 32 It is also a reminder that revised editions of older works could 
still be used in classrooms, and these works often maintained older narrative 
forms and included minimal changes to remain in use. 
231 Michel Brunet, Histoire du Canada par Les textes, tome ff (1855-1960) (Fides, 1979), 230. 
232 Ibid., 216. 
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By 1977, most Quebec texts focused more on language issues, which had been 
so prominent over the past twenty years, than on the narrative of Canadian 
independence. Peacekeeping had been included in earlier texts as an example of 
Canada's shedding its colonial past, but it had no real place in these later texts. 
Newer works like Gerard Cachat's L'aventurefran<;aise enAmerique: un deft, 
1534-1976 contained only brief mentions of peacekeeping. In discussing the 
1950s and Canada more broadly, Cachat wrote : « il y joue un role important et 
souvent meconnu: Lester B. Pearson ya ete un des principaux artisans d'une 
politique pour le "maintien de la paix. »233 No details about specific peacekeeping 
missions were given, and the Suez Crisis and Pearson's Nobel Prize win were both 
lacking from this text. Instead, the Quiet Revolution and the rise of the PQ 
dominated the section on modern Canada and modern Quebec. This suggests a 
shift in Pearson's legacy in Quebec from a politician who was best known for his 
worldly actions, to the domestic Liberal leader of the 1960s. If Pearson was 
mentioned at length in the texts of the 1970s in Quebec, it was usually for issuing 
the new Canadian flag, or for instituting the Bilingual and Bicultural 
Commission, rather than for having conceived peacekeeping. 
These Que bee texts, while almost always marginalizing Canadian foreign 
policy after the Second World War, did reflect a pan-Canadian movement to 
return to a more structured high school curriculum. The declining enrolment 
numbers and reduced school budgets of the 1970s during the years of stagflation 
233 Gerard Cachat, l 'aventure fram;aise en Arnerique: un defi, 1534-1976 (Montreal: Li dee, 1977), 50. 
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resulted in many courses that had been created by teachers being cut in favour of 
a core group of courses.234 George Tomkins suggests that Nova Scotia and Quebec 
led what he called a PC backlash against the open-concept running of high 
schools, and the return of textbook-centred history curricula.2 3s In Quebec, Bill 71 
was passed in December of 1979, which reinforced the ability of the Minister of 
Education to set curriculum organization and content, giving the Ministry 
considerably more power to exercise some form of control over the content of all 
history courses. 
Discussions of peacekeeping in English Canadian textbooks changed little 
from 1967 to 1980 despite new educational goals, new textbooks, and new audio-
visual resources. It continued to be presented to young people as a role that 
suited Canada. This speaks to the resilience of this version of peacekeeping's past 
and also to the inertia of textbook authors. Peacekeeping, as an entrenched 
subject in Canadian history textbooks, continued to have a place in English 
Canadian texts, though its relevance in Quebec was disappearing. 
Peacekeeping and the Peace Studies Movement in the 1980s 
After 1980, there were concerted efforts in many English textbooks to 
promote peacekeeping as a behaviour for young Canadians to adopt in their lives. 
Descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping past co-existed with such language, 
though peacekeeping's weaknesses were normally addressed as well. Lester 
Pearson's career also became viewed nostalgically, as writers realized with some 
234 Tomkins, A Common Countenance: Stability and Change in the Canadian Curriculum, 315. 
235 Ibid., 413. 
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bittersweetness that no other Canadian had taken such a large role in promoting 
peace in the world. This led to whole chapters of many textbooks being devoted to 
peacekeeping in English Canada. At the same time, in the 1980s a vibrant peace 
movement in Quebec used progressive language to try to change the behaviours 
of children and parents while finding little need to refer to peacekeeping to make 
such claims. The success of this movement will be contrasted to what was gained 
through English depictions of Canada as a nation of past and future "Blue 
Berets." 
In the early months of 1982, two grade ten classes in Medicine Hat, Alberta 
worked on a unit examining Canada's role in peacekeeping operations. As a part 
of that unit, each student was required to write a letter either in support of or 
against peacekeeping to then Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark 
MacGuigan.2 36 One of these letters was written by "a concerned citizen," 16-year-
old Richard Pomareinke, who provided seven reasons that he was impressed with 
Canada's peacekeeping efforts. They were: 
1. Canada has a reputation of being impartial and willing to pay the cost. 
2. Canadian forces are highly experienced in peacekeeping. 
3. Peacekeeping prevents major wars from breaking out. 
4. Canada has refused to make nuclear and atomic weapons even though it 
possesses the technology to do so. 
5. By peacekeeping we have become friendly with many important nations. 
6. Peacekeeping has been a part of Canada's identity for many years. 
7. Canada has earned international gratitude and admiration for its role in 
peacekeeping. 
236 LAC, Medicine Hat High School, RG 25-A-3-c, "To the Minister of External Affairs," 1982. 
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Richard's arguments, like those of many of his classmates, matched the 
language of English Canadian textbooks from the 1960s onwards. This suggests 
that at least for the purposes of writing letters to the Ministry, Richard and his 
classmates read and adopted the language of a Canadian history textbook. Those 
letter-writers who did not like peacekeeping, and there were some, also learned 
the criticisms of peacekeeping that were specific to the texts of the 1980s, namely 
that Canada was paying too high a financial cost, that peacekeeping missions had 
cost too many Canadian lives, and that other nations were not doing their share 
to pay for peacekeeping operations. Though peacekeeping had not been a central 
focus of the Trudeau government's foreign policy, these students, their teachers, 
and the texts they read for this assignment all gave peacekeeping a central role in 
how Canada would engage in the world in the 1980s. 
The textbooks available for use in classrooms across Canada in the 1980s 
differed in many ways from those published earlier. 2 37 The form of the textbook 
continued to change. Aides such as teacher's guides, an introductory page, 
summary questions, activities for students, key terms, and side boxes that 
highlighted topics that appeared in the main body of the text began to become 
standard features in approved textbooks. It was no longer the case that Canadian 
history textbooks would present their narrative in a linear format without 
pictures or breaks in the text. 
237 The (often reluctant) inclusion of women's history, as well as a new emphasis on social and cultural themes 
meant that the older political narrative familiar to most history textbooks began to be altered in favour of newer 
topics of study. See Virginia Robeson and Christine Sylvester, Teaching Canadian Studies: An Evaluation of 
Print Materials, Grades 1-13 (Toronto: OISE Press, 1980), vii. 
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In contrast to the notable authors who wrote textbooks in the 1960s, by the 
1980s most were written by high school teachers who had taken on 
administrative roles within their schools. These authors collaborated with an 
academic to ensure their works were accurate and met ministry guidelines. 238 
There was a shift away from producing texts for high school audiences among 
university level historians after the 1960s and 1970s. As writers became 
increasingly interested in producing works for a specialized audience, the 
dislocation between the most current historical research and what was being 
taught in history textbooks widened. 
Textbooks used in classrooms in the 1980s were similar to those of decades 
earlier in one respect: many of the texts from twenty years earlier were still in 
print and in use in classrooms across Canada. Keeping a book in print for as long 
as possible, as well as producing two language versions, were ways for publishers 
to maximize their sales across the country and to try to maintain their slim profit 
margins. Trudel's, Cornell's, Hamelin's, and Ouellet's textbook was still one of the 
more popular textbooks across English Canada. Education critic Paul Bennett 
noted that Canada: A Modern Study by Ramsay Cook and Kenneth McNaught 
was still in use in many classes seventeen years after its initial publication, as 
were many of the other texts approved for use since 1963.2 39 These realities made 
it possible for the student in 1980 to receive in many ways the same narrative 
238 Patricia Baldwin and Douglas Baldwin, "The Portrayal of Women in Classroom Textbooks," Canadian Social 
Studies 26, no. 3 ( 1992): 110. 
239 Paul W. Bennett, Rediscovering Canadian History (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 
1980), 144. 
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about peacekeeping as a student in 1963, though teachers were being urged to 
rely more on their textbooks in the 1980s than they were when these works were 
newly published. 
Peacekeeping had merited inclusion in every approved textbook for the 
previous twenty years, and this entrenched it in the overall narrative of most 
Canadian history texts. 24° However, many authors and teachers of Canadian 
history stressed the need for new topics of study, including peace in the 1980s. 
The peace studies movement in education had its roots in the efforts of the 1960s 
to raise awareness about the dangers of nuclear power. Those who wanted more 
peace education believed that the renewed Cold War rhetoric of Ronald Reagan 
in the United States and the nuclear arms build-up made the immediate threat of 
a nuclear war more pressing than it had been for twenty years. 2 41 
One call for more peace education came from History and Social Science 
Teacher. Published from 1974- 1990, History and Social Science Teacher 
provided a forum for teachers across Canada, at all levels, to discuss trends and 
issues that were relevant to their careers. 2 42 This publication dedicated a double 
issue in 1985 to the topic of peace education, receiving an "enthusiastic response" 
to its call for submissions. Ken Osborne, an educational historian and also the 
editor of History and Social Science Teacher, wrote: "[a]s teachers, we are 
concerned with children and can hardly avoid their questions and their fears, 
24
°For more on why textbook authors rarely remove topics from their works, see Apple and Christian Smith, eds., 
The Politics of the Textbook, 10. 
241 Ken Osborne, "Peace Education: Introduction," History and Social Science Teacher 20, no. 3/4 ( 1985): 7. 
242 Davis, Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-
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which increasingly revolve around 'the bomb' and its impact on the future."2 43 
These concerns were echoed by Terry Carson, a professor at the University of 
Alberta, who believed that students were learning about nuclear proliferation and 
African destabilization from the media, and so teachers needed to engage with 
those subjects. 2 44 The educators who contributed to this issue all recognized the 
nuclear threat, and placed a great responsibility on teachers and students to bring 
about peace in the world. These English-Canadian authors also believed the 
school classroom was the appropriate forum for students to learn about such 
issues and to engage critically with them. 
At the same time, not all of the contributors felt comfortable asking for peace 
studies to become a mandatory part of the Canadian history curriculum. Some 
believed this could lead to the various education ministries setting the framework 
for studying peace. Osborne felt, "peace education ... needs to raise a sceptical 
eyebrow if it attracts the support of those in power in any significant way, since 
this means that it is probably asking the wrong questions or that it has been 
unknowingly co-opted."2 4s Despite these fears, many school boards, including the 
Toronto Board of Education, as well as institutions such as OISE, were in favour 
of adding peace studies to the content of history classes. 2 46 
243 Osborne, "Peace Education: Introduction," 7. 
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Walt Werner, a professor of education at the University of British Columbia, 
felt that simply telling students about the dangers of war was not enough to 
change their behaviour. Instead, to affect student attitudes, he suggested that role 
models and symbols of peace should be given a place of prominence in history 
classrooms. He argued: "[i]f the accomplishments of peacemakers are neglected 
in historical or contemporary studies, then generals become heroes by default, 
the tough talk of political leaders may be equated with strength, and the use of 
military force may be viewed as legitimate foreign policy."247 And while he was 
not mentioned by name in this article, Lester Pearson, and peacekeeping, would 
become central to how peace studies would be brought into Canadian classrooms 
in the 1980s. 
Though perhaps not in line with what some peace studies advocates 
envisioned, several textbooks that came into use in the 1980s devoted 
considerable space to issues of peace in Canada and in the world. The peace 
studies issue of History and Social Science Teacher was reporting on a trend in 
education, and several works had already appeared and been approved for use in 
classrooms that drew upon the topic of peace in the 1980s. These texts normally 
suggested that peacekeeping could be a unifying force in Canada, as it met the 
approval of both French and English Canadians. 248 This language was popular 
with the Pearson government in the 1960s, but also found considerable purchase 
with Brian Mulroney's PCs in the 1980s (It is notable that the use of this language 
247 Walt Werner, "Conceptions of Peace Education," History and Social Science Teacher 20, no. 3/4 ( 1985): 32. 
248 Daniel Francis and Sonia Riddoch, Our Canada: A Social and Political History (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1985), 407. 
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in textbooks pre-dated the Mulroney government, making textbooks an early site 
of a renewed belief in the symbolic power of peacekeeping). 
Canada Today was a popular textbook which argued that all Canadians 
should be peacekeepers. Approved for use in classrooms for over twenty years, it 
was written by three high school educators, Angus L. Scully, Carl F. Smith, and 
Daniel J. McDevitt.249 Though changes were made between the first edition, 
which appeared in 1977, and the second edition, which appeared in 1988, the 
basic structure of the textbook remained the same. The fifth unit of this text, 
"Canada and the World," had chapter 14, "Canada and Peace," as one of its units 
of study. It began with a discussion of peace in the everyday lives of Canadians. 
Students were told to follow certain procedures that replicated the peacekeeping 
process when they faced conflict in their lives. Compromise should be sought 
whenever possible, and the authors also recommended students, "[a]sk for a 
break. Take a cooling off period to think things over. During the break write down 
what you want and what others want."2s0 Such actions mimicked the 
peacekeeping process, and were accompanied by images of young people 
disengaging from high-stress situations. According to these authors, 
peacekeeping need not simply be a foreign policy option. Instead, it appeared as a 
model for all conflict resolution, and was also described as a means to solve 
disputes between different nations, thus giving Canadians a role in the 1980s that 
249 Scully was the head of history at Brampton Centennial Secondary School, Smith was a consultant for the 
gifted programme in history and the social sciences with the Peel Board of Education, and McDevitt was the 
head of history at Glenforest Secondary School in Mississauga. 
250 Angus L. Scully, Carl F. Smith, and Daniel J. McDevitt, Canada Today Second Edition (Toronto: Prentice-
Hall, 1988), 380. 
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suited their peaceable natures and allowed peacekeeping to become one of the 
most important ways in which Canadians engaged with other people in the world. 
Later in the chapter, the individual missions that Canada had participated in 
were described in depth, including UNEF, ONUC, and UNFICYP. There was also 
an interview with Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, 
who supported future Canadian peacekeeping efforts. By presenting the missions 
of the past in tandem with calls for Canadians to play an active peacekeeping role 
in the 1980s, this textbook promoted an active Canadian internationalism in the 
name of peace. Some of the hazards of peacekeeping were presented in this work, 
as students were asked to look critically at the financial cost of peacekeeping, as 
well as debate whether Canada should continue to take part in such actions 
through the United Nations. However, the summary of the chapter suggested that 
both peacekeeping and peace were of vital importance to all Canadians. The text 
argued, 
[i]n our society it is not up to others to create and keep peace. It is up to 
us to take steps to have the kind of world that we want. Canada is committed 
to peace through involvement in the United Nations and through its various 
attempts to advance the cause of peace in the world. There are a variety of 
ways in which Canadians can express themselves about peace. It is up to all 
citizens to make their voices heard. 2 s1 
The goal of global peace was emphasized in this text, and a renewed sense of 
Canada's potential to help in this process through peacekeeping was seen as a key 
role for Canada to play in the 1980s. 
251 Ibid., 404. 
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Lester Pearson was also featured in a section on "Heroes of Peace," which 
praised his efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the Suez Crisis and his 
Nobel Peace Prize win. The treatment accentuated his positive traits while 
acknowledging that no Canadian since him had played such a key role on the 
international stage. The "Heroes of Peace" section also discussed the life and 
work of Mother Teresa, creating a direct link between her work and that done by 
Pearson.252 Later, activities for students included a "Reading Better" section 
which said to "describe in your own words what Lester Pearson and Mother 
Teresa did for peace," and, "write headlines that could have been used when it 
was announced that Nobel Prizes had been awarded to these two people."2 53 Such 
valorizations of Pearson seem to be directly taken from the article by Walt 
Werner in History and Social Science Teacher, in which he called for Canada to 
praise the peacemakers. By providing students with activities that linked Pearson 
and Mother Teresa, this text allowed more time to be spent on Pearson as a figure 
of importance, helping to reinforce his central role in the narrative of 
peacekeeping in Canada. 
Canada Today was not alone in equating peacekeeping with a Canadian 
national identity or a progressive vision of Canada's potential to actively promote 
peace in the world in the 1980s as it had in the past. 254 Other new works normally 
252 Ibid., 382. 
253 Ibid., 383. 
254 Other examples include Gillian Bartlett and Janice Gallivan, eds., Canada: History in the Making (Toronto: 
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included a teacher's guide as part of their materials. In the guide to one such text, 
Canada in the World: Choosing a Role, teachers were told they could discuss the 
benefits of peacekeeping by asking their students to think about how Canadian 
actions had benefited the world and what other methods existed to stop conflicts 
internationally.2 55 Some of the activities recommended included making a map of 
all the places that Canada had sent peacekeepers, inviting a guest speaker from 
the Canadian Forces, and having students write a short essay on whether Canada 
should continue to be a part of peacekeeping efforts. Other texts encouraged 
students to engage in role-playing exercises and imagine themselves as Canadian 
peacekeepers. 2 56 Alternatively, students were told that they could express their 
feelings on the topic of peacekeeping by collecting "pictures, poetry to songs" into 
a "peace book" for their class. 257 In all these cases, students were being 
encouraged to think about the issue of world peace, and peacekeeping was seen a 
uniquely Canadian solution to this issue. 
Though peacekeeping was being portrayed in symbolically diverse ways in 
English Canadian texts, the works that were being used in Quebec did not share 
such ideas. The textbooks that were approved for use in high school history 
classrooms maintained their focus on the events that had taken place inside 
Century, Second Edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1988); Francis and Riddoch, Our Canada: A 
Social and Political History. 
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Quebec after the Second World War. 2ss Most textbooks had a single page of 
Canadian content at the outset of each chapter, followed by numerous pages of 
content related to life in Quebec. In a chapter on "La societe quebecoise d'apres-
guerre (1945-1960)," in one such text, Nouvelle-France, Canada - Quebec: 
Histoire du Quebec et du Canada, peacekeeping was given a brief mention as an 
action which the Canadian government undertook to try to stop a war between 
the Israelis and the Egyptians. 2 s9 No mention of Britain, the domestic 
controversy, or Lester Pearson followed, which suggests peacekeeping had 
minimal importance in the Quebec high school curriculum. It was only at the end 
of the book, when a timeline of events which occurred in Quebec, Canada, the 
United States and the world was presented, that Pearson and the Nobel Prize 
were mentioned, and the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez garnered seven 
words.2 6° 
Despite the approved ministry textbooks emphasizing domestic political and 
social issues, a very strong peace studies movement that was international in its 
scope emerged in Quebec in the 1980s. Unlike in English Canada, an emphasis on 
international peace did not lead to students learning primarily about 
peacekeeping. Instead, local celebrities, politicians, and ordinary Quebeckers 
were tasked with encouraging peace in the world. 
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Efforts to introduce peace education into Quebec classrooms were 
spearheaded by a group called Pacijou, who created a wide variety of teaching 
aids and multimedia materials that were to be used in elementary to college level 
classrooms. As with their English counterparts, Pacijou recognized that, 
« [d]epuis l'arrivee du president Reagan et de sa rhetorique belliqueuse aux 
Etats-unis, les jouets de guerre n'ont cesse de prendre une part croissante d'un 
marche colossal. »2 61 The threat of nuclear conflict forced the organizers of 
Pacijou to look at the toys, video games, and other forms of adolescent 
entertainment that glorified conflict and to attempt a boycott of such 
entertainment. 
Unlike the approach taken by peace studies in the English Canadian curricula, 
the Pacijou group actively tried to sway the parents, teachers, as well as the 
students who were reading their materials, to reject war toys and violent ideas in 
Quebec culture. Almost all their materials on peace education included a page 
directed at parents, to try to discourage them from buying war toys for Christmas. 
The reasoning for this was as follows: « Si on donne a son enfant une trousse 
d'infirmier, on peut s'attendre qu'iljoue a soigner. Si on lui donne unjeu de 
construction, on prevoit qu'il va construire quelque chose. Et si on lui donne un 
jouet de guerre, il faut bien s'attendre qu'il joue a la guerre, qu'il fasse, la journee 
261 Christophe Auger, Cessez le feu!: guide pedagogique (Montreal: Editions Fi des, 1987), I. 
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meme, la guerre a quelqu'un d'imaginaire OU de reel, dans la maison OU le 
quartier. »2 62 
Parents were seen as vital to the project of teaching children about peace. 
Pacijou saw an immediacy in the nuclear threat that led to their issuing a 
challenge to parents to make change in the world. One initiative of Pacijou that 
was aimed at parents was the desire for a "vote populaire" to be taken in Quebec 
that would force those who might advocate for war to opt for peace, something 
that students could long for, but only their parents could help to endorse. 2 63 
In taking these steps, the Quebec peace studies movement was more 
innovative than its English Canadian counterpart. Rather than wait for textbook 
writers to include sections on peace, and rather than rely on the various 
education ministries to accept the themes and spirit of the peace movement, 
Pacijou produced materials and made them available for use in classrooms from 
kindergarten to college. These works were specialized and would not include 
peace studies in only a single chapter, as the approved textbooks would. These 
cahiers also tried to engage students in a variety of ways besides presenting them 
with a story about Canada's contributions to the world. The teaching aids that 
were produced for use in the elementary classrooms had children fill out 
crossword puzzles and word searches that contained the language of human 
262 Ibid., 21. 
263 Centrale de l'enseignement du Quebec, Eduquer a la paix pour desarmer le monde: Guide d'intervention 
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rights, peace, and environmental change.2 64 Those for high schools asked 
students to work on publicity campaigns that tried to change consumer habits. 
Rather than celebrate a concept like peacekeeping and its global attempts at 
conflict resolution, which English Canadian textbooks discussed at length, 
Pacijou's materials invited students to "reach down into their very own culture to 
see how they [ we]re being conditioned to accept the inevitability and excitement 
of organized violence. "2 6s 
These efforts also had some striking results in Quebec. Pacijou reported that 
over 400 schools had participated in its campaign calling for the inclusion of 
peace studies at all levels of Quebec schools. In addition, 12,000 children donated 
over 25,000 war toys to help build a peace sculpture at Laval University. Finally, 
over 100,000 signatures were gathered on a petition asking for the removal of 
violent television programming and an increase in government funding for non-
violent alternatives. 2 66 The success of the peace studies movement in Quebec was 
also due to its support from the Catholic Church, women's groups, and the 
Montreal Transit Authority, all of whom raised funds, donated space for Pacijou 
to use, and helped organize the signing of the petitions. Such a broad array of 
supporters helped foster a strong peace studies movement in Quebec in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, though it was a movement that was specific to Quebec. 
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The 1980s saw a remarkable increase in the discussion of peace-related issues 
in textbooks and other materials for use in high school history classrooms. In 
English Canada, peacekeeping was central to learning about Canada's past, 
present, and future. Perhaps more surprisingly, many of these texts presented 
peacekeeping as an effective strategy for young Canadians to employ in their day-
to-day lives. Such calls did not find resonance in Quebec, in part because by the 
1980s textbooks had largely dropped any references to peacekeeping. Despite this 
decreased relevance for the Quebec curriculum, peacekeeping occupied a larger 
and more privileged place in English textbooks and educational materials at the 
end of the 1980s than it ever had before. 
Peacekeeping and the New World Order, 1990 to 1997 
The belief in Canada's potential to help promote world peace and exert a part 
of its national character on the international stage through peacekeeping changed 
after the missions to Somalia and Yugoslavia were undertaken. Some authors 
chose to section off these newer missions as different from Canada's 
peacekeeping past. Others took the bold step of detailing the problems raised by 
these missions, and asked students and teachers to reconsider Canada's long-
standing peacekeeping commitment. This decline in the perceived utility of 
peacekeeping also encouraged authors to focus more upon its symbolic value, 
which further distanced the content in textbooks from what was taking place on a 
given mission. In Quebec, peacekeeping continued to hold little value in the 
history curriculum, and any mentions of it remained inconsequential. 
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As with all events, there were a few years between UNOSOM and UNPROFOR 
and their inclusion in textbooks. John Saywell's 1994 textbook Canada: 
Pathways to the Present was the first to mention these missions as part of its 
four pages discussing peacekeeping. In a chapter titled "The World Beyond," 
Saywell called what occurred in Somalia a tragedy, though he did not mention the 
details of the killings by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Rather, the text stated: 
"Canadians were on the ground and in the air, but it was soon clear that there 
could be no long term solution to the problem in Somalia until political stability 
and peace were restored in the country."2 67 Saywell believed peacekeeping's 
popularity with the media was a reason why Canada had sent its troops to 
Somalia.2 68 By ignoring the ugly ending to UNOSOM, this text asked students to 
question the utility of peacekeeping as a policy in the present without presenting 
the actual harm that such a mission could cause. Saywell's text also noted that 
during UNPROFOR, Canada's peacekeepers were impotent in the face of a hostile 
Serb army. The peacekeepers "were really the prisoners of the large armies 
surrounding them, and routinely were shot at and roughed up without capacity to 
fight back."2 69 It was also possible to see UNOSOM and UNPROFOR as isolated 
failures in an otherwise commendable history of Canadian peacekeeping. 
Discussing this history, Saywell noted that "[w]hen the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to UN peacekeepers, Canadians rightly believed that much of the 
267 John Saywell, Canada: Pathways to the Present (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994), 133. 
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prize was theirs."2 7° This legacy was hurt by the events that transpired in Somalia, 
but for Saywell and many authors, peacekeeping and Canada could still be linked 
with positive associations. 2 71 
Other textbooks that produced new editions in the middle years of the 1990s 
took a critical tone towards peacekeeping. Canada: A North American Nation, 
edited by Paul Bennett and co-authored by historian Cecilia Morgan, one of the 
most popular textbooks across Canada by the author's own admission, was one 
such text.2 72 Peacekeeping was discussed in nineteen pages of this text, making it 
a subject of considerable importance. In a section titled "Canada's UN role: The 
Peacekeeper," the authors described the good that Canadians had done 
internationally as part of peacekeeping missions but also the challenges that this 
had presented both domestically and abroad. The tensions that the Suez mission 
inflamed were detailed, as were the financial costs and the very pressing issue of 
the Canadian Forces' being over-stretched and under-equipped. In summing up 
this section, however, the authors noted that, "[n]o other nation has done as 
much as Canada to advance the cause of UN peacekeeping," which suggested that 
despite the costs in both lives and dollars, Canada should maintain this 
functional role. 2 73 
270 Ibid. 
271 0ther examples of the positive narrative of peacekeeping remaining after the events in Somalia are Janis 
Barr et al., Twentieth Century Canada (Calgary: Weigl Educational Publishers Limited, 1996); Diane 
Eaton and Garfield Newman, Canada: A Nation Unfolding (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 
1994). 
272 Paul W. Bennett et al., Canada: A North American Nation (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1995), 
VII. 
273 Ibid., 507. 
133 
Peacekeeping also received space in Chapter 21, "Principal Power in a 
Superpower World: 1968-1988," as well as in Chapter 23, "Towards the New 
Millennium: the 1990s and Beyond." This later chapter made the distinction 
between the peacekeeping missions of the 1950s and the 1960s, and the 
peacemaking missions that Canada had helped undertake in the 1990s. Both 
UNOSOM and UNPROFOR were of this newer sort. In describing both, it is clear 
the authors did not support Canada's participation. UNOSOM is stated to have 
"ended with a trial, public censure, and a suicide over a teenaged Somalian who 
had been tortured and killed while in Canadian custody. The unit stationed in 
northern Somalia found its reputation sullied, as cases of murder, torture, racist 
slurs, and obscene initiation rituals surfaced. The Canadians left Somalia, but a 
string of court-martials and media revelations demonstrated that peacekeeping 
could have a darker side."2 74 The authors did not shy away from describing the 
reasons for the failure of the mission to Somalia, as well as the very public nature 
of the Somalia Affair afterwards, which made it one of the largest controversies in 
Canadian politics in the 1990s. This suggests that some authors and publishers 
were moving away from the consensus-based version of Canadian peacekeeping 
history that had dominated the texts of previous decades. This text also continued 
to emphasize the individual heroes of peacekeeping, celebrating the 
achievements of Lester Pearson while applauding the efforts of Canadian 
generals Lewis Mackenzie in Bosnia and Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda, despite their 
274 Ibid., 625. 
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failures to bring quick and peaceful solutions to these regions. By making a 
distinction between Canada's peacekeeping past, and the peacemaking missions 
of the 1990s, these authors were sectioning off the criticisms of peacekeeping as a 
policy, and allowing the spirit of peacekeeping to remain a source of pride for 
Canadians. 
The Third Edition of Canada Today included similar descriptions of 
contemporary peacekeeping history in its 1996 edition. There remained a section 
about how to bring peace into the lives of individual Canadians, as well as many 
flattering descriptions of Lester Pearson's actions in 1956. The teacher's guide for 
Canada Today included a number of handouts that teachers could use to help 
their students learn about peacekeeping, with the titles "Thinking Skills: 
Peacekeepers are like a Family Friend," "Canadians and Peacekeeping: What they 
Did," and "Canadian Peacekeepers in Action."2 7s Similar to other texts, the 
financial costs of continued peacekeeping efforts across the globe were 
considered to be one of the contemporary problems that Canada had to deal with, 
and students were asked to think about whether Canada "should increase 
participation in peacekeeping, given the financial squeeze?"2 76 The end of the 
"Canada and Peace" chapter had a section called "Inquiring Citizen," which posed 
much tougher topics for students and teachers to consider in class. One asked 
students to look into the Somalia Affair, and then discuss the difficulties of urging 
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war criminals to be brought to justice when there were Canadian peacekeepers 
committing crimes against humanity. Such an exercise marked an increase in the 
level of critical thinking about the peace missions that were being undertaken by 
Canadians in the 1990s. In part, this content was an expression of the shock that 
many Canadians felt upon hearing about the murder of Shidane Arone, and also 
of the disappointment when Canada was not able to do more to help bring about 
peace after the fall of Communism. 
The textbooks that were approved for use in high school classrooms in the 
1990s, unlike those from earlier decades, normally recognized the failings of 
peacekeeping, and asked students to question peacekeeping's utility as a policy as 
well as what this meant for Canada's national identity. In the teacher's guide for 
one text, Canada: Our Century, Our Story, the authors provided a breakdown of 
the arguments both for and against Canadian suitability for being peacekeepers. 
These arguments were virtually identical to those that Richard Pomareinke had 
included in his letter to the Ministry of External Affairs in 1982: Canada was a 
middle power, it did not have a colonial past, it was multicultural, and it had the 
capacity to help others thanks to its wealth. The points against future 
participation included Canada's participation in NATO making it less than 
objective in many situations, Canada's traditional ties to Britain and the United 
States, its racially diverse population taking sides in a conflict, and the need to 
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spend money within Canada before seeking to help others abroad. 277 Despite 
these rather broad arguments against peacekeeping, the guide did also include 
the major points that students should know about UNOSOM. These included 
knowing that the Canadian forces were over-extended, that a combat unit should 
never have been sent for a humanitarian mission, and that "photos and 
videotapes of the crimes committed against these Somali citizens horrified 
Canadians at home and tarnished Canada's peacekeeping role, which had been a 
source of pride for the nation."2 78 Textbook discussions such as this would have 
provided students with more knowledge of peacekeeping as a policy rather than 
framing it only as a Canadian triumph and a part of "our" national identity. 
Conclusion 
Peacekeeping found rapid entry into ministry-approved textbooks across 
Canada. While never the central issue in any of these texts, peacekeeping's place 
in English Canadian textbooks grew from a short mention as a part of the final 
chapter to an entire chapter, including audio-visual components recounting its 
past successes, its present utility, and its future potential to help make the world 
more peaceful. This larger presence occurred as students increasingly had to opt 
into Canadian history classes, rather than being forced to take them throughout 
their high school years. 
This adaptability was something that emerged only after peacekeeping had 
achieved consensus support in English Canada. However, most texts approved 
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during the 1950s and the 1960s adopted the Liberal conception of peacekeeping 
as a symbol of independence from Canada's colonial master, Britain, and its 
present ally, the United States. The historians who wrote the textbooks approved 
for use in Canadian classrooms in the decade after 1956 did not invent the 
standardized version of peacekeeping, but rather recognized that this Liberal 
conception was germane to the positive narratives of Canadian history at the 
heart of their works. In so doing, they helped cement peacekeeping's status as a 
symbol of Canada. In Que bee, this narrative involved Canada refusing to go to 
war with Britain, in contrast to what had happened in the First and Second World 
Wars. In all these texts, Lester Pearson's legacy allowed him to be canonized as a 
hero of Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy and a man of peace who deserved 
international recognition, as did Canada herself for allowing Pearson to solve the 
Suez Crisis. 
But peacekeeping as a topic of study was also separated from other events of 
the era through its malleability. In school curricula, peacekeeping could be used 
as a tool of rote memorization, as a way to tell a traditional story of great men 
acting in the world, as part of interactive discussions of how to investigate a 
historical topic, or as part of a teaching unit about alternatives to global conflict. 
Textbook writers, curricula crafters, and some teachers seemed to find in 
peacekeeping something worthwhile for students. Particularly after 1980, as 
teachers rather than historians wrote most of the approved texts, peacekeeping 
took on more symbolic associations as young people were encouraged to emulate 
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Lester Pearson and other "heroes of peace." Such narratives emphasized a unified 
Canadian penchant for peacekeeping abroad and at home while acknowledging 
that problems could arise on such operations. In French Canada, by contrast, 
peacekeeping barely garnered a mention in most textbooks. Ministerial 
guidelines did not demand much discussion of Canada's external policies, and so 
teachers interested in promoting peace looked to change a culture that 
encouraged war toys and violence in children instead. Their results were often 
more successful than English Canadian efforts, as the Pacijou campaigns made 
clear. 
While school textbooks did not create the narrative of peacekeeping, they 
are one powerful way in which a consensus-based narrative of its central events 
and figures was learned by many Canadians from 1959 to 1997. As a result it is 
possible to see when peacekeeping came to be associated with a Canadian 
character, and to some extent, why it remains such a prevalent symbol of a 
Canadian national identity. 
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Chapter Three 
"You can't say anything that contradicts the pictures": The National Film 
Board of Canada's representations of peacekeeping, 1957 - 1995 
The National Film Board of Canada [NFB], an organization renowned for its 
animated short films and high-quality documentaries, made fourteen films 
between 1957 and 1995 that either dealt solely with peacekeeping or had 
peacekeeping as a major component. One such film, A Life of Adventure (1965), 
was a recruitment piece made for the Canadian Forces. Just over fourteen 
minutes in length, this film was shown to Grade 11 and 12 high school students to 
entice them to sign up for the Regular Officers' Training Program.2 79 It depicted, 
among other opportunities that might await a young Canadian in the Armed 
Forces, excitement in the Gaza Strip in Egypt. A young peacekeeper is shown 
working for the UN while the narrator notes: "Canada supplies officers and men 
to the United Nations for this vital job, and if you choose a life of adventure in the 
Canadian Forces, you too may someday find yourself in this exotic part of the 
world."28° After the film presents scenes of sand and jeeps in "one of the world's 
trouble spots," the soundtrack makes a sudden shift to surf music, and shots of 
men riding the waves on their surfboards appear. The narrator then states: 
"Many a Canadian officer has reported that the scenery here is unexcelled," while 
the film shows young women at a resort sunbathing in bikinis. Surfing and beach 
culture were wildly popular forms of entertainment in the 1960s, with movies 
279 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "A Life of Adventure File, May Budget," (Montreal, 1965). 
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such as Gidget (1959) and the music of the Beach Boys capturing the excitement 
many young people felt about the ocean and the beaches of California. A Life of 
Adventure transplanted those beaches to the Middle East, and suggested that 
young men would be free to pursue that same lifestyle that they had seen or 
heard about, but had probably never experienced for themselves in Canada. 
While many politicians, school textbook authors, journalists, and editorial 
cartoonists talked about Canada as a nation of "Blue Berets," this film promised 
young people a "life of adventure" if they donned the Canadian Forces uniform. 
Figure 3.1 A Life of Adventure (1965) 
The NFB's other documentaries about peacekeeping similarly focused on 
Canada's peacekeepers, though they never glamorized the military experience to 
the same degree. These films are little remembered and rarely studied. 2s1 Yet, 
they are important texts that can enrich our knowledge about how peacekeeping 
was presented to Canadians and how it became a symbol of a Canadian national 
281 One of the only articles that discusses an NFB film about peacekeeping is David Jefferess, 
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identity. The NFB was subject to federal oversight, particularly in the 1950s and 
the 1960s, which caused its films about peacekeeping to accentuate the 
constructive role the Canadians were playing, while ignoring any domestic 
controversies from the past. In doing so, they propagated a particular version of 
the past and present for their audiences that accorded with how peacekeeping 
was being remembered and understood only a short time after the creation of 
UNEF. They were, however, careful to not force these films to repeat a political 
line - instead, they accentuated peacekeeping's importance to Canadians. This 
censorship made these early films similar to English Canadian high school 
textbooks in that they were designed to highlight peacekeeping as a Canadian 
activity that exemplified the nation's rising status in the 1950s. Akin to that of 
textbooks, the time lag between events taking place and their appearing in a 
documentary also provides insight into how particular peacekeeping operations 
were constructed after they had taken place. 
This chapter examines why these peacekeeping films were made, how they 
were produced, and what messages they presented to their audiences about 
Canada and peacekeeping. 2 82 Files from the NFB Archives are used to present a 
fuller picture of the production of four films in particular: The Thin Blue Line 
(1957), You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus (1964), Keeping the Elephants Away 
(1986), and The Price of Duty (1995). Equally important are the images that 
282 The number of people who saw each of these films is impossible to know because of the distribution 
methods of the NFB. Films would have been screened in cities across Canada, shown on television 
(particularly on the CBC), and also shown in school classrooms, and the information on each of these 
methods of distribution is not available. 
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appeared in each of these films and how they linked Canadians and their 
peacekeepers during these years. Though peacekeeping was framed as a 
Canadian activity in these films, they were all English productions; there were no 
films dealing with French Canadian perceptions of peacekeeping. 2 83 
The NFB's documentaries about peacekeeping primarily discussed its present 
utility and largely ignored discussions of Canada's past or its future. As the 
shortcomings of UN operations became more glaring these films became more 
critical. But it was peacekeeping, not Canada's peacekeepers, that would be 
criticized from the 1980s onwards. By not employing the nostalgic or progressive 
discourses as often as politicians or textbook authors did, these films offer 
insights into how the functional language of peacekeeping was sometimes 
unsuccessful at symbolically linking peacekeeping to a changing Canadian 
national identity from 1957 to 1995. 
These documentaries have been subdivided into two time ranges, from 1957 
to 1965 and from 1980 to 1995, to identify differences between how peacekeeping 
was portrayed in these decades. Ordinary soldiers were filmed doing their 
everyday routines - a small number of seemingly unexceptional men are therefore 
at the centre of their narratives. The films also made the actions of the 
peacekeepers relatable to Canadians by drawing links between their "Blue Berets" 
and ordinary Canadians. By avoiding the domestic circumstances that 
283 While the NFB never made a film about peacekeeping using its French Canadian unit, many of the films 
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surrounded the creation of UNEF in 1956 and not showing Canada's political 
leaders, these documentaries presented peacekeeping as a non-controversial 
aspect of Canada's foreign policy. This non-confrontational emphasis suggests 
that both the PC and Liberal governments of the time sought to make 
peacekeeping a centrepiece of Canada's foreign policy, regardless of the debates 
these operations engendered in other media sources and during political 
campaigns. 
Because of changes in how peacekeeping was understood in Canada, as well as 
changes in the relationship between the government and the NFB, the Film 
Board documentaries made from 1980 to 1995 presented peacekeeping quite 
differently. They critically examined Canada's peacekeeping role and its 
shortcomings in light of increasing fears of nuclear war in the 1980s and the 
failures on UNOSOM, while nostalgically celebrating Canada's illustrious 
peacekeeping past. Audiences were therefore provided with another venue where 
the utility of the Canadian Forces in the 1980s and the 1990s could be debated. 
These films also made the peacekeepers exemplary men who were serving their 
country rather than framing them as synecdoches for Canada's national identity. 
Such positive depictions in light of what had taken place on UNOSOM reflected a 
more partisan approach to documenting peacekeeping, intimating that 
peacekeeping's symbolic value to Canada's identity was being contested by 
different groups in the 1990s. 
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Each of the films made about peacekeeping represents a negotiation among 
the federal government, the NFB, and the filmmakers. The NFB was formally 
created in May of 1939, just months before Canada's entry into the Second World 
War. It was headed through the war years by John Grierson, who is credited with 
instilling a culture of "craftsmanship and persistent hard work."284 The NFB's 
operational mandate has remained similar throughout its institutional life, 
particularly since the 1950 National Film Act. This Act declared that the NFB 
should "promote the production and distribution of films in the national 
interest," to "interpret Canada to Canadians and to other nations."28s Because it 
was a part of the federal government, however, the head of the NFB, its Film 
Commissioner, had to answer to many different departments, including the DEA, 
the Secretary of State, and the Department of Communications. 2 86 Particularly 
relevant to this discussion are the relations between the NFB and the DEA, as 
peacekeeping was one of the latter's primary responsibilities throughout this time 
period, and it kept a keen eye on depictions of Canada's efforts through the UN. 
The relationship between the federal government and the NFB and its 
filmmakers has garnered renewed attention from scholars since the 1990s. Older 
works tended to see the relationship as either one of unnecessary restriction on 
artistic achievement or one of benevolent interference in the name of some ideal 
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of Canadian art. 2 87 However, recent studies have shown the relationship between 
the federal government and the NFB to be more complex. Zoe Druick's work 
situates the NFB as an organization that sought to represent the Canadian 
population in "realistic" ways, much as the census tries to categorize the 
population.2 88 Other authors have noted that NFB films about a particular group 
can have a great impact on social policies as well as on cultural attitudes towards 
different Canadians. 2 89 These authors see a direct relationship between social 
changes in Canada and changes in what Brian Low describes as "NFB society," or 
the world as it is depicted in NFB documentaries. 2 9° Hence, the documentaries 
about peacekeeping examined for this chapter were made to reflect ideas that 
were central to Canada's national identity. In recognizing this reciprocal 
relationship between filmmakers and the societies in which they operate, a fuller 
understanding of how and why particular images of peacekeeping appeared at 
certain points from 1957 through 1995 can be gained. 
The particularities of the documentary genre also influenced the content 
and reception of messages in these films. Several scholars have noted that a 
formula tends to be employed in historical documentaries: an all-knowing 
narrator describes the images on the screen, "talking head" experts and witnesses 
287 See, for example, ibid; Jones, Movies and Memoranda: An Interpretative History of the National Film 
Board of Canada. 
288 Zoe Druick, Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 5. 
289Ted Magder, Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993); Roger M. Picton, "Selling national urban renewal: the National Film Board, the 
National Capital Commission and post-war planning in Ottawa, Canada," Urban History 37, no. 2 (2010). 
290 Brian J. Low, '"'The New Generation": Mental Hygiene and the Portrayals of Children by the National 
Film Board of Canada, 1946 - 1967 ," History of Education Quarterly 43, no. 4 (2003 ): 541. 
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add their voices, and historical footage is used as evidence for the speakers' 
arguments. 2 91 Many of the documentaries examined in this chapter follow this 
formula to a great degree. Other films, however, were made during or 
immediately after the events they depict, and so the "talking heads" are not 
present; instead, it is the narrator that interprets the images. 
Narration serves as a valuable part of the documentaries on peacekeeping 
covered in this chapter, making the scripts of these films additional sources of 
meaning that were studied. For some film scholars, a reliance on a narrator to 
interpret the images presented to the viewer betrays a "lack of confidence in both 
the power of the visual and the ability of the audience."2 92 The use of omnipresent 
narration to interpret the images that appeared in a documentary was prevalent 
at the NFB between 1957 and 1965, since John Grierson and many of his 
successors believed that images came symbolically loaded with too many 
messages for an audience to understand on their own. The effects of those images 
were said to be uncertain because their interpretation was based upon 
"instinct."2 93 Instead, Grierson and those who shared his opinions held that 
words, which were based on reason and intelligence, were more reliable for 
ensuring the reception of a message. These narrative texts complicate how 
peacekeeping films might have been understood by audiences since the acts of 
seeing and the acts of listening are inherently different. 
291 Jon Weiner, "The Omniscient Narrator and the Unreliable Narrator: The Case of Atomic Cafe," Film and 
History 37, no. 1 (2007): 73. 
292 Ibid., 76. 
293 Peter Morris, "'Praxis into process': John Grierson and the National Film Board of Canada," Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television 9, no. 3 (1989): 278. 
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While documentaries may be non-fiction accounts of the present or the past, 
by employing narration and by editing for time and content, a single linear 
narrative is created for the viewer that can compress the past and limit the 
present. 2 94 Documentaries should therefore be seen as texts that mediate our 
understanding of the present and the past. 2 95 The process of filming and editing a 
documentary involves selecting what images to use and which to exclude. Putting 
limitations on content is a necessity in a genre in which a narrative must move 
along at a certain pace and in which, as NFB documentarian Gwynne Dyer once 
noted: "[y ]ou can't say anything that contradicts the pictures."2 96 Like all sources 
about peacekeeping, these documentary films ultimately show "not the events 
themselves, and not the events as experienced or even witnessed by participants, 
but selected images of those events carefully arranged into sequences to tell a 
story or to make an argument."2 97 It is these narratives and arguments that can 
guide us towards a better understanding of how peacekeeping came to hold such 
an important place in Canada's national identity. 
Interpreting Peacekeeping's Early Years, 1957 to 1965 
294 Robert A. Rosenstone, "History in Images/ History in Words: Reflections on the Possibility of Really 
Putting History onto Film," The American Historical Reivew 93, no. 5 (1988): 1174. 
295 Hayden White, "Historiography and Historiophoty," The American Historical Reivew 93, no. 5 (1988): 
1198. 
296 Frank Faulk, "Warring on TV: A Conversation with Gwynne Dyer," Cinema Canada 1986, 16. 
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The NFB has often found itself in conflict with the federal government. In the 
1950s, the Film Board tried to recover from a sustained campaign to discredit it 
as a hotbed of Communist activity. 298 Well-documented by Reg Whitaker and 
Gary Marcuse in their book, Cold War Canada, the decade following the end of 
the Second World War saw the NFB under suspicion from the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police [RCMP], and the subject of a campaign by periodicals such as the 
Financial Post to get the organization shut down. Whitaker and Marcuse are 
adamant that this was the result of the Canadian government's and the Canadian 
media's acting within a climate of virulent anti-Communism, and was not based 
on actual Communist infiltration.2 99 However, the NFB films on peacekeeping 
produced between 1957 and 1965 were made in an institutional climate that was 
still recovering from the deep suspicions raised by the RCMP probe. These films 
were often greeted with opposition from the DEA or the DND if their messages or 
images were too negative or controversial. This unease encouraged filmmakers to 
present peacekeeping as a successful and functional policy. These documentaries 
ignored controversies within Canada over the deployment or operational 
mandates of the peacekeepers, instead depicting the day-to-day work that was 
being accomplished by the Canadians. Conscious choices placed the peacekeepers 
at the centre of the films and addressed contemporary discussions of Canadian 
independence without taking a direct stance either for or against a particular 
political party. Audiences were therefore shown apolitical peacekeeping films that 
298 Evans, Jn the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989; 
Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957. 
299 Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957, 249. 
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encouraged them to associate with their "Blue Berets" and the work they were 
doing on behalf of Canada. 
The NFB documentaries about peacekeeping made between 1957 and 1965 
examined Canada's participation in its three most prominent missions: UNEF, 
ONUC, and UNFICYP. Zoe Druick and Ted Magder argue that the primary goals 
of the NFB during these years were education, internationalism, and 
citizenship.3°0 In the fifteen years following the end of the Second World War, 
Druick feels the UN was seen as a great hope for the world in many films, and she 
also notes that Canada was often portrayed as a "mini UN," which was 
interpreted as high praise for Canada.301 The NFB's films about peacekeeping 
replicated these goals by educating their viewers about what the Canadian Forces 
were doing on their peacekeeping missions, promoting positive depictions of 
Canada's peacekeepers, and making members of the Canadian contingents a 
synecdoche for all Canadians.302 
With its mandate to interpret Canada for Canadians, it might seem inevitable 
that the NFB would be charged with making films about peacekeeping. The first 
such documentary, however, was not undertaken at the behest of the Canadian 
government. Rather, it was the UN Film Section that wanted footage of UNEF 
operating in the Suez Canal region. Shot in the winter of 1956 and the early 
300 Magder, Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films, 59. 
301 Druick, Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board, 85. 
302 This desire to accurately depict the lives of the peacekeepers was in direct contrast to fiction films about 
the RCMP, which were far more interested in presenting that group as pillars of a past manliness and of a 
more straightforward time. See Dawson, ""That nice red coat goes to my head like champagne": Gender, 
anti modernism and the Mountie image, 1880-1960." 
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months of 1957, Blue Vanguard: The Story of the United Nations Emergency 
Force was privately screened for then-UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold 
and an audience of UN officials.3°3 The director of the film, Ian MacNeill, and the 
producer, Tom Daly, were told that the film was "everything they had hoped for" 
but that it could not be released because it might re-ignite British, French, and 
Israeli anger towards the UN and the other Western powers who had condemned 
their invasion of the Suez region. Instead, the project was shelved and never 
released.3°4 
One year later, in 1958, the NFB released a documentary of its own about the 
Canadians taking part in UNEF. Titled The Thin Blue Line, the film was made 
using colour footage provided by the DND. The Photography Division of the DND 
had contacted the NFB to inform them that they were sending two men to film 
the Canadian Forces' role in UNEF in June 1957. A memorandum from Herbert 
Holmes, the Director of Photography at the DND, stated that the goal was 
"merely a matter of obtaining footage of the lives and activities of service 
personnel in the Middle East, that will in all probability be eventually made into 
some type of training or recruiting film, at which time the National Film Board 
303 Accounts of this meeting appear in two works: Evans, In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the 
National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989; Jones, The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of the 
National Film Board of Canada, 100. These authors offer a full description of the problems the NFB faced 
in trying to get the film released. 
304Copies of the film still exist, and are now known as revised versions of the film. Ian MacNeill, "Blue 
Vanguard: The story of the first United Nations Emergency Force 1956," (Canada National Film Board, 
1957). 
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will be approached with a view to undertaking the production."3°s Because UNEF 
was a new role for the Canadian Forces, the DND wanted to gather footage so 
that recruits could be shown what peacekeepers did on UN operations. 
The NFB was not thrilled that a director and cameraman who were not its 
own were sent to do the filming. Subsequent memoranda indicate that there was 
some bitterness at the DND presenting the Film Board with afait accompli in 
terms of production personnel and scheduling.3°6 In particular, the Film Board 
did not trust that the director, A.W. Acland, a captain in the Canadian Army, and 
the cameraman, R.C Ferguson, a sergeant in the Royal Canadian Air Force, would 
be able to gather sufficient quality footage to compile a complete film. Regardless, 
by October of 1957, the footage had been gathered and was sent to Montreal to be 
turned into a film. The final budget for the project was $g910.oo, a comparatively 
small amount for a thirty-minute documentary.3°7 
Despite its lack of control over the footage, the NFB was responsible for many 
key aspects of The Thin Blue Line. One of its own people, Dennis Sawyer, was the 
editor of the film, and his cuts and pacing made the footage similar in many ways 
to other documentaries that the Film Board was making at this time.3°8 The film's 
305 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Thin Blue Line File, Letter from Herbert W. Holmes 
Director of Photography, DND to Michael Spencer, Chief Liason Officer NFB, 25 June" (Montreal, 1957). 
306 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Thin Blue Line File, Letter from Michael Spencer, Chief 
of the Liason Division to Herbert W. Holmes, Director of Photography, Department of National Defence 2 
July " 1957). 
307 The Film Board had paid $42,460.71 for Blue Vanguard, by comparison. National Film Board of 
Canada Archives, "Blue Vanguard File, Production Manager's Offce Memo 15 September," (Montreal, 
1961 ). For more on the costs of other films about peacekeeping, see Appendix 2. 
308 For more on the NFB style of documentary in this era, see Druick, Projecting Canada: Government 
Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board; Evans, In the National Interest: A Chronicle of 
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producer, Walford Hewitson, suggested the title for the film during a post-
production meeting. The narration for the film was also written by the NFB, 
which significantly affected the messages conveyed to viewers. Though not ideal 
collaborative partners as far as the NFB was concerned, the Photography Division 
of the DND did prove to be capable of letting the Film Board make its film and 
expedited the process to ensure a finished product was available in the early 
months of 1958. 
Figure 3.2 The Thin Blue Line (1958) 
While the DND had hoped for a recruiting tool, The Thin Blue Line project 
turned out to be more than a short film that could be shown in high school 
classes. Instead, it was decided that The Thin Blue Line would be shown on the 
the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989; Jones, The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of 
the National Film Board of Canada. 
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CBC, greatly expanding its potential audience.3°9 Though not officially 
documented, this change in status may have been undertaken because of the 
UN's withholding the release of Blue Vanguard, and there not being any other 
films about UNEF made for distribution. The PCs supported UNEF's work in the 
Middle East and appear to have wanted its story to be shown to Canadian 
audiences. The primary narrative goal of The Thin Blue Line therefore became to 
tell "the story of the Canadian Contingent as part of the UNEF in the Middle East, 
showing the role they are playing in patrolling and maintaining the peace on the 
demarcation line."310 What was outlined in the proposal for The Thin Blue Line 
played a considerable role in determining what was depicted and what was 
omitted about Canada's involvement in UNEF. By focusing on the peacekeepers, 
the documentary de-politicized peacekeeping's beginnings in favour of a positive 
pragmatic narrative. Such a narrative reflected the PC government's support for 
UNEF but not its manner of creation. 
The film opens with a shot of an empty desert. Beginning as a far-away object, 
an armoured vehicle comes to a halt directly in front of the camera. A soldier 
motions for the vehicle to advance as the film's credits appear on screen. A hasty 
account of how the Canadian contingent came to be in Egypt is then provided for 
viewers. Footage of a plane taking off and flying is followed by the appearance of 
an animated map of the world that traces the distance, and the direction in 
which, the Canadians flew to take part in UNEF. Several figures are then shown 




aboard a ship in the Suez Canal heading towards UNEF headquarters. The 
documentary spends much of its remaining time going through the various duties 
that the Canadians are performing as part of UNEF. There are scenes of 
Canadians surveying, clearing landmines, setting up barbed wire, constructing a 
hangar, re-painting jeeps with UN and Canadian insignia, repairing telephone 
wires, running the postal service, performing medical and dental operations, and 
going out on reconnaissance patrols. Interspersed among the images of work are 
those of the Canadian troops relaxing in their base camp, at headquarters, and on 
leave in Egypt and Lebanon. The final scene recalls the film's opening by once 
again depicting a lone armoured vehicle coming to a stop in front of the camera. 
Against the backdrop of a setting sun, the standing figure continues to use his 
binoculars to search the surrounding area for danger as the end credit screen 
appears. 
Figure 3.3 The Thin Blue Line (1958) 
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By the time the film was released, Canada's peacekeepers had been in the Suez 
region for over a year. In looking back at the events of November 1956, this film 
chose not to depict the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, which deprived 
viewers of much of the context for the mission. The divisions that appeared in 
English Canada regarding the invasion and Canada's refusal to support Britain 
also remain absent from the film, despite their central place in the story of 
Canada's UNEF involvement. Nor are Lester Pearson's speeches at the United 
Nations calling for the creation of UNEF shown to viewers. Those speeches were 
largely responsible for Pearson's winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, but the 
film chose to ignore these facts that were so crucial to how peacekeeping was 
discussed in almost every other format at the time. The NFB had footage of 
Pearson at the UN and of the invasion (they had both been included in Blue 
Vanguard), but not depicting the man who by 1958 had become the leader of the 
Opposition appears to have been a conscious choice. Diefenbaker's PCs preferred 
to accentuate the functional value of Canada's peacekeepers rather than dwell on 
these past events in their rhetoric at this time, and this may have had 
considerable bearing on the choice of subject matter for the film. 
Instead of directly tackling the debates of 1956 that had been so heated in 
Canada, The Thin Blue Line educated its viewers on the experiences of the 
Canadian peacekeepers. Early on, the narrator describes how the film will focus 
on Canada's "soldiers of peace" and their role in the "unique force" in Egypt.311 
311 A.W. Acland, "The Thin Blue Line," (Canada: National Film Board, 1958). 
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Though the stated purpose of the film was to depict Canada's peacekeepers, these 
men were not allowed to speak for themselves. This is likely attributable to the 
costly and cumbersome process of synchronizing the sound with the 35mm 
film.312 Instead, the narrator was tasked with interpreting for the audience all of 
the images which appeared on screen. In some cases, the narration allows the 
actions of the soldiers to be understood as an integral part of the larger mission of 
the UN peacekeepers, as when RCAF engineers and signal corps members build a 
hangar, repair motorized vehicles, and put up telephone wires. At other times, 
the narration serves different purposes, as when it states that the creation of 
UNEF coincided with the Edmonton Eskimo's winning the Grey Cup. Shifting the 
focus from the tense political climate of the time to a sporting event de-politicized 
the film and encouraged audiences to see Canada's peacekeeping actions in a 
positive light. 
One of the major ideas presented to the audience was that the Canadian 
peacekeepers were performing their duties on behalf of Canada.313 Peacekeeping 
was undeniably presented in a manner which encouraged Canadians to relate to 
the individuals on screen. The use of so much on-the-job footage specifically had 
the effect of making the Canadian soldiers into typical Canadian men. As 
machinists, telephone workers, truck drivers, postmen, and a host of other 
occupations, the peacekeepers had jobs that were shared by many Canadians at 
312 Jones, The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of the National Film Board of Canada, 67. 
313Zoe Druick discusses citizenship in this era as a process of inclusion and she sees that individual 
Canadians were normally taken to be representatives of the nation as a whole. Druick, Projecting Canada: 
Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board, 46. 
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the time. This would have been in contrast to the ordinary soldiers of the 
Canadian Forces, whose daily routines of drills, weapons training, and marching 
were not as relatable. While politicians and media commentators of the late 
1950s were not always sure how to categorize the peacekeepers -were they a 
police force, something akin to traditional soldiering, or something entirely new? 
- this film argued that the peacekeepers were Canadians, and that was what was 
most important. 
Citizenship can also involve defining oneself in opposition to another. While 
engaged in their day-to-day labours on UNEF, the Canadians often interacted 
and worked side-by-side with the Egyptians, and these scenes appear throughout 
the film. In one shot, both groups build a hangar in which planes for the UN can 
be stored. The Canadians are bare-chested, in contrast to the Egyptians, who all 
wear white button-down shirts and slacks. Visually, the Canadians, with their 
casual dress, are not obviously in charge of the site. However, the narration for 
the film refers to the Egyptians as carpenters "plying their ancient trade" next to 
the "Canadian technicians." Such characterizations recur throughout the film, as 
when another scene shows the Egyptians rowing boats, "handled just as they 
were in Pharaoh's time," to try and navigate along the Suez Canal, which was full 
of shipwrecks from the 1956 conflict. These examples established a clear 
relationship of superiority and inferiority between the Canadians who are 
modern thinking and the Egyptians who are living in the past. Canada's identity 
as a modern and thriving nation was being expressed to the television audience 
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through its peacekeeping activities, and this set it apart from the Egyptians and 
other "backward" peoples of the world. 
Figure 3 .4 Egyptian I Canadian interaction, 
The Thin Blue Line (1958) 
For a large portion of the film, the Canadians were depicted off-duty and 
enjoying their time in Egypt. In one scene, engineers use their skills to create a 
makeshift shower for the other members of UNEF in the desert. This is followed 
with shots of the men using the shower, wearing bathing suits or their 
underwear. These showers are not private, and the men are shown talking and 
interacting with one another while cleaning themselves. Later, a large group of 
soldiers run and splash in the Mediterranean. The men are depicted enjoying 
themselves heartily, with laughs and smiles all around. Such images of the men's 
bodies in various states of undress in the absence of women are tempered later by 
narration that counters any questions regarding the heterosexuality of the 
Canadians. Showing the postal service that the Canadians had created and were 
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staffing, the narrator notes that any cares the men are experiencing in Egypt are 
tolerable if "there's a letter from wife or mother," in which case, "the soldier's day 
is made." Alluding to women back home was a long-standing trope in military 
films of the time as it allowed the men to engage in a full life on screen while 
implying the continued importance of the heterosexual bonds of marriage.314 
Hence, the peacekeepers lived and interacted with other men while on duty, but 
the audience was told that their sexual lives remained in stasis until they returned 
home to Canada. 
The Canadians are also shown enjoying themselves through recreational 
activities on the base. In one scene, the Canadians sit in their cantina playing 
darts and cards and eating pickled eggs, which are jokingly described as a 
delicacy from home. Another scene shows a parade that the soldiers stage in 
honour of Canada Day which is attended by the head of UNEF, Major General 
E.L.M. Burns, himself a Canadian. The soldiers ride on three separate "floats" 
which are flat-bed trucks that had been made available for re-painting. Each 
vehicle represents a different duty that the Canadians are undertaking in Egypt: 
314 Though the films examined in this chapter are all non-fiction documentaries, it is nevertheless useful to 
see them as part of the larger cinematic genre of the military film. Some authors have drawn links between 
the fictionalized characters that have appeared in war movies and the real soldiers in documentaries and 
newsreels. Robert Eberwein argues that military films put male bodies on display for their audiences and 
that the actions of the soldiers/actors are contingent on understandings of masculinity at a particular time. 
The NFB's peacekeeping films, like fictional films about the military in Canada and the United States, also 
promoted a close relationship between filmmakers, the film distribution companies, and the military. 
Lawrence Suid's work suggests that fictional films about the military also tended to depict an "all-
powerful, always victorious armed services," prior to the late 1960s. Since then some films have played an 
active role in rehabilitating the image of the military. See Robert Eberwein, Armed Forces: Masculinity and 
Sexuality in the American War Film (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2007); 
Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film (Lexington, 
Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2002). 
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medical and dental care, laundry, and the postal corps. The soldier riding the 
postal truck has on a Bedouin headdress, and smokes a cigar while delivering his 
letters. The narration from this scene let the audience know that the Canadians 
can "mak[e] light oflocal habits and hardships" experienced in their day-to-day 
duties. 
Figure 3.5 On leave, The Thin Blue Line (1958) 
The numerous scenes of the peacekeepers off-duty have a significant influence 
on the overall narrative of The Thin Blue Line. They suggest to the audience that 
duty on UNEF was fun and that it did not involve a considerable amount of risk. 
Only the minesweepers, a small portion of the force, seem to be in any danger 
since they are dealing with explosives. The rest of the soldiers have jobs to 
perform, but they seem unconcerned with whatever dangers might be present. 
The sole reference to the gravity of the peacekeepers' duty comes in the final 
voice-over, when the narrator mentions that "only their [the Canadians'] constant 
vigilance can prevent fresh violence." Putting this dialogue so late in the film 
intimates that it was not a primary message the filmmakers were trying to 
impress upon the audience. 
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By focusing the film on positive images of peacekeepers enjoying themselves 
in far-away places, Acland's film demonstrated the importance of the original 
mandate given by the DND to make a recruitment film. The Canadians were 
shown performing a variety of tasks that were similar to those worked by men 
and women back in Canada. That these tasks were being done well and were 
crucial to the success of UNEF furthered the idea that peacekeeping was a 
constructive policy for the Canadian Forces. The peacekeepers also relaxed and 
enjoyed themselves much as any other Canadian would hope to, given the chance 
of a Mediterranean vacation. The Thin Blue Line therefore tried to make the 
peacekeepers typical Canadians, while making Egypt an exotic place where a 
young man could find ready access to excitement. 
The beginning of the mission to Cyprus spurred the creation of two new films 
about peacekeeping in 1964 and 1965. For Lester Pearson, Paul Martin Sr., and 
their supporters, UNFICYP demonstrated Canada's willingness to be the world's 
leading peacekeeper. At the same time, some newspapers attacked the 
operational restrictions that the UN had invoked which forbade the Canadians 
from disarming the Cypriots.31s This discursive climate remained staunchly 
political. With peacekeeping's leading figure, Pearson, now the Prime Minister, it 
315 For more discussion of the newspaper coverage of UNFICYP, see Chapters Four and Five. 
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would have made sense if the films produced at this time mentioned the Liberal 
commitment to peacekeeping, but however unlikely, the films made in 1964 and 
1965 about peacekeeping refrained from discussing Pearson's involvement in the 
beginnings of UNEF or the Liberal government's key role in getting UNFICYP 
underway. The domestic political climate of 1956 also remained off-limits for 
these films regardless of the political consensus around peacekeeping that had 
developed in the eight years since. Instead, the films continued to endorse 
Canada's internationalist commitments through the UN as appropriate policies, 
while symbolically linking Canadians to their peacekeepers. 
In the summer of 1964, director Richard Gilbert was sent to Cyprus and Egypt 
to shoot footage for two films about the Canadian peacekeepers there. Gilbert 
arrived in Cyprus soon after the Canadians were introduced, and he remained 
there until at least September of 1964.316 As with The Thin Blue Line, the original 
film description for You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus, whose title was a 
reference to the Shakespearean tragedy, Othello, which was situated on the 
Mediterranean island, influenced the final product that was made. In this case, 
the NFB sought to make, "a theatrical film depicting the Canadian UN role in 
Cyprus, its duties and responsibilities."317 Unlike The Thin Blue Line, this film 
was designed for a theatrical release, though at a little over twenty minutes in 
length, it is not clear whether it would have been shown before a feature film, or 
316 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Press Release," 
(Montreal, 1964). 
317 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Budget 
September," (Montreal, 1964). 
163 
whether it would have been made directly available in classrooms and to film 
clubs.318 
While the NFB had dealt with the UN Film Section and the DND on previous 
efforts, it sent over its own people to make You Are Welcome, Sirs, which it 
would distribute itself. Despite this higher level of autonomy, the NFB was not 
free to construct their film as it saw fit. The DEA took an active interest in its 
production and asked to view a rough version of the film before it was finished. 
Upon viewing the film, it asked Gilbert and the film's editor, once again Dennis 
Sawyer, to move an interview with Cyprus' President Archbishop Makarios from 
the beginning to the middle of the film. The DEA felt that this would make the 
Canadian film seem more "neutral" and not pro-Greek.319 A memorandum was 
sent to Richard Gilbert, and he made the changes requested, despite the extra 
work it would entail. Though the edits seemed relatively benign, the NFB 
continued to find its films about peacekeeping influenced by the Canadian 
Government. 
The film opens with a landscape shot taken from an airplane. After cutting 
away to the opening titles, the film moves to a ground shot of an airport and the 
Canadian base. What follows is a narrative of why the Canadians were called to 
Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios is the first of several notable political figures to 
interpret Cyprus' history. The inclusion of interviews with Makarios and several 
other political figures helps situate You Are Welcome, Sirs, as a "talking head" 
318 Ibid. 
319 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Letter from 
"Muriel" to "Dick" [Gilbert] 29 July," (Montreal, 1964). 
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documentary film. 320 The leading political figures are asked to describe why 
Cyprus is involved in its conflict and how a peaceful solution can be achieved. 
Their words correspond to images of Cyprus' past, as well as images of its present 
that show ordinary people struggling to prosper in a climate of conflict. These 
"talking heads" are named at the bottom of the film as they appear, which lends 
extra importance to their words since the civilian Cypriots are not granted such 
identification. 
Most of the film depicts the operations that Canadians are undertaking. 321 All 
white men in blue helmets or blue berets, the Canadians are shown heading out 
on patrol in armoured vehicles or on foot across the "Green Line" in the capital 
city of Nicosia. At one point, the Canadian troops are relieved by a new unit and 
the film shows the recent arrivals being acclimatized to their new base. 
Throughout the film, Cyprus is presented as a geographically bipolar country: the 
countryside is beautiful and full of abundant resources in contrast with city life, 
particularly in Nicosia, where violence and danger are constant. The film also 
mixes shots of the Canadian peacekeepers on patrol with those of Turkish and 
Greek Cypriot civilians. It concludes with a shot of the Othello Tower, and the 
end credits scroll upwards in front of this historic artefact before the screen goes 
black. 
320 Other interviewees include the Vice President, Dr. Kutchuk, a Turk, whose understanding of the conflict 
largely matched that of Makarios. This compatibility permits the film to maintain a consistent 
understanding of the conflict in Cyprus and its causes. 
321 Richard Gilbert, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, to Cyprus," (Canada: National Film Board, 1964). 
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Figure 3.6 You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus (1964) 
As in The Thin Blue Line, the narrator most often interprets the footage in 
You Are Welcome, Sirs, for the audience. This narration describes what the 
Canadian peacekeepers are doing on Cyprus and how they are different from the 
host Cypriots. It begins with a description of Cyprus as a place of strategic 
importance and one which has been ruled by fifteen different nations. The 
Canadian audience for this film would have understood that their own country 
had not experienced such a past and was not a place where war, as the narrator 
comments, "has dwelt too long." By presenting the Canadians as strong and 
helpful white men and the Cypriots as either foolishly destructive or unable to 
govern themselves, a clear contrast in national identities was being furthered in 
this film. 
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The narration also provided text which was used as part of the promotion 
campaign for the film, since it was not possible to capture the essence of the film 
in a single image. The press release for You Are Welcome, Sirs, paraphrased the 
dialogue of the film to encapsulate what viewers would see. It stated: "They came 
at the request of the United Nations, leaving snow and ice in Canada to place 
themselves between the warring Greeks and Turks on the sun-parched island of 
Cyprus."322 The release also included three images: one of the interview with 
Makarios, one of a Canadian peacekeeper in uniform looking off into the 
distance, and one of Canadian peacekeepers talking to a group of men standing 
next to a camel. The soldier pictured was Guardsman Donald Long, who was 
serving in Cyprus as part of the First Canadian Guards regiment.323 Though Long 
was in Cyprus, he did not appear in You Are Welcome, Sirs. Instead, he was one 
of the three soldiers profiled in the other film Gilbert made on Canada's 
peacekeepers in 1965, Postmark UNEF. That image of Long was at the Theatre of 
Salamis, an architectural landmark that he visited for the film. Long was a 
youthful, clean-cut white man. His looks were clearly thought to be marketable by 
the NFB and Gilbert as he also appeared on the press release for Postmark 
UNEF. The image of the peacekeepers talking to the group of men near the camel 
was also taken from this other film, and is inexplicably from Egypt, not Cyprus. 
The use of the image from Egypt suggests that the NFB believed its audiences 
would expect to see scenes from the desert in any documentary about 
322 
"You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Press Release," (1964). 
323 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Postmark UNEF File, Post-production script," (Montreal, 
1965). 
peacekeeping. Presumably, the NFB felt that viewers would not be concerned 
with the particularities of its promotional images, and would fail to notice that 
the images were not of Cyprus. 
Figure 3.7 Press Release, You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus (1964) 
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The positive value of Canada's service to the UN was repeated several times in 
You Are Welcome, Sirs. The filmmakers interview UN General Thimayya of 
India, who describes the work of the Canadians as "terrific." The peacekeepers 
also speak about UNFICYP in several scenes of the film. It had become much 
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easier to synchronize sound and images, which meant that audiences could now 
directly hear these men talk about their experiences. The scenes in which the 
peacekeepers speak are staged shots of meetings and of patrols across Cyprus. 
They typically involve a single officer giving details about the situation in Cyprus 
that help explain what is taking place there politically or militarily. At other 
times, the officers explain what is appearing on screen during a Canadian 
peacekeepers' patrol. The staging of these scenes makes the dialogue appear to 
have been controlled, and its delivery by the peacekeepers feels wooden and 
unnatural. These scenes, however, all emphasize the good the Canadians are 
doing on Cyprus, and are part of a consistent narrative that emphasized the 
practical aspects of UNFI CYP. 
One large contrast with the earlier peacekeeping films was the central role 
that violence and danger played in the narration and framing of the film. The 
opening sounds of You Are Welcome, Sirs are gunfire, which set quite a different 
tone from the more positive films of the 1950s. The situation in Cyprus as the 
filming was taking place saw the Turkish and Greek irregular forces engaging 
each other in battles in the hills throughout the country. The film notes this, and 
describes how guns are "everywhere, always." Despite this potential to address an 
important issue regarding the operational mandate for UNFICYP that was being 
debated in newspapers back in Canada, the film espoused a positive narrative 
that emphasized the need for Canadian engagement in peacekeeping. 
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The ongoing violence in Cyprus enabled the narrative of this documentary to 
resemble a traditional story of an army trying to defeat an enemy while protecting 
innocent people. This narrative was one that contrasted the professional 
Canadian soldiers of peace with the aimless and suffering civilian population of 
Cyprus. The Canadians frequently appear onscreen riding atop armoured vehicles 
that have large guns on their turrets. The individual soldiers also carry rifles 
around with them, and the film offers several shots of the Canadians standing at 
the ready, guns in hand, keeping an eye out for any dangers that might approach. 
These film images are identical to Canadian Press photographs which appeared 
in many Canadian newspapers in 1964. They are, however, vastly different from 
the images of UNEF which appear in The Thin Blue Line in 1958. No scenes of the 
Canadians are included that show them at rest. Such images presented the 
peacekeepers as professional soldiers who were accomplishing extraordinary 
things in Cyprus. This made them figures worthy of respect. 
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Figure 3.8 Your Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus (1964) 
Audiences were, however, presented with visuals differentiating the 
Canadians from the host population. The Canadians appear strong and confident 
on screen in contrast to the Cypriot civilians. Both the Turkish minority and the 
Greek majority are shown suffering as a result of the conflict. The Turks are 
depicted starving, and scenes of children are contrasted with images of robust, 
adult Canadian forces. Shots of a Greek wedding also make a clear differentiation 
between the Canadians, who see the larger problems that need to be addressed 
before anyone can live safely, and the Greeks, who engage in traditions that have 
not helped keep the island at peace. These civilians are, according to the 
narration, "determined but confused, often violent yet sick of war." Such 
narration pitied the Cypriots, but also placed the blame for their suffering on 
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their shoulders. The Canadian soldiers would do what they could, but ultimately 
the film wondered if the Cypriots would ever learn to get along with one another 
and live in peace. 
Figure 3.9 You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus (1964) 
The films the NFB produced on peacekeeping between 1957 and 1965 crafted 
narratives that emphasized positive aspects of the story of peacekeeping.324 In 
every film that had peacekeeping as its focus, or as a major component, the 
domestic conflicts that had arisen in 1956 were ignored. The major political 
figures involved in Canada's peacekeeping role were also absent from these films, 
even when they had played a foundational role, as Lester Pearson and Paul 
324 Two other films about peacekeeping were made during this era: G.L Polidora, "Overture," (Canada: 
National Film Board, 1958 ). ; V.R Sarma, "The Security Council," (Canada: National Film Board, 1963). 
These films were made for the UN and did not have Canada as the central peacekeeping nation. They did 
however present peacekeeping in very positive terms. 
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Martin had in 1956 and 1964 respectively. These figures and details were 
exchanged for a narrative which stressed the value of peacekeeping as a policy of 
the Canadian Forces. In some cases, Film Board personnel pitched their 
documentaries in such a way as to omit these issues, and in other instances the 
Canadian Government censored or influenced their contents. In focusing on the 
peacekeepers, these films gave Canadians a glimpse into the operational world of 
peacekeeping that could not be gleaned elsewhere at this time. The films also 
made narrative choices which tended to emphasize the leisure and tourism 
possibilities for those who were taking part in peacekeeping operations, 
particularly UNEF. Differences between the Canadian peacekeepers and the 
people living in the host nations were also accentuated in these documentaries, 
which helped to reinforce a particular conception of what it meant to be 
Canadian. Audiences were therefore encouraged to see themselves in their 
peacekeepers and to acknowledge the constructive work they were accomplishing 
overseas. 
Revising Canada's peacekeeping past and present, 1980 to 1995 
The NFB did not produce any films about peacekeeping from 1965 to 
1980, a period which saw the expulsion of UNEF in 1967 and the Trudeau 
government's reassessment of peacekeeping's value as a foreign policy. These 
events would have discouraged schools and other venues from showing the 
earlier films about peacekeeping, particularly those about UNEF.32s However, the 
325 See Appendix B for more information about how many copies of each film were sold after 1982. 
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following fifteen years saw the production of a number of films that had 
peacekeeping as either their exclusive focus or as a major component. This 
reflected the return of peacekeeping to a place of prominence in Canada's 
political rhetoric, as well as in school textbooks, as discussed in the previous two 
chapters. 
The files that the NFB Archives make public regarding these films are not as 
complete as those relating to the films of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, less 
can be known about internal decisions made by the NFB, or any possible issues 
that External Affairs had with these later productions. The proposals for these 
films, their budgets, press releases, and the scripts of each production are 
available, and when combined with critical reviews of these films in newspapers 
and magazines, they help to flesh out the production and reception of these 
documentaries. 
The films made about peacekeeping from 1980 to 1995 demonstrate changes 
in the operational mandate of the NFB, as well as changes in how peacekeeping 
was understood in Canada. Each of the films was proposed to the NFB as helping 
to better inform audiences about Canada's peacekeeping role, as had been the 
case in the 1950s and 1960s. However, a significant difference between these two 
time periods was the different willingness of filmmakers to be critical of the 
federal government. The DEA and the DND no longer seemed interested or able 
to restrict the contents of NFB documentaries about peacekeeping, which freed 
the editorial choices in these later films. As a result, in the 1980s peacekeeping 
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could be presented as an alternative to Canada's NATO role and a check on the 
increasing United States-Soviet antagonism. Filmmakers could also nostalgically 
look back at Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy while hoping their country 
would resume that leading role at the UN. 
This increased artistic liberty also permitted some filmmakers to challenge 
the connection between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. In many 
films, the peacekeepers were portrayed as an elite and professional group who 
were always doing their utmost to fulfil their duties. Particularly during the 
1990s, filmmakers looked at how the media portrayed Canada's peacekeepers, 
and tried to use their films to "set the record straight" about their conduct on 
various UN operations. As a result, these films were more overtly partisan than 
those of previous decades, and the NFB and its documentarians sometimes 
disagreed about peacekeeping's value in the present and the future. These 
disagreements are evidence of Canadians' trying to grapple with the strong 
attachment between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity and the actions 
of the Airborne in Somalia. 
Newspaper columnist-turned-documentarian Gwynne Dyer was 
responsible for several of the most successful - and also most talked-about - films 
produced by the NFB in the 1980s, and many of these films had peacekeeping as 
a central component. Dyer first worked with the Film Board on the seven-part 
series War, which aired on the CBC in the fall of 1983. The third film in the series 
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was a nominee for a Best Documentary Academy Award.32 6 Each part of War was 
seen by an audience averaging over one million Canadians, and aimed to give an 
"in-depth analysis of warfare - its history, its institutions, its causes and its 
consequences."32 7 It was shown at a time when the issue of nuclear war between 
the United States and the Soviet Union was re-emerging as a major political issue 
in North America. The seven parts of War were aired the same fall as the made-
for-TV movie The Day After, which depicted what life would be like on Earth 
after a nuclear war.32 8 This was also the same year as Pierre Trudeau's peace tour, 
and ordinary Canadians were increasingly vocalizing their fears regarding the 
threat that nuclear war posed to North American life, making the timing of Dyer's 
series maximal for its possible impact.32 9 
When Dyer and his collaborator Tina Viljoen proposed three additional films 
that would focus on the Canadian military, the NFB agreed to fund the project in 
conjunction with the CBC.33° They pitched it to the NFB in the summer of 1984 
while their earlier series was finding a still-wider audience on the American 
Public Broadcasting System. The new documentaries Dyer and Viljoen proposed 
would be also be shown on the CBC, since their earlier collaboration had done so 
well for all parties involved. 
326 This film, The Profession of Arms, lost the award to Emile Ardolino's He Makes me feel like Dancin '. 
327 National Film Board of Canada, "Goodbye War Press Materials," (1983). 
328 Michael Dorland, "War Review," Cinema Canada, January 1984. 
329 Orlando French, "Battling global insanity," Globe and Mail, Tuesday 15 November 1983. 
330 Dorland, "War Review." 
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Keeping the Elephants Away, the second film in the Defence of Canada 
series, explores Canada's involvement in military alliances with other nations.331 
It begins with a shot of the graduating class at Canada's Royal Military College 
[RMC] in Kingston, Ontario. The new generation of armed forces officers is 
quickly replaced by a current naval officer who gives a summation of the 
operational mandate of the Canadian Forces in the 1980s. The opening credits 
appear on screen in front of an aerial shot of three Canadian warships, taking the 
viewer away from the naval officer. The film then cuts to footage of the cenotaph 
in Ottawa on Remembrance Day. The new officers of RMC are visually contrasted 
with their elder predecessors, who have appeared to mourn their fallen comrades. 
The film spends a considerable amount of time tracing the activities of the 
Canadian Forces between the Second World War and the 1980s. Footage of 
Canada's major diplomatic figures is interspersed with talking-head interviews 
with other diplomats of the post-World War Two era. The final third of the film 
jumps to present-day Cyprus and follows the Canadian peacekeepers in their 
daily activities. The last scene brings viewers back to Canada with an aerial shot 
of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa and a fighter jet about to take off from a 
runway, visually linking the government and the military. 
The narration used in Keeping The Elephants Away differed from earlier 
documentaries about peacekeeping because of the appearance of Dyer, the film's 
writer and narrator, on screen. As in the War series, Dyer is shown walking 
331 Tina Viljoen, "Keeping the Elephants Away," (Canada: National Film Board, Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1986). 
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through various locales, describing peacekeeping and how Canada had tried, and 
was still trying, to make the UN a more functional organization by promoting 
peacekeeping. Many filmmakers were increasingly cognizant of their own role in 
shaping their films' subjects.332 By embracing the narrator as an individual, 
filmmakers hoped to remind audiences that choices had been made about how to 
present a particular topic, and that each film framed its story subjectively. The 
effect of this framing was to make Dyer the central focus in the documentary, and 
this series was successful in large part because audiences believed Dyer's 
arguments and found him an engaging figure.333 
Canada's peacekeeping past is looked at as a sometimes useful but sometimes 
flawed pragmatic policy. Lester Pearson is said to have invented peacekeeping, 
and the Liberals are credited with making Canada's foreign policy achieve a 
"golden age" after the Second World War. This is done while omitting any 
discussion of the debates that ensued over Canada's siding with the UN instead of 
supporting Britain and France. Similar to many other media offerings at this 
time, Keeping The Elephants Away sought to remind Canadians that they had 
strong ties to peacekeeping in the past and the present, while forgetting to 
remind viewers of the conflicts that peacekeeping caused inside Canada in the 
1950s and the 1960s. 
332 Weiner, "The Omniscient Narrator and the Unreliable Narrator: The Case of Atomic Cafe," 75. 
333 Rick Groen, "A rational analysis of an irrational act," Globe and Mail, 1 October 1983, E3. This article 
credits Dyer's on-screen presence for much of the success of the War series, and the same can be said for 
the Defence of Canada films. 
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The film uses talking heads to explain Canada's peacekeeping past and 
present. Keeping the Elephants Away features interviews with E.L.M. Burns, 
External Affairs' John W. Holmes, Louis St. Laurent's Secretary Dale Thomson, 
and Lt. General Rene Gutknecht. These men all helped to guide Canada's external 
affairs policies, and their opinions support the filmmakers' contention that 
Canada's armed forces are good at peacekeeping, but really "they're designed for 
fighting the Russians." Their thoughts also provide interludes between shots of 
Canadian leaders at the UN and soldiers performing peacekeeping duties. 
Figure 3 .10 Lester Pearson, Keeping the Elephants Away 
(1986) 
The documentary frames the start of UNEF as a political act governed by Cold 
War calculations. This framing of peacekeeping's history supports the central 
argument of the film: that formal alliances with other nations in a nuclear age are 
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foolish. Despite Canada's past successes as part of UN peacekeeping operations, 
the utility of such alliances is questioned because it often served the interests of 
the US or the USSR. The film recognizes the popularity of peacekeeping in 
Canada, but calls it "a last-ditch invention by the disillusioned idealists of the '40s 
when they found their dream of world order through the UN collapsing around 
their ears." 334 The narration notes that the UN has only gone into certain areas of 
the world where Cold War interests are not at play. The failure to provide lasting 
peace in the Middle East and in Cyprus also allows this film to take what it 
describes as a more "cynical" tone regarding the potential of peacekeeping. Dyer's 
narration notes that peacekeeping gives Canada and other nations "something 
useful to do, and it certainly provides good training for their soldiers," but 
restrictions on UN operations limit their effectiveness. Ultimately, the film 
depicts peacekeeping as something that could benefit the world more if nations 
like Canada disengaged from their military alliances, and the superpowers 
allowed the UN to be more than a political debating forum. 
Keeping The Elephants Away also hoped, as earlier films did, to educate 
viewers on the Canadian Forces' daily operations, and what Canada's 
peacekeepers were like. Dyer and Viljoen visited Canadian troops on duty in 
Cyprus, and the film follows two peacekeepers patrolling the streets of Nicosia. 
The soldiers carry guns, ride in armoured vehicles, and are portrayed as 
professional soldiers, as they were in You Are Welcome, Sirs, to Cyprus. Dyer and 
334 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Keeping the Elephants Away File, Script 19 February" 
(Montreal, 1986). 
180 
Viljoen also interview the Canadian peacekeepers about whether they feel they 
are making a difference. One soldier in particular, Captain Rick Peters, describes 
how the Canadian Forces appreciate the chance to experience "a real mission." 
Unlike the peacekeepers who were shown contentedly doing their jobs in the 
1950s and 1960s, Captain Peters expresses the limitations of what the Canadians 
can accomplish on a peacekeeping mission. Particularly, he notes that if the two 
sides in a conflict do not want to settle their dispute peacefully, then the 
peacekeepers cannot, either. The film sympathizes with the soldiers, and hopes 
that these ineffectual restrictions will one day disappear. 
The soldiers are presented in a very positive light, despite the film's anti-war 
message. The narration describes the Canadian peacekeepers as "fairly honest 
people," which Dyer claims is a ''by-product of the profession."335 Audiences were 
therefore encouraged to see their peacekeepers as skilled professionals who were 
interested in keeping the peace, and capably serving Canada abroad. There was 
no attempt to differentiate the Canadians from the Cypriots or any other host 
nation. Attempts to link peacekeeping to ordinary Canadians through either 
shared commonalities or in opposition to other foreign nationals was not a 
primary goal of Dyer's documentaries about peacekeeping. 
335 This dialogue appears in the film as well as in Faulk, "Warring on TV: A Conversation with Gwynne 
Oyer." 
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Figure 3.11 Keeping the Elephants Away (1986) 
Keeping the Elephants Away and the entire Defence of Canada series were 
not as successful as Dyer and Viljoen's earlier films had been. Many Canadians 
shared the films' vision of peacekeeping as a policy that could be more useful if 
the superpowers and the UN would let nations like Canada better utilize their 
knowledge and personnel. Others felt that their argument against Canada's place 
in the Western alliance was too critical.336 The series drew a large television 
audience all the same, and a thirty-minute version of the series was also made, 
entitled Harder Than It Looks. Interest in these films was somewhat diminished 
by the rapid change in the international Cold War climate after they were made. 
As the Soviet Union collapsed, and the world no longer seemed divided into East 
336 
"Media and disarmament," Globe and Mail, Monday 14 April 1986; Evans, Jn the National Interest: A 
Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989. 
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and West, the possibility that Canada's peacekeepers could finally play that larger 
role became a reality, making these films seem more outdated. Dyer did, 
however, come to be known as a "rising star with the peace movement," and his 
syndicated newspaper column continues to be read around the world.337 
The failures and challenges encountered by Canada's peacekeepers in the 
1990s illustrated the dangers of Canada's increasing peacekeeping involvement. 
As the Liberal government of Jean Chretien created the Inquiry into Somalia, the 
NFB funded the production of three films about the Canadian peacekeeping 
experience on UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. The political climate of the 
mid-199os influenced how Calgary-based writer and director Garth Pritchard 
created his films. Pritchard had been a photographer for the Calgary Herald and 
the Montreal Gazette before setting off to film Canada's armed forces overseas for 
the NFB.338 His films were pitched to the Edmonton division of the NFB, and 
Pritchard proposed to follow the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry and the Lord 
Strathcona's Horse, two Canadian Forces units that were based in Western 
Canada.339 
The documentaries Pritchard made about the Canadian peacekeepers in 
Croatia were Caught in the Crossfire, In God's Command, and The Price of Duty. 
All three films were shown on the CBC; In God's Command shown as a half-hour 
documentary called Padre on the Man Alive program in April and Caught in the 
337 Matthew Fisher, "Journalist's new film advocates neutrality," Globe and Mail, Monday 10 November 
1986, AlO. 
338 Bob Blakey, "Troops show valour in the Balkans," Calgary Herald, 6 September 1995, A13. 
339 Pritchard was convinced that this regional focus was the only reason his projects were approved. See 
Helen Metella, "NFB helps filmmakers profile peacekeepers," Edmonton Journal, 27 November 1994, C6. 
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Crossfire and The Price of Duty as one-hour films in September of 1995.34° The 
films were generally very well received. At the 1996 Annual Alberta Film and 
Television Awards, The Price of Duty won the award for the best overall 
production and best documentary over thirty minutes, and Pritchard won best 
director (non-dramatic).341 
Pritchard's original film proposals helped determine his subject matter and 
narrative. Each of the films that he proposed had a separate purpose, but the one 
attached to the first film, Caught in the Crossfire, was applicable to all three: "to 
document the role Canadian peacekeepers are playing in Bosnia and to come to 
grips with the reasons behind the realities confronted by the Canadians in the 
exercise of their responsibilities."342 Similar to that of most of the earlier films 
about peacekeeping made by the NFB, the central purpose of these 
documentaries was to show what the Canadian peacekeepers were doing 
overseas, making the soldiers the central figures. Coming to grips with what was 
I 
taking place on UNPROFOR also meant discussing peacekeeping's shortcomings. 
Akin to the films of the 1980s, these documentaries noted that operational 
restrictions encumbered the ability of the peacekeepers to protect themselves. 
Pritchard made it clear that any restrictions on the peacekeeper' s behavior were 
unnecessary handicaps. By making such a suggestion, his films argued that 
340 Richard Helm, "'One minute you're alive, the next you're dead': NFB's The Padre takes viewers into war, 
where army chaplain ministers to soldiers and civilians on bot_h sides," Edmonton Journal, 13 April 1995; 
NFB, "Protection Force," Globe and Mail, Sunday 2 September 1995. 
341 
"Jake and the Kid wins two awards," Edmonton Journal, 19 March 1996, B 10. 
342 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Caught in the Crossfire File, Budget," (Montreal, 1995). 
Canada's peacekeepers should be free to engage in behaviour that would 
normally be permitted only in war and not in peacekeeping. 
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The Price of Duty, in particular, has had a considerable impact because of its 
depictions of the last days of the life of Corporal Mark Isfeld, an engineer whose 
job it was to clear mines in Croatia. Minesweepers had been depicted in almost 
all of the films about peacekeeping that were made by the NFB before 1995, and 
their jobs were always said to be among the most dangerous. Pritchard dedicated 
an entire film to peacekeepers disarming mines, focusing on three men: Isfeld, 
Sergeant Greg James, and Warrant Officer Dan Hartford. 
The Price of Duty opens with a sequence shared by the other films in the 
series. Quickly-cut scenes of the former Yugoslavia depict civilians fleeing gunfire 
and explosions before a map appears to indicate the geographic setting for the 
film. Ruined buildings are then shown, including one with the graffiti: "Welcome 
to Hell." The film shifts to a sombre shot of peacekeepers standing at attention at 
Isfeld's funeral. After this scene, the documentary goes back in time several 
months to depict the duties and untimely death of Isfeld. The minesweepers are 
shown going out on patrol to several different locations and helping to remove 
deadly dangers. The officers detail the hazards of their occupation throughout the 
film. The last section is a verbal description by Hartford and James of the day 
Isfeld died, footage of the funeral, and an interview with Isfeld's parents. 
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Figure 3.12 The Price of Duty (1995) 
As in Dyer's films in the 1980s, the peacekeepers in The Price of Duty are 
framed as skilled professionals. Their identities as members of the Canadian 
Forces make them exceptional people worthy of admiration. Isfeld, in particular, 
is presented as something of a martyr figure in the film. The Price of Duty is 
bookended by his funeral, and he is the emotional centre around which all of the 
other figures orbit. Young, blond haired, and light-eyed, Isfeld is presented as a 
man who "collected little hearts, little smiles, big eyes, you know ... "343 Isfeld's 
mother knit little dolls that she sent over to her son so that he could distribute 
them to children. These "Issy Dolls," as they have come to be known, are still 
given out today, and are permanently enshrined on the monument to 
peacekeeping in the Garrison Green community in Calgary, Alberta.344 The dolls 
are described as one way that Isfeld connected to the children of Croatia. Atypical 
of the other soldiers, Isfeld is said to have often left a vehicle to present gifts to 
343 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Price of Duty File, Script," (Montreal, 1995). 
344 See the conclusion for a discussion of the Garrison Green community. Bruce Cheadle, "Izzy Dolls 
delight kids 12 years after Master-Cpl. Mark Isfeld died on duty," Canadian Press, 28 April 2006. 
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small children he saw on the way to a minefield. Hartford, near the end of the 
documentary, comments upon Isfeld's penchant for giving out gifts to the 
children and agrees with the sentiment behind Isfeld's gift-giving. He remarks: 
"They're not part of the problem. They're just kids, for Christ's sake. They deserve 
to live. They deserve to have a childhood, you know. They deserve to have two 
legs and a face."345 By caring for children he did not know, and by extension, 
dying for those children, Isfeld becomes a caring and sacrificial figure. It was the 
noble sacrifices of Canada's peacekeepers that Pritchard sought to convey to his 
audiences, and all of his films share such depictions. 
Figure 3.13 Corporal Mark Isfeld, The Price of Duty (1995) 
The bonds among Isfeld, Sergeant Jam es, and Hartford are at the centre of 
this documentary. Both Hartford and James have strong non-sexual feelings of 
345 
"The Price of Duty File, Script," (1995). 
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love for Isfeld, as evidenced by their desire to attend his funeral and the difficulty 
they find in choosing the right words to say to Isfeld's family. Hartford recalls 
how he has had recurring nightmares that involve him standing 
in a church or a chapel of some type and the coffin was laid out behind me and 
I was some kind of guard, some kind of Buckingham Palace type of statue and I 
wasn't allowed to blink or shift around or anything. His wife was right up in my 
face screaming at me and spitting on me and clawing at me and tearing all the 
insignia and what not off my uniform. His kids were there and doing the same 
thing. All I could do is just stand there and stare straight ahead at attention. 
Everybody in the church was cheering her on.346 
Hartford believes that this dream was motivated out of both fear and guilt for 
not having done more to protect Isfeld in Croatia. Sergeant James expresses 
similar guilt when he describes how difficult it will be to speak to Islfed's mother, 
knowing, "you were responsible for someone's life. Not his death, but his life." In 
both these instances, the soldiers were willing to overcome their fears because 
Isfeld's family was owed as much. 
These close bonds of camaraderie also suggest to the audience that unless you 
have fought alongside someone, you cannot know everything about them. The 
affection among the peacekeepers is not atypical of that which appears among 
soldiers in other dramatic war movies. As early as 1925, silent films such as The 
Big Parade were depicting male friendships in the armed forces that had nothing 
to do with male sexuality.347 The passing of a fellow soldier has often permitted 
men to express emotions on screen that they would not normally exhibit; because 
of the militaristic setting, tears, sorrow, and anguish are not considered un-
346 Ibid. 
347 Eberwein, Armed Forces: Masculinity and Sexuality in the American War Film, 18, 20 
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manly. In The Price of Duty, Isfeld's wife and parents are told about his heroism, 
but they are not privy to the details of his actual death, which the male 
peacekeepers alone experienced. James and Hartford, on the other hand, are 
shown overwhelmed with emotion for Isfeld and compare his death with their 
own fears of how they might die while peacekeeping. 
The men talk directly to the camera, providing narration for the scenes 
throughout the film. Hartford, in particular, seems to have been favoured by 
Pritchard for his willingness to be candid about the lives of the peacekeepers and 
the limitations they face in trying to perform their duties, and to curse on screen. 
At one point, while the others are attempting to disarm a mine that has been 
placed near the pump in a farmers' field, Hartford describes the utility of a small 
flashlight that he calls "the cat's ass for this type of work," before criticizing the 
DND for making the peacekeepers purchase them themselves.348 Pritchard and 
his crew had been allowed to stay with the Canadians in several different parts of 
the former Yugoslavia for three months, and this allowed them to gather a 
considerable amount of footage that detailed the daily routines of the 
peacekeepers. His belief in having the peacekeepers speak for themselves 
motivated this decision, and encouraged the peacekeepers to discuss their 
apprehensions and their frustrations. 
Isfeld's commitment to helping children could be celebrated as an honourable 
personality trait, but the Serbian and Croatian adults who appear in the 
348 
"The Price of Duty File, Script," (1995). 
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Protection Force films are not portrayed in a positive light. The Canadians did 
not resort to violence, and this marked them as better than the non-Canadians 
depicted in Pritchard's films. For example, the Croatian and Serbian forces that 
the Canadians interact with are shown the respect of fellow-soldiers, but they also 
struggle to keep drunken civilians with guns from shooting at other civilians. The 
two sides in the conflict are described by one of the peacekeepers in In God's 
Command as hating each other "almost genetically."349 Many of the villagers are 
also depicted as helpless victims or willing to commit atrocities, dig up graves, 
and generally prevent the Canadian peacekeepers from bringing order to the 
region. This distinction between the Canadian peacekeepers and the Serbs and 
Croats provided another level of differentiation that set the peacekeepers apart as 
exceptional people. 
The critical response to Pritchard's films often referred to the value of letting 
the exceptional Canadian peacekeepers speak for themselves. Many reviewers 
stated that only the peacekeepers could describe peacekeeping accurately, since 
they had actually participated in these operations. One reviewer called The Price 
of Duty and Caught in the Crossfire "refreshing and innovative" because "the 
story has no stars, no obtrusive millionaire news anchors or TV reporters, a 
minimum of political charlatans, lying diplomats and howling victims, all of 
which most viewers are no doubt mightily sick of [sic]."3s0 Most reviewers, 
Pritchard, and the film's producer Jerry Krepakevich, made the tarnished image 
349 National Film Board of Canada Archives, "In God's Command File, Script " (Montreal, 1995). 
350 John Haslett Cuff, "Two samples of the value of public TV," Globe and Mail, Wedesday 6 September 
1995, Cl. 
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of Canada's peacekeepers in the 1990s one of the central foci of their discussions 
of the films. Assailing what they felt were overly negative depictions of Canada's 
peacekeepers elsewhere, the filmmakers and many reviewers found the films' 
"honesty" and "intimacy" to be their strongest points.351 The filmmakers and 
those who found the films to be more "honest" than other media depictions 
ignored Pritchard's directorial and editorial choices, since the finished product 
matched their political views on peacekeeping. 
Pritchard's choice of narrators also reflected his personal politics. This 
narration was done by Gwynne Dyer, creating a link to the very successful films 
he had made for the NFB in the 1980s that were also quite critical of the 
restrictions on the Canadian Forces. Dyer's narration is more limited than it had 
been in his earlier films, and his voice does little beyond introduce the location of 
each scene and provide some detail that explains who the parties are on screen. 
Of particular note is the narration's referring to Corporal Isfeld by his nickname, 
"Issy." This use of informalities is done by all the soldiers in the film. But having 
the narrator use similar language asked the audience to identify with Isfeld as 
"Issy" as well. 
There were, however, differences between how Pritchard and Krepakevich 
discussed the film and how the NFB marketed it. The press release for The Price 
of Duty and Caught in the Crossfire began by asking the question, "Ten Canadian 
351 Blakey, "Troops show valour in the Balkans," Calgary Herald; Helm, '"One minute you're alive, the 
next you're dead': NFB's The Padre takes viewers into war, where army chaplain ministers to soldiers and 
civilians on both sides," Edmonton Journal. 
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soldiers have died in the Balkans, is it worth it?"3s2 By questioning the value of 
peacekeeping as a concept, the press release did not take the same attitude 
towards peacekeeping as the filmmakers had in their interviews. The Canadian 
contribution to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia was also called "costly" 
and a huge trial for the Canadians. This language addressed the debates over 
whether Canada was still suited to its peacekeeping role. The press release argued 
that Pritchard's films, which they described as "totally unique," would add to this 
debate and help Canadians see the dangers that peacekeeping posed. All of this 
was not nearly as positive towards the Canadian Forces as many reviewers or the 
filmmakers seem to have been. This suggests that the NFB recognized the value 
of Pritchard's films, but did not agree with his personal politics.353 
352 NFB, "Protection Force," Globe and Mail. 
353 These differences have become more apparent in the years since 1995, as Pritchard has repeatedly 
spoken out about how his experiences working with the NFB and the CBC have not allowed what he 
considers to be "truthful" accounts of Canada's military to be shown to national audiences. See Bruce 
Garvey, "CBC 'abandoned our military': Award-winning filmmaker tells heroic tales," Calgary Herald, 22 
November 2003, A7. 
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Figure 3.14 The Price of Duty (1995) 
All three of Pritchard's films focused on the Canadian peacekeepers rather 
than overtly addressing the political debates that surrounded peacekeeping in the 
1990s. Despite this apparent desire to avoid the political controversies 
surrounding peacekeeping, Pritchard's films were arguments in favour of a 
particular form of peacekeeping and against what he called "retired colonels and 
professors being called on as the expert of the day to talk about something that 
they know nothing about."354 After Canada's peacekeepers found themselves 
scrutinized in a number of media outlets for the conduct of the Airborne 
Regiment in Somalia and back in Canada, many Canadians lashed out against 
these critics and voiced their strong support for what the individual troops were 
accomplishing. For the last twenty years, Pritchard has shared these more 
354 Helm, '"One minute you're alive, the next you're dead': NFB's The Padre takes viewers into war, where 
army chaplain ministers to soldiers and civilians on both sides," Edmonton Journal. 
193 
supportive views. In an interview in 1995, Pritchard suggested it was a shame 
that hardly any Canadians knew the names of those peacekeepers who had died 
in Croatia, and yet "lots of Canadians know the name of the young Somali who 
was killed."355 This indicates that Pritchard could not accept that Shidane Arone 
was more notable than one of Canada's peacekeepers. He also ignored the 
differences between Canada's peacekeepers who volunteered to risk their lives, 
and Arone, a teenager who had been tortured and killed against his will. In so 
doing, Pritchard demonstrated the willingness of many Canadians to forget what 
had taken place in Somalia in 1993. His insistence that films and news media 
depict the peacekeepers in a positive light highlights the backlash against those 
who sought to reform Canada's military and rid it of white supremacists, 
misogynists, and other "un-Canadian" types. It also demonstrates how Canada's 
peacekeeping identity was being contested in the 1990s. 
The films the NFB made about peacekeeping from 1980 to 1995 are texts that 
illuminate changing Canadian attitudes about peacekeeping and the changing 
institutional goals of the Film Board.356 Each of the films discussed in this section 
reflected a specific historical understanding of Canada's capacity to help the 
world through peacekeeping. These films helped to educate many Canadians 
about what their peacekeepers were doing overseas by focusing on their day-to-
day operations. At the same time, the conscious choices of the filmmakers made 
355 Ibid. 
356 The other film made about peacekeeping during this era that was not discussed is Martin Duckworth, 
"Peacekeeper at War: A Personal View of the Gulf War," (Canada: National Film Board, 1994). This film 
was more concerned with Canada's involvement in the Gulf War against Iraq and contrasting that to 
Canada's legacy as a peacekeeping nation. 
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the Canadian peacekeepers exemplary professionals. Civilian policy-makers and 
those who had not experienced an operation for themselves were not given such 
favourable treatment, and the functional value of peacekeeping, but not Canada's 
peacekeepers, was challenged because of the operational restrictions enforced by 
the UN and by the Canadian government. These divisions between the Canadian 
Forces and the Government would continue to be publically debated after 1995, 
and these films offer important insights into how Canadian audiences were 
exposed to contested visions of peacekeeping's place in Canada's national 
identity. 
Conclusion 
Films tell us much about how Canadians understood peacekeeping between 
1958 and 1995. While each film tells us something about the era in which it was 
produced, some continuity exists over time; the focus on individual peacekeepers 
in NFB films and the visual depictions of the activities of peacekeepers was 
something they all shared. There were, however, differences in the portrayals of 
peacekeeping which were due in part to changes in the technology and the use of 
narration being employed by filmmakers at the NFB. Since the intended 
audiences for these films included school-aged young Canadians as well as 
broader television or cinematic audiences, the differences between how 
peacekeeping was portrayed in these films compared to in other media are 
glaring. The specificities of the NFB's operational mandate to interpret Canada to 
Canadians played a key role in these differences, as did the restrictions that were 
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imposed on the contents of documentaries made about peacekeeping between 
1957 and 1965. More important, the different documentary depictions reflect 
changing understandings of Canada's peacekeeping role at particular times from 
the 1950s to the 1990s. 
These films show the complexities that can arise when the federal government 
is involved in the production of culture and cultural policy. The NFB's 
peacekeeping documentaries demonstrate how even films that aimed to be 
apolitical can provide important lenses through which to examine how Canadians 
and their "Blue Berets" were linked. The early films discussed in this chapter 
were made with considerable governmental interference. The DEA and the DND 
both took an interest in how peacekeeping was portrayed to Canadian audiences. 
This suggests that these branches of the government were concerned with 
controlling the messages that Canadians received about peacekeeping. In these 
films, Canada's peacekeepers were shown engaging in valuable work, and 
appeared to be similar to ordinary Canadians. The later films most likely did not 
have such controls in place regarding their contents, and the peacekeepers were 
shown as professionals who performed specialized tasks. This made them 
honourable figures who were worthy of positive documentaries about their work. 
Such framings permitted the filmmakers to more critically examine 
peacekeeping, though the individual peacekeepers were never criticized. 
By focusing on the peacekeepers, these documentaries did not employ 
nostalgic or progressive language as often as did other media. Early films did 
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downplay the tense political debates that surrounded peacekeeping's origins, and 
it was only thirty years later that such topics or Lester Pearson would feature in 
an NFB film about peacekeeping. These omissions were quite different from the 
political rhetoric and high school history textbooks that celebrated Pearson and 
made peacekeeping a bipartisan expression of a Canadian national identity. The 
NFB's documentaries on this subject instead emphasized the functional value of 
peacekeeping, which was more open to questioning, particularly after the 1980s. 
In so doing, they demonstrate the necessity of comprehending the diverse ways 
peacekeeping was understood in Canada between 1958and1995. 
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Chapter Four 
"Peace is not front page news:" English and French Canadian newspaper 
coverage of peacekeeping operations, 1956-1997 
An article in the Calgary Herald in 1993 stated that peacekeeping was "a 
thankless task" that rarely led to accolades amongst local populations and 
Canadians back home.357 Instead, the editorial declared: "[p]eace is not front 
page news." While peace in and of itself did not garner many banner headlines in 
Canadian daily newspapers, Canada's involvement in UN peacekeeping 
operations grabbed considerable front page and editorial space. At the outset of 
new peacekeeping missions, or when things went awry for the Canadian forces 
serving under the United Nations flag, daily newspapers in English and French 
Canada paid attention and letters to the editor suggest that their readers did, 
too.358 
Canada's newspapers, more than any other medium, provided the language 
and imagery which linked peacekeeping to the country's national identity. Being 
the first responders to international events permitted articles and editorials to set 
the frameworks within which peacekeeping would be discussed in each of the 
time periods covered in this dissertation. Politicians were often left addressing 
the linkages made by the press, and their words in turn reinforced what 
newspapers had already said regarding peacekeeping. As will be shown, this 
357 
"Mission Accomplished," Calgary Herald, 12 May 1993. 
358 This is not to say that letters to the editor provide a perfect sample of readers' opinions. Rather, as 
Valerie Korinek has argued in her work, letters to the editor provide an indication of opinions, both positive 
and negative, that a periodical believes their readership holds as well. See Chapter Three, "A Faithful 
Friend and Tonic: Reading Chatelaine" in Valerie Korinek, Roughing it in the Suburbs: Reading 
Chatelaine Magazine in the Fifties and Sixties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
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could be problematic, as newspapers advanced ideas about peacekeeping being 
representative of the best or worst Canadian international action and encouraged 
peacekeeping to be framed in domestic terms, largely ignoring its relevance to the 
host nations. This domestic emphasis came about because newspapers wanted to 
make stories relatable to local audiences. The tendency for newspapers to laud 
the actions of the past while forgetting any sources of tension further permitted 
the narratives of peacekeeping to mythologize a sanitized version of the past 
centred on Lester Pearson and Canada's wonderful work with the UN. Such 
understandings influenced how politicians, and later how textbook authors and 
documentary filmmakers, presented peacekeeping. This also encouraged 
politicians, authors, and artists to see peacekeeping in nostalgic or progressive 
terms, which helped to cement its place in the pantheon of Canada's national 
symbols. 
This chapter is divided into six sections that correspond to the start of UNEF, 
ONUC, UNFICYP in 1956, 1960, and 1964 respectively, when the Canadians 
serving on UNEF were expelled in 1967, the months surrounding the revelations 
about the Airborne's conduct on UNOSOM in 1993, and the time around the 
release of the report of the Inquiry into Somalia in 1997. These time periods saw 
frequent mention of peacekeeping in front page articles, major articles in the first 
ten pages of a newspaper, editorials, letters to the editor, and also in minor 
stories buried in the back pages. As a result, both the casual and the dedicated 
reader would have been exposed to this news coverage. 
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Because they sought to inform but also influence their readers, newspaper 
articles, editorials, and letters to the editor provided some of the most dramatic 
language in support of, and against, peacekeeping. Considerable time will be 
spent here on the Suez Crisis, as newspapers symbolically linked peacekeeping 
and Canada's national identity immediately after Lester Pearson made his 
speeches at the UN General Assembly. Newspapers also employed simplified 
narratives about the peacekeeping past after reporting a decline in Canada's 
international standing during the Diefenbaker years. From then onwards, 
newspapers combined nostalgic, functional, and progressive discussions of 
peacekeeping to express particular conceptions of Canada. These conceptions 
encouraged Canadians to see themselves as suited for all peacekeeping 
endeavours, which would have disastrous effects in the 1990s. 
The peacekeeping discourses also came to provide journalists and letter-
writers with clear narrative frameworks to follow. Meg Spratt has noted that 
journalists use recurring cultural themes, and rely on tropes to tell their 
stories.359 Lester Pearson, in particular, served as shorthand for all that was good 
about peacekeeping and Canada in the world. Audiences were encouraged to 
contextualize and interpret every peacekeeping story, editorial, or letter to the 
editor by drawing upon cultural knowledge about Pearson and Canada as a 
peacekeeping nation.360 
359 Meg Spratt, "When Police Dogs Attacked: Iconic News Photographs and Construction of History, 
Mythology, and Political Discourse," American Journalism 25, no. 2 (2008). 
360 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism; Thompson, 
The Media and Modernity, 8. 
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Newspapers also communicate collective memory when they discuss the past. 
If people rely on language and imagery that is culturally specific, then they must 
draw upon social knowledge in order to think about the past in any way.361 
According to communications scholar Jill Edy, journalists provide an avenue for 
collective remembrance by using commemorations, historical analogies, or 
historical contexts. She argues that journalists can help particular memories 
remain current in the minds of readers, or can help other memories re-emerge 
long after their events have occurred, by writing about them in newspapers.362 
When a peacekeeping operation was placed in a historical context, or Canada's 
peacekeeping efforts were commemorated, a cultural collective memory of 
peacekeeping that was almost entirely positive was invoked. Canadians were said 
to have a duty to help other nations and to have demonstrated an aptitude for 
peacekeeping operations. Such ideas were employed in an attempt to create 
linkages with Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy. This collective memory was 
challenged by the expulsion of UNEF in 1967 and the Somalia Affair in 1993, but 
such shortcomings were always forgotten in favour of a positive narrative. 
In the Canadian context, the concentrated ownership of newspapers among a 
small number of publishers partially accounts for peacekeeping being presented 
in similar language and imagery across large geographic divides. This mattered 
more than political affiliation after 1956 because in most cases papers had a 
favoured political stance, but were willing to change according to the issue at 
361 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York Harper Colophon Books, 1980), 51. 
362 Jill A. Edy, "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory," Journal ofComm11nication 49, no. 50 (1999). 
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hand.363 The Thomson Corporation, Southam Incorporated, and later the 
Hollinger Group, have had control over most of the daily newspapers published 
in Canada for the past sixty years.364 This concentrated ownership has not, as 
David Taras has noted, always meant that newspapers were controlled with a 
tight rein by their owners, or that the papers under the ownership of a single 
person or group espoused the same political line. As will become clear, papers 
across the country found peacekeeping a policy with considerable practical value 
for the Canadian Forces as well as considerable symbolic value as a marker of 
Canada's national identity. 
All the newspapers used in this chapter relied on the Canadian Press [CP] or 
the Press Canadienne [PC] to obtain many of their articles relating to 
international events.36s Hence, if the CP or PC chose to transmit stories about 
Canada's peacekeepers, they were made available to readers all across the 
country. Between 1956 and 1997, most newspapers also cut down on their 
coverage of international events to focus more on local or national stories. These 
two factors placed boundaries on what stories and what story angles each paper 
could follow, and also allowed for continuity between papers. 
363 Rutherford, The Making of the Canadian Media; David Taras, The Newsmakers: The Media's Influence 
on Canadian Politics (Scarborough: Nelson, 1990). 
364 Taras, The Newsmakers: The Media's Influence on Canadian Politics, 15. 
365 For more on the development of the CP and the PC, see Gene Allen, "The (Bi)national news: Canadian 
Press and the Service Francais in the 1960s," at The Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical 
Association (Montreal, 2010). 
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As a result of these editorial choices, international stories had to be made 
relatable to Canadian audiences.366 International crises were often not the most 
important news stories in a given day, but a Canadian connection to far-away 
places through peacekeeping allowed stories about the Middle East, the Congo, 
Cyprus, and Somalia to receive more newspaper space than they would have 
otherwise. Making these stories suitable for a Canadian audience resulted in 
certain themes being repeated in these articles, and certain actors - those who 
were in the nations that needed peacekeeping interventions - receding into the 
background. These preferences reflected conceptions of Canada as a 
peacekeeping nation that was unique in the world. 
Canada's daily newspapers played an active part in forging the links between 
peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. They often provided the language 
and metaphors that would be adopted by politicians, textbook authors, and 
filmmakers to discuss peacekeeping because of the short turnaround between 
events occurring and their being reported. They also employed regular narrative 
frameworks for their audiences that helped routinize discussions of Canada as a 
nation of "Blue Berets." How they conceptualized Canada's peacekeeping actions 
was therefore crucial to how and why peacekeeping became and remained so 
popular from 1956 to 1997. 
366Michael Schudson's work on journalism has been influential in making scholars aware that "there is 
interaction between what the vvorld is and how it gets reported ... The reporter not only relates stories but 
makes them." See Manoff and Schudson, eds., Reading the News: A Pantheon Guide to Popular Cu lt11re, 4. 
Framing the Suez Crisis, 1 November to 30 December 1956 and 
Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize win, October 1957 
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As Lester Pearson won accolades around the globe for his role in bringing the 
Suez Crisis to an end with his proposal for the creation of a peacekeeping force, 
newspaper coverage of Canada's role in the crisis remained heavy and sustained 
from 1 November to 30 December 1956. His actions were far more divisive in 
Canada than elsewhere, and newspapers sided either with the PC's pro-British 
stance or the Liberals' pro-UN position. The former included the Herald, the 
Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun, and the Montreal Gazette, while Liberal-
supporting papers included Le Devoir, La Presse, the Toronto Star, the Halifax 
Chronicle-Herald, the Winnipeg Free Press, the Regina Leader-Post, and the 
Ottawa Citizen. Each paper relied upon particular constructions of Canada to 
support their positions. These divisions have been described by Jose Igartua as 
"a significant juncture in the dissolution of English-speaking Canada's self-
representation as a British nation."367 This section builds on Igartua's argument 
by demonstrating the mechanics through which a new Canadian identity came to 
have meaning and expression. Newspapers found cause to make historical 
analogies, connect peacekeeping to discussions of Canada's national identity in 
the present, and to forecast what might be in Canada's future in their pages. By 
examining the early language used to describe Pearson's actions at the UN and 
the composition of UNEF, it is possible to determine how Canadian daily 
newspapers played a foundational role in establishing the narrative frameworks 
367 lgartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71, 115. 
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through which peacekeeping would be discussed. Tracing this language forward 
one year to when Pearson received his Nobel Peace Prize, it is possible to see a 
consensus narrative emerging about Canada and its peacekeeping role. 
Because the Suez Crisis was the first large-scale peacekeeping operation 
undertaken by the UN, newspapers and their readers used varied language to 
describe UNEF. In many instances, papers made reference to the "police action" 
in the Middle East, which was similar to how they had described the force sent to 
Korea in 1950.368 The Star, on 20 November, reminded its readers: "[t]he 
important thing is not the glamour of Canada's role, but the success of the police 
project."369 In Le Devoir, an editorial spoke of the« formation d'un corps de 
police charger -- d'imposer et de maintenir la paix. »37° Though peacekeeping and 
police action are not entirely different, policing is an action that Canadian readers 
would have been familiar with in their everyday lives.371 Negative portrayals of 
peacekeeping would come to dwell on the differences between it and policing. 
Conversely, as peacekeeping came to be understood as a separate activity, its 
positive aspects -- impartiality and mediation among them -- would be 
emphasized in the press. 
To try to understand the events of 1956, many editorials and letters invoked 
the lessons that the recent past could provide. Pro-British newspaper editorialists 
368 Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from 
Hiroshima to Korea, 174. 
369 
"Nasser Bars QOR," Toronto Daily Star, Tuesday 20 November 1956, 6. 
370 Gerard Filion, "Les Hongrois seront !es victimes de l'agression de Suez," Le Devoir, Saturday 3 
November 1956, 6. 
371 Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in Nationalism in Canada, ed. Peter Russell (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966), 15-16; Walden, Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth. 
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and letter-writers often commented that the world would come to see the Suez 
invasion as a helpful action and not one based on colonial assumptions. Several 
authors in both PC- and Liberal-supporting papers expressed concerns about the 
Second World War's being repeated in the Middle East with Egypt's President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser portrayed as a new Hitler, the same language used by 
Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden and later by John Diefenbaker.372 Unlike 
politicians, who often referred to the Korean example, these editors and letter-
writers selectively made a historical analogy with the Second World War that they 
felt was more appropriate. Britain's more positive role in the Second World War, 
and the disastrous legacy of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, gave 
the Hitler analogy predictive power to forecast to newspaper readers what would 
transpire in the near future.373 Uncertainty about the present, therefore, became 
cause to make references to the past, as well as to the future. 
These same editorialists and letter-writers often framed their discussions of 
the Suez Crisis as a Cold War battle. They warned that Canada was unwittingly 
encouraging a Communist expansion through its lack of support for Britain.374 
This opportunity would come through the increased ability of the Soviet Union to 
influence the other Arab nations through its "pawn," Egypt, and to quell an 
uprising that was simultaneously occurring in Hungary. The Cold War and the 
threat of Communism were rarely far from the surface in any international 
372
"Can Get Peace," Toronto Daily Star, Monday 12 November 1956; "Letter to the Editor," Ottawa 
Citizen, Tuesday 6 November 1956. 
373 Edy, "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory," 77. 
374 
"A Way Out," Ottawa Citizen, Tuesday 6 November 1956, 6. 
206 
coverage in Canadian daily newspapers in the 195os.37S What these authors did 
not note in taking the Liberals to task for their "attacks" against Britain and 
France was that the latter two nations had probably done far more than Canada 
to assist the Soviets by destabilizing Egypt and encouraging it to seek more aid 
from Communist sources. 
But peacekeeping was presented as more than a Cold War policy to Canadian 
audiences. Newspapers were quick to frame the events in the Middle East as 
symbolic of Canada's independence or as a "betrayal" of Britain. When discussing 
Canada's international policies, authors often relied on metaphor to describe 
Canada's relationship to the UN, to Britain and France, and to the United States. 
The most common linguistic device used was a child-adult comparison, famously 
expressed by Lester Pearson in Parliament, that Canada would not be Britain's 
"choreboy."376 Described as one of Canada's mother nations, Britain was seen as 
an independent actor which made its own decisions (right or wrong, depending 
upon one's political stance) and a "grown-up" state.377 Canada, on the other hand, 
was depicted as either a child in relation to Britain, or in language used in 
Liberal-supporting papers, as an adult of equal stature. 
This child-adult metaphor was employed in both French and English Canada. 
In a Le Devoir editorial of 3 November, Canada's foreign policy was described as 
375 For more on this, see Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition 
of the Willing,from Hiroshima to Korea; Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a 
National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957. 
376 An example of this, which also details Pearson's statements is "Canada "No Choreboy"," Ottawa 
Citizen, Tuesday 27 November 1956, 1. 
377 
"Canada's Lead," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Monday 5 November 1956; "Letter to the Editor," Ottawa 
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"plus adulte" in the midst of a discussion against flag-waving and supporting the 
British in what the paper felt was another Boer war.378 Along similar lines, a 
reader responding to an editorial in the Calgary Herald argued that Canada had 
finally "severed her apron strings from Britain's imposed rule, and stayed out of a 
war that was not her business."379 In both English and French Canadian 
newspapers, in these cases and many others, language was used which averred 
that Canada was a nation that no longer relied on its "mother" to make decisions, 
something which appealed to many Canadians in the late 1950s. It also implied 
that Canada need not forget its past with Britain, but like all children, it needed to 
define its own identity. 
While Liberal-supporting papers chose to call Canada an independent adult in 
their pages, PC-supporting papers used strong language to attack the split 
between Canada and Britain over the Suez Crisis. It should be remembered that 
they did this weeks in advance of the PCs' formally debating the Liberals' policies 
in Parliament.38° One article in the Herald, perhaps the strongest critic of the 
Liberal government's efforts at international mediation, called Canada's stance at 
the UN "shameful."38i Continuing with the child-adult metaphor, the Herald 
referred to the UNEF as "[s]ending a boy on a man's errand."382 These papers 
used this comparison to imply that the Canada-Britain bond had to remain strong 
378 Filion, "Les Hongrois seront Jes victimes de l'agression de Suez," Le Devoir, 6. 
379 
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and to argue against what they saw as a policy that altered Canada's relationship 
with Britain. 
Other voices wondered about Canada's future if its traditional ties with Britain 
were severed, and blamed the Liberal government for presenting such a 
possibility.383 PC-supporting letter-writers posited that Canadian independence 
was just a shift in dependencies from Britain to the United States. In a letter to 
the Gazette, Harry J. Delaney from Ottawa argued that Canada's "independent 
course" was really another step in the Americanization of Canada. He lamented 
the "unjustifiable parental-resentment complex, which seeks every opportunity to 
express its independence in an exaggerated manner often petty, if not downright 
malicious."384 Letter-writers such as this viewed Canadian participation in 
peacekeeping as an unwelcome change in how it was defining itself 
internationally. Because the US had condemned the British action in the Suez, 
and Canada had not supported Britain, many people falsely felt that the events 
surrounding the creation of UNEF were orchestrated solely by the Americans to 
shame the British. Rather than accept that Canada would agree more with the US 
on a matter of foreign affairs, they preferred to think of Canada as a member of 
the Commonwealth, and rejected the Liberal promulgation of Canadian 
independence through its foreign policies that had gained traction with many 
Canadians at this time. 
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Editorialists and letter writers further related peacekeeping to domestic 
political issues by invoking the flag debate. A letter printed in the Toronto Star on 
13 November stated, "[i]f there was ever a time in Canadian history that it was 
imperative that we have a distinctive flag for our nation, it is today."385 J. 
Spofford of Toronto, the letter-writer, argued that Egyptians, and others, would 
misinterpret the "true meaning and function" of the Canadian forces if they were 
serving under a Union Jack or a Red Ensign. An editorial on 27 November in Le 
Devoir titled, "le drapeau distincif n'est pas un luxe," suggested it was well past 
time for Canada to stop using the Red Ensign, which contains a Union Jack in the 
corner, as the flag of its armed forces.386 This editorial and others argued that 
Canadian honour was being sacrificed for the sake of an outmoded fidelity to 
Britain, and only a new flag would help Canada achieve its independence. This 
connection caused the Suez Crisis to become another instance in which debates 
about Canada's national identity would be waged. 
As Canada's politicians formally spoke about UNEF in Parliament, their views 
were influenced by, and helped influence, the linkages that had been made in 
. Canada's newspapers. Louis St. Laurent, as the Prime Minister, was one of the 
prominent figures in newspaper coverage during the later days of November and 
early December of 1956. He did not feature as much in earlier coverage, as his 
parties' actions were judged based upon what Pearson said and did at the UN. 
When St. Laurent stood up to PC attacks in the House on 26 November, most 
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Liberal-supporting papers applauded the Prime Minister's stance on the Suez 
Crisis. French language papers, in particular, were incredibly supportive of St. 
Laurent and his government throughout this period. Le Devoir published an 
editorial on 1 December which stated that St. Laurent's speech was « un discours 
qui fera epoque » in the history of Canadian foreign relations, and the paper 
applauded what it saw as the Prime Minister's standing up for Canada's 
independence, as it had advocated since the start of the Suez Crisis.387 
Yet, when St. Laurent dramatically announced in the House of Commons that 
"the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world" was 
coming to an end, pro-British papers blasted the Prime Minister for openly 
insulting Canada's allies. The Gazette called St. Laurent's words a "painful 
departure" from his usual attitude to foreign affairs, and other papers targeted St. 
Laurent's French Canadian temper in editorials dealing with that speech.388 An 
editorial in the Globe and Mail went for a more dramatic effect in calling St. 
Laurent's speeches in Parliament in favour of UNEF a "grotesque spectacle."389 
Such attacks were levelled against the Prime Minister as the leading 
representative of a government that had, in their opinions, mishandled a chance 
to help Britain quash a tyrant in the Middle East. 
Lester Pearson, on the other hand, won almost universal acclaim for his 
proposal to create UNEF. From the outset of the crisis, his actions were described 
as an expression of the desires of the Canadian government and its people for 
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world peace. In an editorial in the Chronicle-Herald from 1 November, Pearson 
was said to have sanity, wisdom and determination.39° Using ideas from the 
Bible, several letter writers praised the high values of Lester Pearson as an 
individual. A letter writer to the Citizen declared her support for Pearson's 
"Christian decision to send a police force to Egypt" and her outrage at the 
bombing of "Egyptian children."391 Other phrases associated with Pearson were 
"freedom-loving" and "hard-working." In several editorials, these character 
attributes were noted to be ones that Canadians could be proud of, or could share 
in. He was said to be acting in a way that was exemplary of Canadian values at 
their finest, which gave peacekeeping a Canadian, and not simply an 
international, association. 
Numerous editorials and letters to the editor from PC supporters challenged 
the government on the composition of the Canadian contingent to UNEF. Once 
the tangible details of UNEF were made available, support for the Liberals 
seemed to slide as the realities of the operation became more apparent. Authors 
attacked the "typewriter army" of signallers and communications officers that 
Canada sent to join UNEF after Nasser and the Egyptians refused to allow the 
Queen's Own Rifles to be part of the force.392 These voices felt that Canada was 
not adding to its international reputation by allowing Nasser to dictate which 
Canadian units would be allowed into Egypt. They saw no problems with either 
the British invasion of the Suez region, or with Canada's proposing to send the 
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Queen's Own, which served under a flag that was similar to the British Union 
Jack. 
Conversely, the peacekeepers sent to participate in UNEF were also cast as 
"Canadian ambassadors" in many editorials across the country. Canadians were 
reminded that their soldiers were leaving a place with high living standards and 
high pay to enter a count1y where poverty, illiteracy, and starvation were 
widespread.393 Such distinctions should not, according to the Chronicle-Herald, 
lead to Canadians acting as "contemptuous ... braggarts or bullies," but rather as 
people filled with the spirit of "charity, decency andjustice."394 Being both a 
soldier and an ambassador was asking much of the peacekeepers and of 
Canadians as a whole. Echoing the ideals of the colonial era, it was assumed the 
forces would display "a standard of discipline and control of the highest order."395 
By making the peacekeepers representatives of Canada, and making Canada 
better than the host nations, an imbalance of power was being written into their 
relationship. 
Editorials and letters to the editor during this time, in focusing on Canadians 
and ascribing to them a moral mission that only they were capable of performing, 
certainly did not cast the Egyptians as equals to Canadians. For example, Nasser 
was usually the sole Egyptian mentioned by name, one of the hallmarks of 
whether persons were of value in a newspaper article. He was described, in 
addition to being a new Hitler, as a Fascist, and elsewhere as a lackey for the 
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USSR.396 These negative traits at least gave him a character, unlike ordinary 
Egyptians, who were essentially absent from daily newspaper coverage. Instead 
of being compared to Egypt and its citizens, Canada and its peacekeepers were 
judged in comparison to Britain, largely using the child-adult metaphor. The 
names and ranks of Canadian soldiers also appeared in photos or in local stories 
about heading to the Middle East as members of UNEF.397 These extra details 
made the Canadians important subjects in this coverage. Such understandings of 
Canada as a nation capable of helping others through its good conduct 
encouraged readers to symbolically associate their "Blue Berets" with their 
national character, and downplayed the importance of peacekeeping for the host 
nation. 
The Suez crisis caused a serious division among newspapers and their readers 
along partisan lines, and partially caused the defeat of the Liberal government by 
John Diefenbaker's PCs in 1957. Yet the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to 
Lester Pearson in October of 1957 brought a host of articles from across the 
country that not only accepted but praised Canada's peacekeeping role and 
Pearson as the creator of UNEF. Liberal-supporting papers linked Pearson's 
actions with the attributes of the country as a whole. 398 The Globe and Mail, 
which had been so critical of Canada's stance against Britain, also published an 
editorial with the title "Deserved Distinction" that praised Pearson and the UNEF 
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that he helped to create.399 In both Liberal- and PC-supporting papers, Pearson 
and UNEF were seen as significant international actors from the previous year, 
and something for which the rest of the world was grateful. This was based 
largely on the record of UNEF's successfully helping to keep the Egyptians and 
the Israelis separate from one another, and re-establishing shipping traffic 
through the Suez Canal. But it was also based on the belief that Canada's 
international policies should be centred on the UN and the promotion of peace in 
the world. 
By October of 1957, a consensus about UNEF had emerged in the press. The 
strong partisan attacks that characterized editorials and letters to the editor were 
no longer present. Britain's actions were no longer being defended as loudly, and 
some commentators recognized that the invasion of the Suez region had been a 
mistake. Canada's role in mediating the Suez Crisis also seemed to silence any 
talk about Canada's being anything other than an adult nation. In their place 
were commemorations of the leading role that Canada had played in helping to 
diffuse the crisis in Egypt. The daily routines of Canada's peacekeepers were not 
popular stories, nor were updates about Egyptian reconstruction common. 
Instead, attention remained focused on Lester Pearson and the ideals behind the 
peacekeeping force. By facilitating this shift in attention, the press consciously 
shaped a positive narrative of peacekeeping as a Canadian activity that would 
increasingly be promoted in the coming years. 
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Reporting ONUC, 1 ,July to 15 September 1960 
In 1960, Canadian newspapers strongly encouraged their nation's 
peacekeeping role. Accordingly, ONUC received heavy and sustained coverage in 
all the daily newspapers examined during the first two months of its actions. 
Newspaper coverage of the mission to the Congo reflected the peacekeeping 
experiences of 1956 and 1957, as well as the particularities of going to the Congo. 
Because of a greater sense of confidence about Canada's identity at the time and 
the involvement of Belgium rather than Britain in these events, a consensus 
about the value of Canada's contribution to ONUC quickly emerged. Canada was 
compared and contrasted to the Congo in most articles, which helped reinforce 
the differences between a white nation, Canada, and a Black decolonized country, 
the Congo. 4oo These differences involved discussions of the respective pasts, 
presents, and futures of the two nations. The positive narrative that had emerged 
following Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize win also provided reasons for Canada to 
resume a leading role in a peacekeeping operation. Despite this interest from 
journalists and letter-writers, after the UN peacekeepers arrived, and a routine 
was established, stories about the Congo faded from the front and editorial pages 
to the depths of the international section. 
Canadian newspapers have often received credit for forcing the 
government to get involved in ONUC. 4°1 Kevin Spooner has produced the best 
and most comprehensive work on this operation, and he dispels this notion. In its 
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place, he argues that the Diefenbaker government was swayed not by press 
coverage and public opinion, but rather decided to participate because of self-
interest and a desire to stop the spread of Communism. 4°2 By employing a larger 
analysis of the press, this section demonstrates that while newspapers may not 
have played a central role in shaping the government's foreign policy, they did 
continue to help shape how Canadians understood their peacekeepers and their 
own national identity, as well as the places to which their peacekeepers were sent. 
Initial descriptions of the Congo after its independence was obtained on 30 
June emphasized its colonial past and its current backwardness. These portrayals 
contrasted Canada, an independent and bilingual peacekeeping nation, with a 
vastly different Congo. The Congolese were rarely named as individuals, other 
than Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, President Joseph Kasavubu, and head of 
the breakaway province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe. In such discussions, tropes 
about the Congo from the colonial era were employed. 4o3 A month before the 
Congo gained its independence, an article in the Star by Smith Hempstone 
stated, "Belgium's act of abdication after little more than half a century of 
colonial rule has left the Congo ... with its loin cloth down."4°4 A Chronicle-Herald 
editorial from 9 July argued that the Congolese had a "complete lack of control" 
thanks to their never having been an independent nation, and any mutiny or rape 
was the result of "the impact on the half-educated mind of the forcible acquisition 
402 Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 8. 
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of independence itself."4°s English Canadian newspapers also occasionally used 
the term "primitive" to describe the Congolese. 4o6 Such terms may have been 
used to rally support for the UN action in the Congo, on the basis that the 
Congolese would not be able to run the country themselves, but they were also 
over-simplifications and negative stereotypes. 
One reporter, Ron Haggart, made the Congo's "backwardness" the central 
theme of his many on-the-spot reports from the Congo. In one front-page article 
in the Star, Haggart wrote about the Congolese being afraid of Aunt Jemima 
pancake boxes, since the Congolese believed "it really [ wa]s Aunt Jemima ground 
up inside that box."4°7 In a later article from 30 August published in both the Star 
and the Sun, Haggart reported on a discussion with a Canadian soldier who was 
arrested and taunted near a pot of boiling water while some of the Congolese 
mimicked eating sounds with their mouths and hands. 4o8 The article, titled, 
"Thought they would eat me alive -- Canuck tells Haggart," later allowed that this 
was all a joke by the Congolese and that the soldier was released without being 
harmed. Such language would have only reinforced the idea that the Congo was a 
backwards place where modern consumer goods were wasted and human flesh 
was likely to be on the menu at dinner. 
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Letter-writers employed racially-prejudiced language and imagery to describe 
the Congo. A letter to the Chronicle-Herald from 6 August contrasted Canada, 
"lusty and naturally born," with the Congo, "delivered by caesarean, premature if 
not still-born." 4o9 The letter writer, A.St.G. Abbott, also ascribed to Canada a 
"tradition of civilization," while the Congo was "the inheritor of centuries of 
witchcraft, carnage and fear." Another Sun reader used his personal experience of 
having "many Africans under his control" to give credence to his view that the 
Congolese, like the Black population of South Africa, were simply not ready to 
take control of their own country. 410 Such opinions expressed in two newspapers 
at opposite ends of the country show how the colonial-era discourse surrounding 
the Congo remained in use by many Canadians at this time. That letter writers 
would use such graphic and negative language about the Congo indicates that 
some newspaper readers really did see it and its people as different from their 
Canadian self-image. 
Canadian Christian missionaries who had been forced to flee when 
violence against the white population broke out were also used as sources for 
reports on conditions in the Congo. Papers across the country carried stories 
from those who had returned home with harrowing tales of danger and escape. 
Because of their Canadian connection, missionaries, rather than the Congolese 
themselves, were used as sources for what was taking place in the Congo. These 
stories emphasized certain aspects of Congolese society that played into 
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conventional understandings of the Congo. In a Sun article, a missionary 
described how the Congolese believed "the whites eat people at night" and also 
mentioned that boxes of food with labels were not trusted because they might 
contain the person on the box. 411 The relationship between the missionaries and 
the Congolese and why the missionaries were trying to bring their religion to the 
people of the Congo were never mentioned. Instead, their views were used to 
confirm the backwardness of the Congolese and the dire need for Canadian 
participation in ONUC.412 
Despite the prevalence of such descriptions, some letter-writers actively 
challenged the racially-charged views of other Canadians. George Maxwell wrote 
to the Sun to oppose the views of one of its regular columnists, Harold Weir, 
noting that the argument Weir used was "built around emotionally charged 
words and phrases such as rape, murder, footsie with the Russians and Congolese 
bestiality."413 These voices blamed the Belgians for having run their former 
colony so poorly, and expressed sympathy with the Congolese for the difficult 
task they faced. Belgium was widely known to have done a horrible job of 
administering the Congo since it took control of the Congo Free State in 1908. 
Few Canadians had qualms about condemning these colonial efforts that had 
resulted in the deaths of millions and inspired Joseph Conrad to pen Heart of 
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Darkness. 414 Such letters framed Canada as having a duty to help less fortunate 
nations through its aid and peacekeeping efforts because of its international 
reputation as a supporter of the UN.415 
Though considerable space was devoted to descriptions of the Congo and its 
people, it was the Canadian connection that garnered most of the coverage of 
Congolese events in Canadian daily newspapers. In these articles, editorials, and 
letters, Canadians and their peacekeepers were rarely criticized. While members 
of UNEF had been attacked for being a "typewriter army," the members of ONUC 
were celebrated for reflecting Canada's bilingual nature. The troops sent to the 
Congo were largely bilingual members of Canada's signal corps, and provided 
essential communications and logistics services for ONUC during its four-year 
operation.416 Because of this, the Chronicle-Herald argued that Canada's French 
and bilingual population made it uniquely suited to guide the Congolese on "the 
road of Western democ.racy."417 The Citizen and the Leader-Post also made 
reference to Canada's bilingual nature to strengthen arguments for why Canada 
needed to help the new republics of Central Africa, and portrayed Canada as a 
suitable member of the UN force.418 These papers positioned Canada as a 
successful democratic and bilingual country which reflected a confidence in 
Canada's identity that was absent four years prior. 
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The French Canadian press was less sure of Canada's "bilingual" makeup, and 
several articles questioned whether the members of the Canadian contingent 
were actually French speakers. 419 Despite these concerns, a common language 
was one of the reasons that both Le Devoir and La Presse were in favour of 
Canadian participation in ONUC. La Presse published an editorial on 14 July 
titled "Pas de neocolonialisme ! " which argued it was necessary for Canada to 
ensure that the gains of Congolese independence could be enjoyed by the 
Congolese, and not their former rulers, the Belgians. 420 When three Canadian 
signalers were attacked by Congolese troops who mistook them for Belgian 
paratroopers, La Presse stated that the Congolese « ignorant la difference entre 
les nationalites occidentales tout autant que nous ignorons nous-memes les 
distinctions qui existent entre les gens de couleurs. » 421 Turning the situation 
around in this manner, this editorial suggested that stones should not be cast the 
Congolese's way before Canadians considered their own attitudes towards those 
they were attempting to assist. 
Editorials in Le Devoir concurred with these sentiments about the need to end 
the legacies of colonialism, arguing that it was time Canada established stronger 
economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties not only with the Congo, but with all of 
French Africa. Such ideas about ONUC can be seen as the germ of Quebec's 
efforts to reach outwards to an international Francophonie later in the 1960s. 
These French Canadian papers did not look at Canada as the success story it 
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appeared to be in the English press. However, they did see language issues as 
central to Canada's politics of the time, and understood how important they could 
be to the new Congolese nation. 
Further Canadian qualifications for peacekeeping included its 
independent and peaceful character. The Globe and Mail was perhaps the loudest 
voice calling for Canadian participation in the UN operation. One of its editorials 
noted that Canada had "no special interest in the Congo dispute" and "no record 
of colonialism."422 Many editorials acknowledged that Canada was a white nation, 
but felt that this was of little consequence, since Canada was both willing and able 
to play a constructive role in ONUC. 423A14 July editorial in the Globe and Mail 
also mentioned that Canada was particularly suited to UN service as it had "no 
axe to grind in Africa, no interest save that of protecting human lives, black and 
white."424 In contrast to four years earlier, Canada was now portrayed as an 
experienced and independent peacekeeping nation. 
No longer were allusions to Canada's infancy raised in the daily press. 
Instead, Canada was conceptualized as the leading peacekeeping nation in the 
world. Papers like the Globe and Mail expressed concern that Diefenbaker's 
government was letting Canada back away from its world-leading role in 
peacekeeping that had been established in 1956. The Citizen also noted that if 
Canada had not volunteered its forces to ONUC, the country would have suffered 
a great embarrassment because of the time and effort that diplomats and 
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politicians had put into enhancing Canada's role at the UN.425 These two papers 
had taken opposing views of the creation of UNEF, but found common cause in 
promoting Canada's peacekeeping role in 1960. They also did this with no 
reference at all to the war of words that had taken place four years prior. This 
consensus demonstrates the popularity peacekeeping was enjoying among 
Canada's daily newspapers because of its perceived utility. 
Diefenbaker's reluctance to send peacekeeping forces to the Congo, even 
when asked by then UN Secretary of State Dag Hammarskjold to be a part of the 
force, led to his being called "miserly" and accusations that he was "shunning 
responsibility."42 6 Lester Pearson, by contrast, advocated for more Canadian 
involvement, which was seen as the right and "honourable" position for Canada 
to take.42 7 The press wholly embraced Pearson's enthusiasm, saw this as a 
continuation of Canada's long-standing support for the UN's endeavours, and 
challenged the Diefenbaker government's decision to alter Canada's record of 
participation on such operations. 
Newspaper coverage of ONUC captured the views of many different 
Canadians about the Congo and their country's irenic role in 1960. The 
journalists who wrote about this operation employed racially-prejudiced 
language when discussing the Congolese, and letter writers were often worse in 
their descriptions. Yet the perception of Canada as a peacekeeping nation had 
changed dramatically from 1956. In the span of four years, peacekeeping had 
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gone from a policy that was questioned thoroughly to one that represented the 
pinnacle of positive Canadian engagement in the world. Canada's peacekeepers 
were held to be exemplars of the best that a now independent and mature Canada 
could offer. The Congo mission was also one of the first instances in which all 
major daily newspapers were in favour of Canada's peacekeeping operations, and, 
in fact, most actively sought a larger role for Canada than the Diefenbaker 
government thought prudent. This desire for more UN peacekeeping came from 
its perceived utility as a practical policy for the Canadian Forces as well as its 
being perceived as a symbolically proper policy for an independent and peace-
loving nation like Canada. 
Covering UNFICYP, 15 February to 15May1964 
Lester Pearson's electoral victory in 1963 brought renewed enthusiasm for 
Canada's potential to play a leading international role through UN peacekeeping. 
The following spring, when Canada volunteered for duty on UNFICYP, daily 
newspapers found an occasion to commemorate Canada's peacekeeping past, 
discuss the value of UN service in the present, and hypothesize about future 
opportunities for Canada's peacekeeping talents to be employed. Unlike in 1960, 
however, uncertainties over Canada's domestic stability influenced discussions of 
peacekeeping. Disagreement over bilingualism in Canada caused doubts 
regarding the appropriateness of Canada's role in Cyprus to be expressed in both 
English and French Canada. When peace was not forthcoming in Cyprus, 
editorials and letters to the editor also criticized the manliness of the 
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peacekeepers because of restrictions imposed by the UN. Though 1964 was the 
acme of press-government consensus about peacekeeping, alternate conceptions 
of Canada as a peacekeeping nation were being more frequently reiterated. These 
promoted its symbolic value while casting doubts on its practical worth, further 
focusing Canadian understandings of peacekeeping on its domestic import. 
Newspapers across the country greeted Canada's rapid deployment of the 
VanDoos to Cyprus with enthusiasm. The major role Canada played in creating 
and staffing the peacekeeping force sent to Cyprus was generally seen as a return 
to its elevated reputation of 1956. Many papers hearkened back to 1956 and saw 
the events of the time as a revival of Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy. 42 8 
They recalled the international praise Pearson and Canada had received, while 
selectively ignoring the domestic debates that ensued over Canadian participation 
in UNEF. The Diefenbaker years were attacked as a "back-slide,'' and the Sun 
even went so far as to write, "[t]he kindest thing to say about the Diefenbaker 
government's records in foreign relations and international diplomacy is 
nothing."42 9 Many newspapers had turned against the former Prime Minister by 
1964 and looked for new directions in leadership reminiscent of the Liberals from 
the 1950s. Paul Martin and Lester Pearson were cast as those who would save 
Canada's reputation by being, in the words of a Gazette editorial, "moderate, 
practical and reliable."43° Peacekeeping was by this point an established 
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Canadian role and mentioning 1956, Pearson, or the Suez Crisis could convey a 
positive understanding of the recent past. 
Positive opinions about Canada's involvement in Cyprus gave editorialists and 
letter writers cause to hope for a more peaceful future as well. Pearson spoke 
often of his dream of a permanent international police force. Though it was never 
realized, many papers expressed support for Pearson's plan for a more 
permanent UN peacekeeping "army."431 They saw peacekeeping as the primary 
means through which Canada could make a positive impact on international 
affairs. In the Citizen, one letter-writer credited Pearson for his "victory over war 
in Cyprus," forecasting the eventual resolution of this "flare-up."432 Pearson's 
efforts to promote peace in Cyprus and to eventually achieve permanence for 
what remained a mission-by-mission ad hoc force were roundly applauded, 
adding a progressive bent to discussions of the events in Cyprus. 
Though many Canadians remained optimistic about peacekeeping's future 
value, its perceived value at the time was affected by rising tensions between 
English and French Canadians. While Canada's French heritage was one of the 
reasons given for its participation in ONUC in 1960, by 1964 language rights 
issues in Canada had become more complicated. Clear differences existed in the 
editorials of English Canada and Quebec regarding whether it was appropriate 
for Canadians to serve in Cyprus. According to the Sun, having French Canadians 
make up the largest part of the force would showcase Canada's bilingual talents. 
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And a letter to the editor attacked the forces of separatism, and celebrated "our 
indissoluble Canadianism."433 Hence the French Canadian soldiers in the 
peacekeeping force would "become indistinguishable Canadian citizen-soldiers 
for whose individual and collective welfare and safe return we unanimously 
experience the deepest concern." These authors employed traditional arguments 
about war's uniting a country to cover up deeper tensions in Canadian society. 
Other English newspapers took a more cynical tone regarding the use of 
French Canadian forces for peacekeeping. An editorial in the Herald wrote that 
Canadian assistance to Cyprus had "sad irony" because of the many parallels 
between the Cypriot situation and Canada's.434 Both countries had two main 
linguistic groups, with the minority population seeking a more equitable stake in 
the country, so the comparison was in many ways an apt one. This editorial even 
hypothesized about a time in the future when, however unlikely, these tensions 
might cause Canada to ask for assistance from the UN for its domestic problems. 
Though such ironies existed, Canada was still said to be a better country than 
Cyprus because armed warfare was not taking place in Canada. Instead, it was 
engaging in "international good citizenship" by sending peacekeeping forces to 
help in the Mediterranean. 
Such views were not held by the French Canadian press or by the English 
press in Montreal. The French Canadian press considered it strange that Canada 
was sending forces to Cyprus. Editorials in Le Devoir, in particular, wondered 
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about the wisdom of Canadian participation in an operation that had «quelques 
analogies avec le malaise constitutionnel actuel du Canada »435 The editorials in 
Le Devoir refused to accept that peacekeeping was a panacea that could mend all 
Canada's internal problems. This did not prevent the paper from supporting 
Canada's peacekeeping role or its desire to strengthen the UN. In this, they 
agreed with their English Canadian counterparts. Rather, they emphasized the 
functional value of peacekeeping for the Cypriots, as they had done with the 
Congolese in 1960.· 
A letter-writer in the Gazette wrote that Cyprus should be seen as a warning 
to Canada and other countries that war and strife would be the outcome when 
"two races in one nation accuse each other of domination and discrimination."436 
This letter writer was far more pessimistic about the situation in Cyprus, which 
can be read as unease about the situation in Quebec in 1964. Conversely, a letter 
published in La Presse expressed sympathy with the Cypriots who had risen up 
against a majority that had denied them their rights. 437 As they were situated in 
the midst of heated debates over language rights, these letter writers used this 
domestic situation as a framework for the events in Cyprus. As a result, their 
views were darker than those expressed elsewhere in Canada. 
While Canada's internal issues dominated the press coverage of UNFICYP, the 
operational mandate of UNFICYP also caused negative views to be aired. The 
Canadian forces were ordered to fire on any Cypriots only if they had been fired 
435 
"Le Canada et la crise de Chypre," Le Devoir, Saturday 11 April 1964, 4. 
436 
"Troubles in Cyprus Pinpoint Dangers of Bickering Races," Montreal Gazette, 5 March 1964, 6. 
437 
"Chypre et la lutte pour la liberte," La Presse, Friday 13 March 1964, 6. 
229 
upon first and they were not to disarm any of the civilian population. These 
orders were typical of UN peacekeeping operations, but the PC opposition under 
Diefenbaker and many daily newspapers questioned these restrictions on the 
effectiveness of the Canadian forces. Diefenbaker referred to the peacekeepers as 
"passive policemen,"438 and believed that the UN restrictions on their behaviour 
would "emasculate" them. 439 Such language was carefully framed not to attack 
the soldiers themselves, but only the UN operation and its goals. Papers used 
similar phrases and described the mission as "peacekeeping with hands tied," 
called the peacekeepers "Handicapped Policeman," "Cardboard Soldiers," and 
noted that the Canadians would be frustrated, but they"[could] only grit their 
teeth and bear it." 44° These terms suggested that the soldiers who were operating 
under UN auspices in Cyprus were not "full" soldiers because they could not 
shoot their guns or use force to subdue situations. Such desires for more 
aggression coexisted with statements praising Canada's desire to promote peace, 
and one did not seem to rule out the other. 
These challenges to the soldiers' masculinity were countered by stories that 
told of the Canadians' anger at not being able to use their guns, and their 
eventual enforcement of rules on the ground that were not in line with the UN 
mandate. 441 Pictures of the VanDoos with their guns and artillery often 
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accompanied these articles. An article about the VanDoos' "retaliating" appeared 
next to a photo of a peacekeeper in a tank with a large tank gun. Another story 
about the VanDoos' taking up dangerous positions in the capital city of Nicosia 
had a photo next to it of a soldier holding a large bazooka on his shoulders while 
two other soldiers stood nearby. The caption for the photo read: "Canadians on 
Cyprus prepare to go to work today."442 Such photos and stories painted the 
VanDoos as soldiers in a traditional sense, carrying weapons, ready to use them if 
necessary; rugged and assertive, rather than peacekeepers who were designed to 
be inserted into tense spots around the world to facilitate diplomacy. Indeed, 
newspapers often portrayed peacekeeping as just another activity of the armed 
forces, rather than a specialized task that required different training and a 
different kind of soldier. 
Canada's participation in UNFICYP allowed newspapers to reaffirm their 
support for an internationalist foreign policy. They did this by making reference 
to the past Canadian peacekeeping success in 1956 while ignoring the tensions 
this mission created among many Canadians. Most English Canadian papers also 
noted that this mission was a chance for Canada to show that its language 
problems were not nearly as bad as Cyprus's. In Quebec, both English- and 
French-language newspapers found the problems in Cyprus all too similar to the 
political climate they were experiencing. In their view, Canada's status as a nation 
seemed to be on the decline as domestic problems threatened the unity of the 
442 Ibid. 
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country. Further challenges appeared when some newspapers questioned the 
wisdom of sending Canadian soldiers into harm's way in Cyprus without allowing 
them to respond with their guns. These difficulties allowed criticisms about 
peacekeeping to be expressed concurrently with statements praising Canada's 
illustrious peacekeeping past and its plans to bring about a more peaceful future. 
Peacekeeping remained a popular policy in both English and French Canada, 
therefore, but doubting voices began to grow louder. 
The End of UNEF, 15 May to 15 June 1967 
Newspapers, like Canada's politicians, were shocked to learn of President 
Nasser's insistence that the Canadian contingent in UNEF be removed in May of 
1967. What followed was an outpouring of stories, editorials, and letters to the 
editor which commented upon this setback in Canada's fortunes as a 
peacekeeping nation. The "death of UNEF," as it was labelled in some 
newspapers, was blamed on two figures: Nasser and U Thant. Nasser was an easy 
target, since he was a dictator, and had a history of trying to intimidate the UN 
peacekeeping forces. Thant was perhaps a less-likely villain, but his willingness to 
accede to Nasser's demand to have UNEF withdrawn attracted the ire of many 
Canadian newspapers. Paul Martin was portrayed struggling with Thant over the 
end of the force, and several papers noted that this was the first time in recent 
memory that Canada and the UN had disagreed.443 Thant's authority to remove 
the force was questioned, and Martin was described as fighting to keep the peace 
443 Tom Hazlitt, "Martin in battle for peace force," Toronto Dai(y Star, Friday 19 May 1967, 1. 
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in the face of weakness at the UN. 444 In attacking Thant, many papers referenced 
the League of Nations' refusal to take action against the Italian aggression in 
Ethiopia, and some of the predictions of doom came from papers seeing parallels 
between the organizations and their unwillingness to be active in world affairs. If 
Canadians wanted to avoid a repeat of the end of the League of Nations, so it 
seemed, they needed to affirm their government's support for the UN and 
international peacekeeping. 
Across English Canada, CP articles and editorials eulogized peacekeeping by 
referring to Canada's peacekeeping past. Canada was said to have worked hard 
for the UN in the past, and the expulsion of its forces from Egypt in 1967 was 
therefore unjust. The Star published several editorials, including two titled, "Can 
UN peacekeeping survive Sinai Crisis," and, "The end of illusion for Canadian 
policy," which looked back over the previous ten years and ahead to an 
increasingly murky future for peacekeeping. These editorials and many others 
commemorated the Suez Crisis as a high point in Canadian foreign policy, while 
ignoring the debates and challenges that had occurred about Canadian 
participation in missions to the Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus. There was a 
palpable bittersweetness in such editorials. One piece from the Star, for example, 
argued, "If the UN cannot find a peacekeeping role for those which have been 
proving their impartiality and devotion for 11 years in this work, then its own 
future will be dark, and the great hope on which Canada has centred its foreign 
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and defence policies will dissolve." 445 These events were sobering for many 
advocates for peacekeeping, though its past remained a source of pride in most 
newspaper articles and editorials. 
The future of Canada's international participation in peacekeeping operations 
was also thrown into doubt despite the continued presence of Canadians on other 
peacekeeping operations around the globe, including UNFICYP. Such discussions 
made a correlation between the current setback and peacekeeping's future 
utility.446 The unification of Canada's Armed Forces in 1964, which had 
anticipated a large Canadian role in peacekeeping operations, now seemed an 
unwise choice. An article in the Chronicle- Herald noted that the machinery of 
peacekeeping was falling apart, there was a malaise among those in charge of 
peacekeeping, and questioned whether international peacekeeping operations 
would continue to be used across the globe.447 The Star wrote of Canada's need to 
choose its international commitments more carefully and to concentrate more on 
domestic issues rather than "playing a dramatic role on the world stage."448 These 
views predated almost identical statements being made by Pierre Trudeau and 
Mitchell Sharp during their foreign policy reviews from 1968 to 1970. When the 
press changed its views about peacekeeping, these astute politicians seem to have 
paid attention. 
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However, it was not all doom and gloom for Canada's peacekeeping identity. 
Despite peacekeeping's being seen as a "dead" policy, some papers continued to 
perceive it as something for which Canada was suited as a middle power. The Sun 
stated that Canada was lucky to have Lester Pearson as Prime Minister because of 
his international standing and past history with peacekeeping. An editorial noted 
that Pearson's experience and "fibre" would ensure the survival of peacekeeping 
and a strong Canadian role in future operations. 449 The mission to Cyprus was to 
continue, and Pearson stated that Canada would not hesitate to send more 
peacekeepers around the globe if asked by the UN. These sentiments were 
applauded in the Sun, which believed that Canadians, "regardless of politics," 
would be behind their Prime Minister. Having a strong political advocate in 
Pearson allowed many people to believe Canada would continue its irenic role in 
the future. 
The French Canadian press, on the other hand, saw peacekeeping solely as a 
functional policy option. As a result, their views of the events of May 1967 were 
far less dramatic. Editorials called on Canadians to follow the French line in 
trying to bring peace to the world and to shed their close associations with Britain 
and the United States.4s0 Paris was portrayed as having an independent foreign 
policy that gave it more freedom to negotiate with Cairo and Moscow in crisis 
situations. This position was consistent with the papers' earlier discussions about 
ending colonialism and strengthening the ties between Canada and the new 
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nations of the world. La Presse and Le Devoir argued that the Canadian 
government was not really impartial, and that Canadian participation in 
peacekeeping missions served Western interests. In so doing, they sought to 
frame peacekeeping as a policy that had achieved tangible results in the past and 
could again. By ignoring peacekeeping's symbolic relevance to Canada's national 
identity, these papers found no need to eulogize the end of UNEF. The French 
Canadian press maintained its approval of peacekeeping as a policy, but also 
recognizied that it was not what made Canada a unique country. 
It was, instead, the Montreal Exposition that appeared in most headlines in 
the French press during the spring of 1967. Both Le Devoir and La Presse gave 
Expo '67 far more coverage than the Middle East crisis and the expulsion of the 
peacekeepers. Making the story local, one editorial worried about « les effets 
menacent meme de rejaiUir gravement sur !'Exposition universelle de 
Montreal. »451 By presenting peacekeeping as a pragmatic policy, it could be 
reduced to something that might have adverse effects on the success of Expo 
rather than something of vital concern to all Canadians. As a local story, Expo '67 
managed to garner more interest and column space than an international one, 
despite Canada's involvement in both. 
Across English Canada, newspapers offered dour assessments of the present 
and future utility of Canada's peacekeeping role. They did so while applauding 
Canada's efforts in the past on behalf of world peace. In French Canada, 
451 Ibid. 
236 
peacekeeping was viewed as something that could be of value for Canada, but 
only if it continued to move towards a more independent foreign policy - a 
position that had been advocated since 1956. Such editorials continued to focus 
on Canada and its peacekeepers while largely ignoring the consequences of 
another war in the Middle East. In English Canada this meant discussing 
peacekeeping's symbolic value to Canada, while in the French press stories about 
Expo '67 were dee.med more important. The positive narrative of Canadian 
participation in peacekeeping faced its toughest challenge to that point, but with 
Pearson as Prime Minister, a strong political desire for more Canadian 
involvement in UN peacekeeping remained. 
Over the next fifteen years, the Canadian government's position on 
peacekeeping see.med in Hne with these more conservative assessments offered 
by most newspapers about the good that Canada could accomplish in the present 
and the future. Trudeau's Liberals continued Canadian participation in 
UNFICYP, and volunteered Canadians for service in UNEF II in 1973 despite the 
government's not showing interest in being a "helpful fixer." By participating in 
every UN peacekeeping operation that was undertaken, Canada preserved links 
between the present and the country's "golden age." In all these cases, 
peacekeeping remained framed as an appropriate Canadian role, and its 
peacekeepers in their blue berets, or "casques bleus," were celebrated for their 
glorious past. 
Breaking News from Somalia, 1March-1June1993 
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When the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeeping, 
Canadian newspapers took the opportunity to commemorate Canada's 
peacekeeping past. An editorial in the Globe and Mail referred to peacekeeping 
as "the proudest postwar tradition in the Canadian military," and noted that 
Canada's record of service on peacekeeping operations was unparalleled.452 
Peacekeeping was described in this account and others as a Canadian activity and 
something that all Canadians had excitedly supported for the previous forty 
years. In both English and French Canadian dailies, Canadians were told to 
remember Pearson, and to honour Canada's peacekeeping legacy.453 These papers 
shared the Mulroney government's enthusiasm for peacekeeping, and as the 
tensions of the Cold War lessened, the calls for more Canadian peacekeeping 
grew louder. These calls, and the resultant Canadian participation in 
peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq/Iran, ignored both 
the French-Canadian press' earlier pragmatic views and the editorials in the 
English press in 1967 which hoped future Canadian involvement in peacekeeping 
would be more measured. 
This enthusiasm carried over into the early 1990s. Beginning in December 
1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment participated in "Operation Deliverance" 
in Somalia as part of UNOSOM, then as word of the deaths of several Somalis at· 
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the hands of the Airborne emerged in March of 1993, newspapers became sites of 
intense debate over the proper role of Canada's peacekeepers. These debates 
pitted those who continued to advance a positive narrative of Canada as a 
peacekeeping nation and were interested in rehabilitating the image of the 
Canadian Forces against those who saw its armed forces as unsuited for their role 
in Somalia. What made the events in Somalia so polarizing was the torture and 
taking of glory photos that dehumanized the Somalis and seemed to make the 
killings by the Airborne premeditated. When information about soldiers in the 
Armed Forces being part of white supremacist groups became known soon after, 
Canada's current peacekeepers could not be linked to their historical 
predecessors. This dislocated a major source of Canadian identity from the 
present and forced Canadians to re-evaluate their status as a peacekeeping 
nation. 
Newspaper coverage of the Somalia mission has never been studied 
systematically or placed within a broader historical context. Sherene Razack's 
book, Dark Threats and White Knights uses newspaper coverage of the Somalia 
mission to make the argument that peacekeeping is a colonial endeavour.454 Her 
work employs newspaper sources to aptly demonstrate how a national narrative 
about peacekeeping was threatened by what happened in Somalia. Razack argues 
that it was only by isolating the Airborne as un-Canadian that mythologies about 
Canada being a peacekeeping nation survived. Her study, and that of other 
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anthropologists, Catherine Besteman and I.M. Lewis, makes generalizations 
about Canada and its institutions without investigating the historical 
development of the language and ideas that surrounded peacekeeping in 
Canada. 455 This section demonstrates that peacekeeping was simultaneously a 
means of expressing a nostalgic longing for Canada's past, a functional 
expression of Canadian policy, and a way for post-colonial inequalities to be 
perpetuated. It provides a richer understanding of peacekeeping's changing place 
in Canada's national symbology. 
Throughout UNOSOM, newspapers presented Canada as superior to 
Somalia. 456 Descriptions of Somalia in the press mentioned that it was behind the 
times, slipping backwards to an older era, and failing to keep up with the modern 
world. 457 Many articles blamed the Somalis for the state of their country, denying 
the role of the Cold War and arms shipments from both the United States and the 
Soviet Union for the country's current state. There were, however, some articles 
that recognized that Somalia was another in a long line of "basket case countries" 
who were given brief media coverage and then left to their own devices. 458 
Though such descriptions appeared regularly in the fall and winter, the news 
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cycle habit of largely forgetting about Canada's peacekeepers and the host nations 
had occurred by February 1993. 
The Somalis, when they were discussed, were typically portrayed as famine 
victims or lawless tribal warriors. 459 They were cast as so different from 
Canadians that the peacekeepers had difficulties relating to them. A Star article 
on 21 March written by Paul Watson, a reporter who was in Somalia with the 
Canadian peacekeepers, captured a sense of restlessness, boredom, and isolation 
among the Airborne. 46o This piece appeared less than a week after the killing of 
Shidane Arone and less than a month after two other Somalis had been killed 
"execution-style.':' Watson, however, would not have been aware of these killings 
as they had not been made public while he was writing. The article described 
peacekeepers who felt they were being underutilized in famine relief efforts, and 
were upset at the lack of leadership and political change in Somalia. Unnamed 
troops also admitted that they wished they could shoot their guns more, and were 
said to have opened fire on Somalis who threw rocks at them. They used racial 
slurs such as "Smuftie" against the local population, and were in the practice of 
"shouting racist cracks from the top of armoured vehicles, figuring no one would 
understand EngJlish but their buddies." The article focused on how the Canadian 
peacekeepers needed different duties to try to keep themselves occupied, not on 
what the consequences of such thinking and behaviour could be. While 
informative, such pieces did little to criticize the troops for holding such views, 
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the Canadian Forces for sending troops who held such attitudes over to Somalia, 
or the government for believing that any part of the Canadian Forces could be 
suitable for peacekeeping duties. 
Newspaper coverage of Somalia changed in April 1993 when Major Barry 
Armstrong's letter detailing the killing of two Somalis was made public. 461 
Articles, editorials, and letters to the editor suddenly returned their attention to 
the Canadian peacekeepers. The press's role in covering the peacekeeping 
operation became central to how these events were reported, with editorials and 
letters to the editor strongly disagreeing about whether the peacekeepers were 
being treated fairly. 
As with earlier operations, the Canadians were the central focus of news 
stories. Ex-military members and the families of soldiers who were serving in 
Somalia wrote to newspapers defending the Airborne from what they considered 
a smear campaign by the media. These letters posited that newspapers and 
television news programs were presenting stories about the Airborne's assaulting, 
torturing, and killing Somalis without "all the facts." One wife writing to the 
Citizen found it unacceptable that she was being "bombarded" by stories about 
the reprehensible conduct of her husband's regiment.462 An article about the 
experiences of wives near the Canadian Forces base in Petawawa, Ontario noted 
the unfair backlash that wives of the soldiers faced. Re-printed in several papers 
across the country in both English and French, this story described the 
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experience of Veronica Gibson, nine months pregnant, who, while walking in a 
mall wearing her husband's Airborne sweatshirt, had someone "growl" at her, 
and a woman "hiss" that her husband was a murderer.463 The pregnant wife's 
humanity while facing animalistic attacks against her, her husband, and Canada's 
peacekeepers made her the heroine of the article. It was further reported that 
many wives feared their husbands would be subject to a homecoming similar to 
that which awaited US soldiers returning from Vietnam. 464 All these family 
members believed that the killings had been justified, and one wife noted that the 
Airborne were all highly trained soldiers who "must have felt something was 
wrong" to act as they did. The views of these family members mattered far more 
than those of Somalis, who were not contacted on how they viewed the killings. 
Though many family members of the peacekeepers came to their defence, few 
stories in daily newspapers were combative towards the Canadian Forces, and, in 
fact, many were apologetic towards the Airborne as a whole. Articles often quoted 
returning soldiers who stressed the humanitarian relief work that the Canadian 
peacekeepers had accomplished in Somalia. 465 Another described the 
peacekeepers as "far from being trigger-happy killers,'' suggesting that the 
suspicious deaths were an aberration in an otherwise excellent peacekeeping 
unit.466 An article in the Leader-Post argued that the Airborne was getting a black 
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eye that it "did not deserve" through media reports.467 Several editorials focused 
on the end of the famine, the removal of militias, and the building of schools, to 
frame the Somalia mission as a success. 468 These editorials posited that all 
peacekeepers should not be tried for the crimes of a few soldiers, and suggested 
that the military could administer justice properly within its own ranks. 
Many newspapers used articles from reporters who were with the Airborne in 
Somalia to show the good that the Canadian Forces were accomplishing there. 469 
An article in La Presse went to a francophone member of the Armed Forces for 
an update about relations between the Canadians and the Somalis. By using the 
white Canadian soldiers as sources for reports about how Somalis felt about the 
Canadian peacekeepers, these articles continued to cover international events in 
ways that centred on their Canadian connection. Despite some peacekeepers' 
being under investigation for murder, the white soldiers were taken at their word 
for how the mission was going, and no attempt was made to talk to Somali's 
about their feelings, to counter such a narrative. 
Regardless of the presence of these articles, the details of the deaths of 
Shidane Arone and others at the hands of the Airborne cast doubt on the 
Canadian Forces as suitable peacekeepers. But what mattered far more than the 
deaths of the Somalis was the presence of white supremacists in the Airborne. It 
was discovered that Corporal Matt McKay, one of the men being held for the 
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March 1993 death of Arone, was a known member of a white supremacist group, 
and a photo of him wearing a Hitler T-shirt and giving a Nazi salute appeared in 
some papers. 47° Canadians were not prepared to support those who believed the 
deeds of Hitler and the Nazis had been justified. The killings, combined with the 
presence of "un-Canadian" beliefs among the Airborne, resulted in newspapers' 
no longer employing language that symbolically linked Canada and its 
peacekeepers, marking the end of almost forty years of such language. As 
peacekeeping lost this metaphorical connection with Canada, stronger criticisms 
about its practical value came from editorials and letters to the editor, especially 
as no political actors rushed to defend peacekeeping as an institution, as they had 
in 1967. 
The Free Press, the Chronicle-Herald, the Star, La Presse and the Globe and 
Mail suggested that both the Canadian Forces and the PC government needed to 
be held accountable for the killings. These newspapers lambasted Minister of 
Defence and PC Party leadership front-runner Kim Campbell, while Liberal 
politicians similarly attacked her. The partisan attacks of the House of Commons 
from this time were echoed in the news coverage of Campbell's performance as 
Minister of Defence. The Chronicle-Herald wrote, "Canadians will not tolerate a 
glossing over of accountability in order to suit the political needs of a party -- and 
a defence minister -- knee-deep in a leadership race."471 Language such as this 
targeted Campbell as part of the reason for the failures in Somalia. By shifting 
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their attention from the peacekeepers to higher level government officials, these 
newspapers perpetuated the idea that the peacekeepers were different from those 
who gave the orders. Such a distinction would ultimately make the number of 
figures blamed for the Somalia Affair quite limited and would also serve to reduce 
the calls for whole-scale reform of the military and its operations. 
The military leadership was, however, painted as an "old boys club" that 
needed to have its business aired. The Canadian Forces and Campbell were 
challenged in a Free Press editorial for not dealing with the presence of white 
supremacists in the Airborne earlier. Noting that the "proud record" of the 
Airborne should not be thrown out because of the actions of a few ''bigots," this 
editorial nonetheless commented, "[i]t makes no sense at all to send those highly-
trained racists to nations populated by black people and order them to keep the 
peace."472 A La Presse editorial gave examples of racists in the Canadian Forces, 
including Cpl. Matt McKay and a sergeant who, upon being passed over for a 
promotion by a francophone officer, called that officer a "frog." This editorial 
argued that even ideal candidates might be susceptible to « des positions 
ideologiques incompatibles avec certaines missions. »473 It went on to suggest 
that it was anachronistic not to hold the members of the Armed Forces to the 
standards of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These were important 
criticisms, but because of Canada's long and positively-portrayed history as a 
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peacekeeping nation, the larger question of whether Canada was suited for a 
peacekeeping role was not addressed. 
When news about the killings in Somalia became public, many people rushed 
to defend peacekeeping as a policy and the Canadian Forces as an institution. As 
evidence of beliefs in white supremacy in the Airborne became known, however, 
these challenges to the Canadian Forces' peacekeeping reputation made it 
I 
increasingly difficult for authors who supported the military to effectively link the 
Airborne with Canada's peacekeeping past or to mobilize those who sought a 
larger Canadian role through the UN in the future. Such attacks focused on the 
peacekeepers as Canadian ambassadors, while downplaying the actual damage 
they had caused in Somalia. As in 1967, this latest downturn in Canada's status as 
a peacekeeping nation was followed by a change in political leadership that spoke 
of the need for more selective Canadian involvement in UN operations. But the 
creation of the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia shortly thereafter ensured 
that larger-scale changes to Canada's peacekeeping status would ensue. 
The Somalia Inquiry and its Fallout, 1 June- 30 July 1997 
In July of 1997, the Commission into Somalia released its large, multi-volume 
report, titled Dishonoured Legacy. The Report was released on Canada Day 
weekend of 1997, in what some saw as an attempt to bury its findings. If that were 
the intent, it failed, as every daily newspaper in Canada published extensive 
coverage of the Report in their 3 July editions and for the remainder of July. 
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Newspaper coverage of the release of the Report revived debates over the 
utility of Canadian peacekeeping efforts. Most papers did not attack peacekeeping 
as a policy, preferring to note that it remained the most popular role of the 
Canadian Forces since the Second World War. Instead, such articles criticized the 
Canadian Forces' leadership and the Chretien government for not allowing a 
satisfying end to the Somalia Affair to occur. Where English Canadian 
newspaper editorials and letter writers wondered how Canada's international 
reputation could be rehabilitated, their French Canadian counterparts prior to 
the Report saw Canada as a flawed country, and applauded the Commission for 
plainly pointing out what needed to be changed. English and French newspaper 
coverage remained primarily concerned with Canadian decisions and actors, and 
framed these events as being part of a larger political culture in Canada in the 
1990s that was riddled with uncertainty about the country's present and future. 
As with the other events in the history of peacekeeping discussed in this 
chapter, news coverage of the Report of the Somalia Commission made Canada 
the central focus, and largely neglected where the peacekeepers had been sent. 474 
Few reporters went back to Somalia, nor were the killings of Shidane Arone and 
others the central foci of the press coverage. What occurred in Somalia was 
therefore not covered as a UN failure, but primarily as the largest failure in 
Canada's peacekeeping history. 
474 An exception is the following article, which suggested that what took place in Somalia was indicative of 
larger worldwide trends of intolerance against non-whites: Francois Brousseau, "Les vrais sauvages: Le 
scandale somalien en ltalie revele un veritable pattern internationale," le Devoir, Friday 20 June 1997, 
Al2. 
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English and French Canadian newspapers used the past differently when 
discussing the Report. Though Pearson had become shorthand for all the good 
that Canada had accomplished while peacekeeping, in 1997, editorials and letters 
to the editor in English papers rarely referred to Canada's history as a 
"peacekeeper to the world." The events in Somalia disrupted the use of a positive 
narrative of peacekeeping's past, and made newspapers focus on the present. 
Only a single article in Le Devoir invoked Pearson, to contrast Canada's 
peacekeeping past with what had taken place recently and to remind Canadians 
of their proud legacy of international assistance. 475 In the French press, a 
historical analogy was found in the Dreyfus Affair in France of 1894 to 1906. In 
that case, a Jewish officer had been accused of treason, and was wrongly 
convicted, which led to appeals and a long-standing division in the country over 
the power of the armed forces and the prevalence of anti-Semitism in France as a 
whole. An article in Le Devoir by Yves Cloutier made this connection to the 
Somalia Affair and argued that justice was missing from the end of the 
Commission. There remained among the Forces « de mercenaires cruels, excites 
a la haine des civils en gc§neral, et des non-Blancs en particulier, par un 
entrainement stupide et une mentalite de groupe primitive qui deshonore ceux et 
celles qui exercent leur metier humainement. »476 And until they and the military 
culture that permitted them to kill and torture people in Somalia were changed, 
475 Lise Bisonnette, "De deshonneur en deshonneur: L'ethique du gouvernement Chretien epouse celle de 
l'armee canadienne," Le Devoir, Friday 4 July 1997. 
476 Yves Cloutier, "Le rapport de la Commission d'enquete sur les evenements de Somalie: L'affaire 
Dreyfus, Jes cadavres en plus" le Devoir, Thursday 10 July 1997, A 7. 
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Canada could not be counted among « le plus meilleur pays du monde. » Here 
again, peacekeepi:ng's present lost touch with its history, and any positive 
narrative was replaced by referring to a nation divided, as France had been over 
the Dreyfus Affair. 
Many articles and letters to the editor commented upon the reputation of the 
Canadian Forces. The individual peacekeepers responsible for the killings were 
condemned, and the Airborne was roundly criticized for its part in the Somalia 
Affair. As an example of this, the Free Press published a letter from a former 
member of the Airborne who wanted to remind Canadians of the good that the 
peacekeepers had accomplished in Somalia. The letter was adjacent to a large 
photo of Master Corpora1 Clayton Matchee standing over a beaten Shidane 
Arone, with the caption: "The torture and death of Shidane Arone marked Somali 
mission."477 In so doing, the paper was making its readers aware that the events 
in Somalia were not all school buildings and police operations. 
When transcripts of interviews with members of the Airborne which de-
humanized Somalis were released, some letter writers wrote of their belief that all 
Canadians shared in this disgrace. A letter in the Sun from 5 July expressed 
disgust at the language members of the Airborne had used. 478 Another letter-
writer in the Star felt that the Canadian flag was metaphorically bleeding on 
Canada Day because of what the Report had uncovered. 479 Such letters were also 
often filled with resentment at the Commission for bringing to light details that 
477 
"Somalia mission misunderstood," Winnipeg Free Press, 5 July 1997, Al 1. 
478 Merlet R. Shukrieh, "Uncivilized soldiers," The Vancouver Sun, 5 July 1997, A22. 
479 
"Our flag flies free, but it bleeds," Toronto Star, Tuesday 8 July 1997, A14. 
250 
would hurt Canada's reputation internationally as well as domestically. Many 
Canadians still held that their country was "strong and free," though it had been 
through a tragic series of events. Canada was simply "no longer quite perfect," but 
still potentially a force for good in the world. 
Newspaper articles and editorials in English Canada often referred to the 
nation's fragile institutions when discussing the Somalia Inquiry's Report.48° 
With the failure of the constitutional reforms of Charlottetown in 1992 and the 
near-victory of separatists in Quebec in 1995, many Canadians viewed their 
country's institutions as holding a fragile nation together. Particularly in English 
Canada, the Somalia Inquiry's Report was read as one more way that the Canada 
they knew and loved was being erased from existence. 481 The heads of the 
Commission, and specifically Judge Gilles Letourneau, also had their motives 
questioned by several columnists, including Jack Granatstein and Richard 
Gwynn. Granatstein wrote a commentary for the Globe and Mail which called on 
the government to make many of the changes recommended by the 
commissioners, while cautioning that its attacks on individuals were too harsh 
and arguing that replacing the entire Canadian Forces leadership was too 
impractical. 482 Gwynn made similar arguments, and expressed the hope that the 
Canadian Forces would maintain their place as a vital national institution. 483 
480 
"Canadians deserve better," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, 2 July 1997; Tim Harper, "'Proud legacy 
dishonored'," Toronto Star, Thursday 3 July 1997. 
481 
"Portrayal of Somalia report too harsh on forces," Regina Leader- Post, Wednesday 9 July 1997, A6. 
482 Jack Granatstein, "A report on the Somalia Commission," Globe and Mail, Friday 4 July 1997, A13. 
483 Richard Gwynn, "Somalia report is mean-spirited smear job," Toronto Star, Regina Leader- Post, 
Sunday 6 July 1997, F3. 
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These English Canadian voices took issue with Letourneau in particular for 
challenging the military during the Inquiry and for stating publicly that the 
Commission had been hamstrung by both the government and an uncooperative 
military leadership. The underlying sentiment in such pieces was that Canada 
was not as flawed a nation as it was presented in the Report. Individuals could be 
chastised for their actions, but Canada had to emerge from the Somalia Affair a 
better and stronger peacekeeping country. 
French authors, in contrast, universally expressed admiration for what 
Letourneau and the Commission had undertaken. This was because their 
conceptions of Canada were not shaken as profoundly by the release of the 
Report. One letter to the editor stated: «Son [Letourneau's] courageux refus de 
se laisser baillonner par le pouvoir politique me rassure quelque peu quant a 
l'etat de sante de notre democratie. »484 The commissioners were described as 
responsible, courageous, and having integrity and a desire for truth that were 
contrasted with the views of the Liberal government. These pieces continued to 
express a belief that peacekeeping could be a useful policy for Canada in certain 
circumstances but that greater efforts needed to be made to change the 
discriminatory institutional climate of the Canadian Forces. Such descriptions 
expressed an understanding of Canada that was not as tied to institutions like the 
military or symbols like peacekeeping. Rather, many Quebecois' experiences with 
language rights issues made them view Canada as an inherently flawed nation. 
484 
"Un traitement odieux," Le Devoir, Monday 14 July 1997, A6. 
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The military was therefore one of many institutions, and peacekeeping one of 
many policies, in need of change. 
The French and English press did share common targets for much of their 
anger: Jean Chretien and his Defence Minister Art Eggleton. This was because of 
the Liberal government's premature ending of the Inquiry and its open criticisms 
of the Commission and its Report. Chretien was attacked in almost every letter to 
the editor in the newspapers examined in this chapter for giving the country "lies 
and duplicity" as well as denying Canadians a satisfying conclusion to what had 
started in 1993 in Somalia.48s A letter in La Presse chastised the Chretien 
government for « son infinie capacite a banaliser les sujets les plus serieux. »486 
The recent memory of Chretien's perceived mishandling of the Quebec 
referendum in 1995 caused one letter-writer to deride him as "the very same man 
who professed to know nothing about a Quebec problem almost to the eve of the 
narrowest referendum mishap, which very nearly cost us the country."487 
Eggleton was attacked for describing the Report as unfairly critical to the Armed 
Forces while admitting that he had not read it in its entirety. 488 The actions of 
Chretien and Eggleton also helped fuel conspiracy rumours that suggested a 
massive government and military cover-up and a purposeful obstruction of 
justice. 489 The reaction to the Liberal government suggests that many Canadians 
485 
"Letters to the Editor," Globe and Mail, Tuesday 8 July 1997, Al 0. 
486 
"Scandales en ra.fale," La Presse Friday 11 July 1997, 82. 
487 
"Letters to the Editor," Globe and Mail.Globe and Mail Tuesday 8 July 1997, Al 0. 
488 
"Response no surprise," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, 12 July 1997, A26. 
489 Jeff Sallot, "Somalia questions remain unanswered," Globe and Mail, Monday 30 June 1997; Gilles 
Toupin, "Somalie: Chretien nie tout camouflage," La Presse, Friday 4 July 1997. 
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took the Report very seriously. They sought reforms for what clearly was a flawed 
Canadian Forces, which would allow future Canadian participation in UN 
peacekeeping to occur. By obstructing such processes, Chretien and Eggleton 
were guilty of either denying the problems that many Canadians knew existed, or 
doing less than was necessary to return the country to its once proud place as the 
world's preeminent peacekeeper. 
Though some newspapers had defended the Airborne in i993, few expressed 
regret when the unit was disbanded. The reports of torture, death, hazing, and 
white supremacy by this unit severed any connection it might have had to 
Canada's peacekeeping history. By ridding the Canadian Forces of these men and 
their leaders, it was hoped that Canada's peacekeeping role could be revived, as 
there were still missions like the ones to Haiti or to the former Yugoslavia that 
cried out for Canadian participation. The Canadian Forces' leadership preferred 
to talk of "peace making," which allowed soldiers to operate with fewer 
restrictions than those found on peacekeeping operations. As seen in Chapter 
One, the government also began to employ this language which further 
challenged the continued relevance of Canada's role on traditional peacekeeping 
operations. The Somalia Affair's impact on all of these occurrences was 
substantial. A letter-writer in the Globe and Mail wrote, "[t]he ghost of Shidane 
Arone has not been laid to rest. It walks abroad in Canada haunting the soul of 
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our nation."49o Editorials and letters to the editor in daily newspapers argued that 
only by holding the politicians and the military accountable could Canada as a 
nation move past this crisis. Meeting this challenge would determine whether 
peacekeeping remained a viable policy for Canada in the present and the future, 
or whether it would become relegated solely to commemorations of the past. 
Conclusion 
Daily newspapers' coverage of peacekeeping was crucial to the creation and 
dissemination of the peacekeeping narratives central to this dissertation. 
Newspapers quickly linked peacekeeping to discussions of Canada's national 
identity, and emphasized its domestic purchase rather than commenting upon its 
value to the host nations. These linkages were then picked up and adapted by 
many of Canada's leading politicians, and became the basis for the heated 
debates that occurred through the 1957 federal election. Once the PCs gained 
office, newspapers employed a positive narrative about Canada's involvement in 
peacekeeping that stressed its value to the present and its potential future 
benefits for the cause of world peace. After Pearson won his Nobel Peace Prize in 
1957, this positive understanding of the value of UN peacekeeping was solidified. 
For the next ten years, there existed a consensus view about the value of Canada's 
potential as a world peacekeeper. Whether it was serving in the Middle East, 
aiding the cause of Congolese independence, or helping to stop a "brush fire" in 
Cyprus from spreading, the Canadian government was encouraged to commit 
490 Mohamud Siad Tognae, "When Somalis think of Canada, they think 'safe and secure'," Globe and Mail, 
Saturday 26 July 1997, 02. 
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more peacekeepers to UN service. This enthusiasm became tempered in 1967 
when UNEF was expelled from Egypt. Editorials and letters to the editor in both 
English and French Canada called for the more selective use of Canadians on 
future UN operations, whiich came to be adopted as the Liberal Party policy 
throughout Trudeau's time in office. 
In general, though, the government's intermittent fascination with 
peacekeeping, from its highest point in the Pearson era to the lows of the late 
1990s, was not reflected in this newspaper coverage. This was because of the 
invocation of glowing historical commemorations of Canada's peacekeeping past. 
From 1957 onward, any time Canadians participated in a new UN operation, they 
shared in this proud tradition. Lester Pearson was mentioned often for his 
commitment to international peace and for his Nobel Peace Prize victory. 
Debates over Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations were largely 
forgotten or ignored, whether they were substantial ones like the questions over 
Canada's relationship with Britain in 1956 or more minor episodes such as 
whether the Canadians should be able to disarm the Cypriots. By selectively 
framing peacekeeping as a policy that also embodied Canada's national character, 
the press contributed to an overly rosy view of Canada's potential as a world 
peacekeeper. 
This language associating Canada with its peacekeepers helped to solidify the 
bonds between :readers and their peacekeepers. It could also have harmful 
consequences, most clearly seen when years of press support for an increased 
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Canadian peacekeeping role merged with the Mulroney government's desire to 
engage the Canadian Forces more abroad, and the Airborne were sent to 
participate in UNOSOM. To be sure, this language was different in English- and 
French-Canadian newspapers. The French press consistently stressed the need 
for Canada to engage in the world as an independent middle power. As part of 
this, they advocated more participation in UN peacekeeping operations and more 
aid for newly independent nations, particularly in French Africa. In English 
Canada, it was more likely that Canada's peacekeepers were also presented as 
exemplars of what was best in the country as a whole. This stronger bond 
between English Canadians and peacekeeping was consistent with what has been 
presented in previous chapters. 
After the killings by the Airborne became known, more editorials and letters 
to the editor questioned the validity of Canada's peacekeeping policies. The 
authors lost a common language in which to situate discussions of Canadian 
peacekeeping when it no longer became appropriate to compare the Airborne 
with Canada's illustrious peacekeeping past. This emptied peacekeeping of much 
of its symbolic value and challenged the perception that Canada was a nation of 
"Blue Berets." .As the Report of the Commission into Somalia was released, 
articles, editorials, and letters to the editor demonstrated that their primary 
concern was making sure that Canada was able to move on from what had been 
done in Somalia. Authors across the country blamed Chretien and a select group 
of military leaders for allowing Canada's peacekeeping reputation to be tarnished 
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and for not actively trying to make the country's military reflect a more tolerant 
image that had been a part of the narrative of Canada as the world's peacekeeper. 
Newspapers offered their readers regular coverage of peacekeeping when 
Canadians participated in new missions and when the Canadians failed to keep 
the peace. These articles, editorials, and letters to the editor created and 
disseminated particular understandings of peacekeeping as a Canadian policy, 
which makes their contents vital for the understanding of why so many 
Canadians closely associated their national identity with peacekeeping. But they 
also framed these articles so that their Canadian audiences would find them more 
palatable. In the case of the Congo and Somalia, this meant employing racially-
prejudiced language to describe the host nation. Stories about the peacekeepers 
also tended to disappear to the back pages when the missions were no longer new 
or exciting. Newspapers were, therefore, culpable in making peacekeeping more 
than just a pragmatic policy, and from 1956 to 1997 they actively encouraged 
their audiences to see themselves as part of a nation of "Blue Berets." 
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Chapter Five 
From Policeman to Klansman: Depictions of Peacekeeping in Newspaper 
Editorial Cartoons, 1956-1997 
The now-defunct Canadian Museum of Caricature presented its exhibit "The 
Perils of Peacekeeping" in Ottawa from 7 June to 25 October 1992. During the fall 
of 1992, Canadians were on display as peacekeepers in missions around the globe 
and in the newly built peacekeeping monument "Reconciliation." To add to these 
displays, the museum showcased 85 editorial cartoons from newspapers across 
the country in both English and French. The official guide to the exhibit told 
viewers they would see cartoons which were drawn during important events in 
Canada's peacekeeping history.491 It emphasized the contributions of cartoonists 
and their cartoons to helping Canadians understand "the contradictions and 
ambiguities of Canada's role in world affairs." Conceding that editorial cartoons 
had often adopted a critical tone regarding peacekeeping, the exhibit nonetheless 
framed Canada as a nation of "Blue Berets." It described how any criticisms of 
peacekeeping came from Canadians wanting to make the world a safer place 
because of their '"genuine commitment to world peace." In so doing, the exhibit 
celebrated Canada's peacekeeping identity, and actively encouraged its existence. 
Editorial cartoons are the subject of this final chapter because they were the 
medium with the least governmental control over its contents. Newspapers had 
considerable freedom to present peacekeeping as they wished, and editorial 
491 
"The Perils of Peacekeeping: Canada and World Affairs after 1945," (Ottawa, 1992). 
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cartoonists, by the symbolic nature of their drawings, were even less bound to 
present peacekeeping with any accuracy. As a result, their works were more 
critical of Canada's peacekeeping role than were the articles and editorials found 
in their papers, and considerably more so than the high school textbooks and 
NFB documentaries discussed earlier. Satire was the cartoonists' primary 
weapon, and peacekeeping was a topic which was lampooned for different 
reasons from 1956 to 1997. Yet, while cartoonists offered prescient criticisms of 
Canada's peacekeeping efforts, they were rarely sustained; audiences were more 
inclined to focus on other topics when cartoonists did as well, which blunted the 
impact of their satire. While newspapers sought to be the first to report a story 
about peacekeeping, and politicians sought to provide an official account of those 
events, cartoonists made metaphorical connections to popular culture to both 
challenge and inform their audiences. That this was the medium which offered 
the most criticisms of peacekeeping in Canada in part explains how peacekeeping 
endured numerous setbacks from 1956to1997, and remained a central part of 
the nation's symbology. 
This chapter examines selections from the over 150 editorial cartoons related 
to peacekeeping made between 1956 and 1997 because cartoonists saw more 
"perils of peacekeeping" than the 1992 exhibit let on. These cartoons were 
another medium in which visual depictions of Canada's peacekeepers appeared to 
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audiences across the country.492 Whether describing the host nations, Canada's 
politicians, or its peacekeepers, cartoonists offered Canadians satirical criticism 
of their country's UN participation. Depictions of the host nations relied on racial 
stereotypes, though more often these figures were not central to how 
peacekeeping was portrayed. Instead, the Canadian connection was emphasized, 
and the Prime Ministers and their Secretaries of State for External Affairs 
frequently appeared in these images. Of particular importance are editorial 
cartoon depictions of Canada's peacekeepers. While Canada's peacekeepers were 
largely above reproach in the political rhetoric, school textbooks, NFB 
documentaries, and regular newspaper coverage examined earlier, cartoonists 
were not so kind .. In depicting peacekeepers as bumbling policemen or later as 
members of the Ku Klux Klan, cartoonists caused strong reactions from 
newspaper readers at particular times. That these criticisms resonated only at 
select times provides insight into the resilience of peacekeeping as a symbol of a 
Canadian past and future that could withstand multiple challenges in the present. 
While cartoons appeared in newspapers on the same pages as written text, 
current historical research on the daily press differentiates between the written 
and visual elements contained within their pages. A newspaper editorial can 
name its major characters, describe an event in detail, and provide historical 
analogies. Editorial cartoons, by contrast, normally tell their narratives in a single 
492 These visuals were particularly important before the prevalence of television in Canada. By 1956, just 
over half of all Canadian households had access to a television set, a remarkable feat considering that the 
first CBC broadcast was in 1952. Rutherford, When Television Was Young: Primetirne Canada, 1952 --
1967, 49. 
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panel. Cartoons are also thought to be the most frequently viewed items on 
newspaper editorial pages because of their humour, their short narratives, and 
their occupying large spaces on the page. 493 They also use elements of the 
fantastic to describe actors and situations, which written newspaper articles 
cannot. 494 Such fantasy elements allow for more interpretation on the part of 
viewers than might be possible with written texts. 
Many studies of political cartoons in Canada have focused on the careers of 
important individuals such as Len Norris at the Vancouver Sun, Duncan 
MacPherson at the Toronto Star, or Aislin (Terry Mosher) at the Montreal 
Gazette.495 These artists, and the roughly two dozen other cartoonists who have 
normally worked in Canada at any given time, developed unique styles that 
viewers recognized, and they often published books of their most popular 
cartoons for wider consumption. 496 Despite the importance of these artists, this 
chapter will focus on the content of their cartoons. Cartoonists operated in a 
milieu that provided them with the language and imagery of peacekeeping, and 
they, in turn, inHuenced it with their visuals. Because no cartoonist operated in a 
cultural vacuum, it is more productive to examine how ideas from Canadian 
493 Lucy Shelton Caswell, "Drawing Swords: War in American Editorial Cartoons," American Journalism 
21, no. 2 (2004): 15. 
494 Janice L. Edwards, Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: image, Metaphor, and 
Narrative (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1997), 19. 
495 Each of these cartoonists has published collections of his cartoons from years past. These cartoonists 
also figure prominently in the works of Raymond Morris and Peter Desbarats and Terry Mosher. See Peter 
Desbarats and Terry Mosher, The Hecklers: A History of Canadian Political Cartooning and a Cartoonist's 
History of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Raymond Morris, Behind the Jester's Mask: 
Canadian Editorial Cartoons about Dominant and Minority Groups, 1960-1979 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1989). 
496 This statistic about the number of cartoonists appears in Morris, Behind the Jester's Mask: Canadian 
Editorial Cartoons about Dominant and Minority Groups, 1960-1979, 62. 
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society, its political leaders, and its media made their way into images about 
peacekeeping, rather than to examine individual cartoonists' political views. 
For an editoriall cartoon to have relevance, it had to speak to both a 
contemporary news item and established cultural conventions. Accordingly, this 
chapter is divided into six sections, with the same date ranges that were used in 
the previous chapter. But unlike newspaper articles and editorials, cartoons 
about peacekeeping came in more restricted time frames. Rather than appear 
steadily for weeks or months after the start of a new operation, most cartoons 
were printed within a few days of a specific occurrence. These depictions were 
more sporadic than those done in other media forms since sustained coverage of 
stories by cartoonists was rare. 
Cartoons about peacekeeping were, in addition, almost exclusively critical, 
which speaks to the particularities of this medium and cartoonists' reliance on 
satire to make their arguments. Some of these criticisms were particular to a 
given mission though others continued to be used for longer periods of time. 
Artists also tended to focus their attacks on specific individuals while leaving 
Canadian society relatively unscathed. Anne Rubenstein similarly argues that 
comic strips are important markers of both modernity and tradition in a political 
culture. 497 Though they often expressed a desire for change indicative of 
modernity, most cartoons, sometimes hypocritically, also criticized new ideas. 
497 Anne Rubenstein, Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation: A Political History of 
Comic Books in Mexico (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 42. 
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Editorial cartoons did, however, play an important role in the production, 
dissemination, and reception of media messages about peacekeeping. As late as 
1989, Canadian cartoon scholar Raymond Morris wrote, "[ w ]hile some may miss 
the point, the cartoons are designed for quick comprehension by most adults, are 
more readily grasped than most art forms, and can therefore be studied without 
serious concern that readers will regularly and substantially distort their 
meaning."498 Communications scholars and historians reject such an approach, 
and point to how cartoons are interpreted through the audiences' "visual 
literacy."499 For communications scholar Elisabeth El Refaie, being visually 
literate requires viewers to be familiar with the conventions of cartoons, to have 
considerable knowledge of figures from current events, and to be able to make 
the metaphorical links that the cartoonist's do in their illustrations.s00 
Some editorial cartoon conventions include using size as a marker of 
importance for a particular figure, using stereotypes for people and places who 
are considered different from the cartoonist and their audience, and drawing 
upon popular comic strip characters. In the first case, a direct correlation 
between the status of a figure and its size in comparison to everything else in a 
cartoon can be made. Canada's political leaders were normally portrayed as 
498 Morris, Behind the Jester's Mask: Canadian Editorial Cartoons about Dominant and Minority Groups, 
1960-1979, 5. 
499 The term visual literacy is employed by Caswell, "Drawing Swords: War in American Editorial 
Cartoons."; Edwards, Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and 
Narrative; Elisabeth El Refaie,. "Multiliteracies: How Readers Interpret Political Cartoons," Visual 
Communication 8, no. 2 (2009); Chris Lamb, "Drawing Power: The Limits of Editorial Cartoons in 
America," Journalism Studies 8, no. 5 (2007); Paul Messaris, "Visual Aspects of Media Literacy," Journal 
of Commuication (1998); Linda Trimble, Laura Way, and Shannon Sampert, "Drawn to the Polls? 
Representations of Canadian Voters in Editorial Cartoons," Journal of Canadian Studies 44, no. 2 (20 I 0). 
500 El Refaie, "Multiliteracies: How Readers Interpret Political Cartoons," 182. 
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smaller versions of themselves, intimating their lack of power. Stereotyping, on 
the other hand, occurred when Egypt's President Nasser in 1956 and 1967 and the 
Congolese Prime Minster Patrice Lumumba in 1960 were portrayed as either 
fools or devils.s01 While participating in peacekeeping, by definition, meant that 
Canadians were not taking part in a war, depictions of the host nations often 
relied upon cultural conventions of the "enemy" that were reminiscent of wartime 
cartoons. Images of good animals, like the dove, and evil animals, such as snakes 
or alligators, filled these cartoons with over-simplified but coded characters. 
Many cartoonists also made reference to comic strips while lampooning the 
leading political figures of the era.s02 These figures may have been familiar to 
audiences, and helped convey additional meaning based upon the profile of such 
characters. Interpreting such processes is not automatic, and scholars of cartoons 
and comic strips therefore give audiences a considerable role in determining 
which cartoons resonate more than others.s0 3 
Visual literacy is culturally specific, which means that images appearing in 
English and French Canadian editorial cartoons often drew upon different 
501 Such depictions were similar to those employed during the Second World War. See Caswell, "Drawing 
Swords: War in American Editorial Cartoons." 
502 Since the late 1980s comic strips and comic books have received more scholarly attention as sources of 
popular culture. See Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester, eds., Arguing Comics: Literary Masters on a Popular 
Medium (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2004); Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester, eds., A Comic 
Studies Reader (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009). Both of these works talk about recent 
trends in the study of comics, and the struggles of scholars to overcome the belief that their source 
materials are only for juvenile audiences. By contrast, the importance of editorial cartoons has been noted 
since nineteenth century depictions of Boss Tweed helped expose corruption in New York City, to name 
one famous exampl1e. 
503 El Refaie, "Multiliteracies: How Readers Interpret Political Cartoons," 191. 
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cultural ideas about the host nations, Canada's military, and the nation.s0 4 
Cartoons from French Canadian newspapers alluded to ideas that were more 
prevalent in the newspaper coverage from Quebec, particularly a stronger desire 
for Canada to break from its colonial past with Britain, the importance of 
minority rights, and the existence of a Francophonie. Individual artists in both 
English and French Canada, however, made careers out of attacking politicians in 
a similar manner .. sos Hence, the distinctiveness of French Canadian cartoons as 
well as the shared artistic community among cartoonists in Canada can be 
gleaned. 
Cartoonists further helped encourage their audiences' visual literacy by using 
anchors in their drawings. Anchors label people, places, and things in a cartoon, 
and allow audiences to better understand what is being depicted. This practice 
was popular in the 1950s, but as the decades progressed, far fewer anchors were 
used in cartoons about peacekeeping because television's wholesale adoption by 
North Americans made people better able to recognize political leaders on 
504 Much of the best literature on political cartoons examines the impact of visual literacy on cartoon 
representations of specific events. Janis Edwards' work highlights a cartoonist's ability to use metaphor, 
allusion and metonymy to create and disseminate images of political candidates that form a web of imagery 
along with the candidate's self-presentation and other media messages. A study by Linda Trimble, Laura 
Way and Shannon Sampert of the Canadian election campaigns of 2004, 2006 and 2008 employs similar 
understandings about the potential of cartoons to be agents of change. Seeing cartoons as a part of the 
process of image creation and dissemination allows these authors to argue that cartoons are powerful 
rhetorical tools that give the media considerable agency in their presentation of a political figure. See 
Edwards, Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative; 
Trimble, Way, and Sampert, "Drawn to the Polls? Representations of Canadian Voters in Editorial 
Cartoons." 
505 Raymond N. Morris, The Carniva/ization of Politics: Quebec cartoons on relations with Canada, 
England, and France, 1960- 1979 (Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1995), 129. 
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sight.s0 6 Nonetheless, anchors provided assistance to audiences who viewed 
cartoons on peacekeeping which contained figures with exaggerated facial 
features and bodies, the use of buildings and animals as metaphors for people, 
sports, and movie references, allusions to other political events of the time, and 
historical analogies that seemed appropriate to the cartoonist. These metaphors 
permitted multiple meanings to be read into a given text. The repeated use of 
certain visual representations was therefore quite important because it implied a 
stable conception of Canada's peacekeepers and the host nations. 
The cartoons that appeared in Canadian daily newspapers between 1956 and 
1997 made connections with viewers by employing particular images that related 
their country and peacekeeping. These images changed over time as 
understandings of peacekeeping were altered by domestic circumstances, the use 
of different narratives in newspapers and political speeches, and the experiences 
of Canadians on peacekeeping operations. Through their single panels, therefore, 
cartoons presented peacekeeping as something more complex than it was often 
portrayed in other media, and created a space in which the Canadian attachment 
to peacekeeping could be challenged. At the same time, these criticisms were not 
able to question Canada's peacekeeping role effectively because of the strength of 
peacekeeping's symbolic discourses and the transient nature of the editorial 
cartoon itself. 
506 James R. Heninger, "Does Television Enhance the Shared Symbolic Environment? Trends in Labeling 
of Editorial Cartoons, 1948-80," American Sociological Review 48, no. 1 (1983): 103. 
The Suez Crisis, 1 November to 30 December 1956 and Lester 
Pearson's Nobel Prize Win, October 1957 
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When newspaper coverage of the Suez Crisis was at its peak in November and 
December of 1956, numerous editorial cartoons commented upon Canada's role 
in the international conflict. Negative portrayals of Egypt's leader, Nasser, 
appeared across the country, though there was a general lack of cartoons about 
other Egyptians .. As with the editorial coverage of this time period, cartoons 
tended to portray the Canadian side of the Suez Crisis, largely ignoring the 
difficulties facing the Egyptians. When they appeared in cartoons, ordinary 
Egyptians were drawn atop or beside camels and dressed in flowing robes. One 
cartoon used the cultural stereotype of the Middle Eastern oil baron, and showed 
two :r:nen next to their Cadillac, with five covered women in the back seat.so7 
Nasser was, however, a key figure in these cartoons. Though his country had been 
invaded by the British, French, and the Israelis, he was vilified as the leader of an 
enemy government. Cartoonists did not like his autocratic manner or his ties to 
the Soviet Union. sos They focused on Nasser's nose as the dominant feature on 
his face and usually exaggerated it. He was also drawn as an aggressive and self-
important bully. One cartoon in the Montreal Gazette showed him in the back 
seat of a UN police car, giving directions to two white officers in the front. The 
caption of the cartoon was "Back Seat Driver."sog It spoke to the improbability of 
Nasser's dictating the composition of the UN force in the Middle East, by making 
507 Len Norris, "Just as I feared, Fusiloil... they've rung a bunch of Canadian policemen in on us after 
all..."," Vancouver Sun, Tuesday 27 November 1956, 4. 
508 
"Riding High," Regina Leader- Post, 30 November 1956, 23. 
509 John Collins, "Don't Take Dictation Down," Montreal Gazette Friday 30 November 1956. 
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the allusion to a criminal doing so in a police car. Though he was not technically 
an enemy during the Suez Crisis, Nasser was labelled as a "new Hitler," and his 
ties to the Soviet Union and his demand that the Canadian units not be from the 
Queen's Own made him a villain in cartoons. By focusing on Nasser alone and on 
the Canadian connection, cartoonists encouraged their audiences to see the crisis 
as something that had little to do with ordinary Egyptians. 
Because of his efforts at the UN, Lester Pearson was frequently portrayed in a 
positive light throughout the Suez Crisis. Cartoons of Pearson often depicted him 
as what I term, "Little Mike," with his signature bowtie and smile, but with very 
short arms and legs. Cartoonists embraced Pearson's nickname, Mike, and used 
the bowtie and "boyish" smile to represent him in their images.s10 It was a 
common convention in cartoons to depict those vying for party leadership, or to 
be the head of a country, as smaller versions of themselves.s11 A cartoon from the 
Ottawa Citizen showed "Little Mike" driving a car up a hill with the sign 
"Calmness and Thought" alongside his car.s12 He chose this, the high road, 
instead of "Hysteria and Violence" which was the road leading downwards. The 
cartoon gave Pearson credit for helping Canada and the world through his 
rational thinking, which was implicitly contrasted with the British example. 
Cartoonists did not attack Pearson's actions at the UN. Instead, they approved of 
510 John Collins, "Egyptian Hieroglyphics," Montreal Gazette, Friday 16 November 1956, 8. 
511 Edwards, Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative, 
Chapter Five. 
512 
""Mike" takes the high road," Ottawa Citizen, 13 November 1956, 6. 
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his advocacy for a greater Canadian role in international politics, something that 
had been a part of Canada's foreign policies since the creation of the UN in 1945. 
Figure 5.1 Ottawa Citizen 13 November 1956 
Louis St. Laurent was not depicted as frequently as Pearson in editorial 
cartoons, but images of him appeared soon after his speech to the House of 
Commons declaring the end of the era of the "Supermen of Europe."s13 Though 
the editorial line of the Gazette argued that St. Laurent's attacks against Britain 
and France were too strong, a cartoon on 27 November showed St. Laurent 
513 
"Greatness is not always a matter of size," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Wednesday 28 November 1956, 
6. 
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working to get Britain and France "in focus" with one another.s14 In the Star, a 
cartoon showed St. Laurent driving a car towards "Nationhood Ave." rather than 
turning down streets with the signs "Chore Boy" for UK and USA, respectively.sis 
Other papers that held contrary opinions about the Suez events did not publish 
cartoons questioning St. Laurent despite frequent editorial challenges to the 
Prime Minister. vVhether this was a decision made by the cartoonists themselves 
or by the newspaper editors is not clear, but it does stand as an instance of 
silence. 
Figure 5.2 Toronto Star 28 November 1956 
514 The editorial in question was from a day later, 28 November. See "Painful Departure," Montreal 
Gazette, 8. The cartoon of St. Laurent is from John Collins, "Trying To Get Them In Focus," Montreal 
Gazette Tuesday 27 November 1956, 8. 
515 Les Callan, "The right road is straight ahead," Toronto Daily Star, Wednesday 28 November 1956, 6. 
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Cartoonists did not stay silent about the Canadian contribution to UNEF. 
Many depicted the members of this force as policemen.516 Positive depictions of 
policemen had them strong and sure of their purpose, and armed in case trouble 
broke out. These portrayals made the members of UNEF into an actual police 
force, which was not their task in Egypt. A cartoon appearing in the Toronto Star 
on 3 November titled, "The man for the job," showed a white man looking off to 
the west towards the words "world peace disturbance."517 Les Callan, the artist, 
had been working at the Star since 1937. The frequent use of anchors was typical 
of his style of drawings and helped the audience decipher what was being 
depicted. 518 This figure, dressed in a uniform which had "Intl. Police Force" 
written on the chest, appeared in front of the words "UN International Law- and 
Conscience" written on the UN building. This illustration was reminiscent of 
those that had appeared in the popular syndicated comic strip of the 1930s and 
4o's, King of the Royal lklounted.519 This strip depicted Mountie Dave King 
fighting for order in the Canadian North-West.520 Callan drew UNEF as though it 
were simply a variation on Canada's Mounties, which implied that Canada was 
well-suited to such an international role. 
516Robert Chambers, "Deputizing a Posse," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Friday 9 November 1956, 6. 
517 Les Callan, "The Man For the Job," Toronto Daily Star, 3 November 1956, 6. 
518 An example of how Canadian soldiers from the Second World War were portrayed is Les Callan, 
"'Welcome Home Son'," Toronto Daily Star, 13 March 1946, 6. 
519 Walden, Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth. 
520 For discussions of the origins of many of these myths, see R.C. Macleod, The NWMP and Law 
Enforcement, 1873 --- 1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976). The fictional and non-fictional 
dissemination of these myths is the topic of Walden, Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol 
and Myth. 
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Figure 5.3 Toronto Star 3 November 1956 
Akin to written newspaper coverage and the political rhetoric of the time, 
cartoons drew upon language that tied UNEF to Canada's domestic concerns. A 
cartoon in Le Devoir by Robert Lapalme, who worked for the paper from 1950 to 
1959, also depicted the peacekeeping force as police officers. Captioned "Un 
drapeau pour identification," it showed a man with a moustache being attacked 
by another man carrying the Union Jack.s21 The figure being attacked yells, 
"S'cours! Police! Police!" but his face is horrified as another figure running to the 
scene also carries the Union Jack. This was Canada, holding a policeman's 
521 Robert Lapalme, "L'ONU constabulaire en Egypte," Le Devoir, Saturday 1 December 1956, 4. 
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truncheon with a broad grin on his face. Though anxious to help, the cartoon 
implied that without a unique flag, Canada could never gain the respect and trust 
of the Egyptians. A.s with many editorials at the time, Lapalme linked Canada's 
peacekeeping role to the country's status as an independent nation. Canada was 
found lacking and the cartoon implied that a change should occur soon. 
The link between peacekeeping and police work opened UNEF to more 
negative depictions commonly found in dime novels, comic strips, and film.s22 
These depictions made the ordinary police officer into a heavy-set "clod" who was 
inept at his job, and relied upon either a private eye or a super-hero to solve the 
crimes that were plaguing the city. At the Winnipeg Free Press, Peter Kuch, an 
artist at the paper since 1952, was responsible for a number of images about 
UNEF. A cartoon of his from 5 November 1956 presented a police figure carrying 
a truncheon with the anchor "UN police" on it, standing amidst two sets of 
fighting figures: Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden versus Egypt's President 
Nasser and Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev versus a figure labelled 
"Hungary."s23 The police officer was heavy around his midsection, and had a 
double chin. He was also indecisive and was not shown engaging in either of the 
fights that were taking place. Newspaper editorials did not invoke the image of 
the timid and fat policeman, but cartoonists had this cultural image at their 
disposal, and some employed it for satirical effect. 
522 James A. Inciardi and Juliet L. Dee, "From Keystone Cops to Miami Vice: Images of Policing in 
American Popular Culture," Journal of Popular Culture 21, no. 2 ( 1987): 89-90. 
523 Peter Kuch, "Khrushchev: Hey you! Stop that fight over there!," Winnipeg Free Press, 5 November 
1956, 21. 
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Figure 5.4 Winnipeg Free Press 5 Nov.ember 1956 
While certain cartoons drew parallels between domestic and international 
police work, others chose to criticise the peacekeeping force for its being different 
from normal soldiering. The warm and pleasant conditions that soldiers could 
expect on UNEF appeared often in cartoons, to suggest that the mission would be 
an easy one.524 A Kuch Free Press cartoon of 16 November showed a soldier in 
Egypt reading a book while being served a drink by a fellow soldier in front of an 
ideal suburban home.525 Instead of a car in the garage there was a tank; a garden 
grew in front of the house; there was even a woman, presumably the officers' 
wife, just inside the window. The home had also been outfitted with a television, 
with the CBC on. The caption for the cartoon quoted Prime Minister Louis St. 
Laurent saying that he did not want the soldiers on UNEF duty to live under "less 
524Len Norris, "Volunteers wishing to participate," Vancouver Sun, Tuesday 6 November 1956, 4. 
525 Peter Kuch, "Mr. St. Laurent: "We do not want our forces to be living under less comfortable conditions 
than they have had at home."," Winnipeg Free Press, Friday 16 November 1956, 13. 
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comfortable conditions than they have had at home." Such cartoons made UN 
duty into a vacation for the Canadian soldiers and satirized how the soldiers were 
living compared to others back home who might not enjoy all those amenities. 
Figure 5.5 Winnipeg Free Press 16 November 1956 
When the Queen's Own Rifles were scrapped in favour of a logistics force, 
cartoonists lampooned the Canadians who would take part in UNEF by altering 
their bodies from those of normal soldiers. Some cartoons visually portrayed the 
Canadian contingent to UNEF as effeminate. A Free Press cartoon depicted a 
group of Canadian peacekeepers as a female drummer with a typewriter, a male 
flag-bearer with a giant pencil, and a male flautist with a pen.s2 6 The inclusion of 
a female member of UNEF highlighted that this was not a typical armed force. It 
went further than other cartoons by not only taking away the soldiers' guns, but 
also their identities as men. Other visual markers of the forces' effeminacy 
526Peter Kuch, "Spirit of '56," Winnipeg Free Press, Tuesday 20 November 1956, 17. 
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alluded to their being "bookish," rather than rugged soldiers. The most 
identifiable way cartoons conveyed this was with the presence of eyeglasses in 
cartoons. A direct result of the Canadians having eyeglasses was their being 
drawn with smaller muscles and less confidence than regular soldiers. Glasses 
appeared on Canadians members of UNEF in several cartoons, as did their use of 
typewriters.52 7 In a play on words, one cartoon labelled the Canadians the "1st 
Chairborne" for their reliance on desks, typewriters, and calculators. In these 
cartoons, difference was visually marked as something that was not good for 
Canada or its armed forces, though the actual utility of the logistics forces in the 
Middle East was considerable.52 8 
Other cartoons placed the Canadians in women's clothing to make similar 
arguments. One artist, Len Norris, who had been at the Sun since 1950, and was 
well-known for his incisive criticisms of Canadian society, showed a barracks full 
of soldiers scrubbing the floors and polishing their uniforms while an officer 
relayed that "housekeeping units" were being sent instead.52 9 A Calgary Herald 
cartoon from 22 November depicted two sailors mocking the departing 
Canadians, who appeared in maid's skirts and chefs hats, and carried brooms 
527 Other cartoons that used glasses and or typewriters include "I hope these bullets can read English!," 
Ottawa Citizen, 22 November 1956; "One rapid-fire duplicator, two mobile field calculators, six medium 
and light typewriters and one thirty-calibre cheque protector. Is armed to the teeth ... ", Calgary Herald, 
Thursday 29 November 1956 1956, 4. 
528 Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67. 
529 Len Norris, "Our trip to Egypt's called off.. they're only sending 'housekeeping' units ... " Vancouver Sun, 
Tuesday 20 November 1956, 4. 
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and mops.s3° The Canadians were shown beside supplies for the mission: 
deodorant, doilies, bug powder, and a vacuum. The gendered work of the 
"housekeeper" became an avenue through which the masculinity of the men in 
the Canadian contingent could be mocked, something not discussed in editorials. 
By calling the logistics units "housekeepers," however, these cartoons framed the 
UNEF as different, and arguably inferior to, other regular soldiers, who not only 
cleaned, but killedl. 
Figure 5.6 Calgary Herald 22 November 1956 
530 
"And will mother's little helper promise to be careful about housemaid's knee?," Calgary Herald, 
Thursday 22 November 1956, 4. 
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Other cartoons used size to convey that UNEF was a lesser force. A Regina 
Leader- Post cartoon anchored a tiny member of UNEF who was dressed as a 
crossing guard, "Inadequate Authority," for attempting to stop a much larger 
Nasser riding in a giant tank.531 Cartoonists, like many of their readers, were not 
sure what to make of Canadian participation in the peacekeeping operation under 
the UN's rules. This, combined with the satirical nature of editorial cartoons, 
presented the peace force in a more negative light than elsewhere in newspapers. 
Despite this criticism, after learning that Lester Pearson was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize for 195'.7, several cartoons praised his actions from a year 
earlier. Not surprisingly, these cartoons appeared in Liberal-supporting papers. 
Most often they referred to the impending Liberal leadership race, and Pearson's 
improved chances of winning the nomination because of his success.532 A cartoon 
in the Chronicle - Herald from 16 October showed a now grown-up Pearson 
being adored by a winged female figure.533 This figure wore a sash anchored 
"Lester B. Pearson fan club," and she also held a laurel in her hands, a symbol of 
peace. The caption for the cartoon, "A New Star is Born," suggested that Pearson 
was now the man to beat in the Liberal leadership race, and a figure worthy of 
idolization for Canadians. 
531 
"The policeman's lot is not a happy one," Regina Leader- Post, 21 November 1956, 17. 
532 
"The Search for Cinderella," Montreal Gazette, Wednesday 16 October 1957, 8; Robert Chambers, 
"Tough Competition,"' Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Saturday 19 October 1957. 
533 Robert Chambers, "A New Star is Born," Halifax Chronicle-Herald, Wednesday 16 October 1957, 6. 
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Figure 5.7Halifax Chronicle - Herald 16 October 1957 
Cartoonists also offered commentary on the debates over the Suez Crisis, one 
year removed. An image from the Star, instead of depicting Pearson, showed his 
Nobel Peace Prize crashing down on to a number of angry men.s34 The men were 
anchored with the words, "Angry debate on Canada's role in UN-Suez 
developments of 1956." The title for this cartoon, "End of the Debate," implied 
that any questioning of the Liberal government's policy from a year before was 
now irrelevant because the world had recognized Pearson and Canada's 
contribution to global peace. The Nobel Prize was addressed to Pearson and 
534 Les Callan, "End of the Debate," Toronto Daily Star, 16 October 1957, 6. 
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Canada, linking them together. Few newspaper articles in 1957 acknowledged the 
strength of the debates that had occurred in 1956. For a cartoon to remind its 
viewers about the controversies surrounding Canada's involvement in UNEF 
underscores how cartoons were able to transmit messages to their audiences that 
differed from those contained in newspaper editorials. 
As the Suez Crisis was tempered by the presence of UNEF, cartoonists no 
longer felt the need to depict its major actors. What had been drawn by 1957 were 
images of peacekeepers as policemen who embodied both the positive and 
negative associations that came with such a linkage. The Canadian soldiers, 
alternatively, were shown in the Middle East on an easy mission, womanly, and 
bookish compared to regular soldiers. These critical presentations of the Suez 
Crisis differed from the editorial content of daily newspapers because of the 
satirical nature of editorial cartoons and their allusions to other popular cultures' 
understandings of policemen and soldiers. Canada's increasing stature in world 
affairs was, by contrast, a source of pride in many cartoons. Lester Pearson's 
Nobel Prize win also seemed to confirm that Canada should take a more active 
role in promoting peace in the world. Cartoonists therefore believed in Canada's 
rightful place as an important world actor, but seemed less convinced about 
peacekeeping because it did not conform to earlier conceptions of soldiering. 
The Congo, 1 July to 15 September 1960 
When the UN asked Canada to assist on ONUC in July 1960, peacekeeping 
was understood by many to be an activity that showcased the best qualities 
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Canadians had to offer the world. Despite the repeated criticisms found in 
cartoons four years earlier, the positive experience of Canadian involvement in 
UNEF made peacekeeping an accepted role for the Canadian Forces. Cartoon 
depictions of this operation differed from political speeches and newspaper 
editorials because they centred on the Congolese and not the Canadians. Across 
English Canada, the Congolese were portrayed as primitive, dangerous, and 
sometimes cannibalistic. Earlier images of the peacekeeper as a lesser soldier or a 
bumbling policeman were less prevalent, though not entirely absent at this time. 
The leading figures of the Congo crisis, Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba, UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, and Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev 
were also made into figures from the Africa of Stanley and Livingstone. By 
making use of these tropes and drawing upon popular culture, cartoonists 
encouraged their viewers to hold on to long-standing beliefs about the Congo and 
the inferiority of its people. The use of such racially-prejudiced imagery underlies 
the reluctance of many cartoonists to see Canada's role in decolonization, a new 
role, as something more than a subject for satire. 
Few cartoonists depicted Canada or its peacekeepers as characters in their 
images about the Congo. However, negative images of policemen and soldiers 
could still be employed as in a cartoon in the Chronicle- Herald from 26 July 
which showed a heavy-set and wrinkled male police officer peering into a 
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cauldron that sat atop a fire.535 The police officer carried a truncheon in his left 
hand, but seems out of place in the jungle setting. As with the mission to Suez, 
marking the peacekeepers as different allowed cartoonist Robert Chambers, who 
had been drawing visuals of Canada for Halifax audiences in such a manner since 
1932, to employ visual images that were not flattering but would have been 
familiar to many readers. The cauldron into which the peacekeeper peered also 
had large bones scattered around it - a visual reminder that the Congo was a 
place where cannibals lived. The presence of the peacekeeper was as a result little 
more than an excuse to convey a trope about the Congo. 
Figure 5.8 Halifax Chronicle - Herald 28 July 1960 
535 Robert Chambers, "Did Somebody Call on Policeman?," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Tuesday 26 July 
1960, 6. 
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Interactions between the Congolese and Canadians were portrayed in a far 
more positive manner in French Canadian cartoons. This was consistent with the 
anti-imperial stance taken by Le Devoir and La Presse in 1956. A cartoon by 
Robert Lapalme, now working for La Presse, on 4 August used the fable of 
Cinderella to advance an anti-colonial position. A figure anchored "Canada 
Franc;ais" played the role of "Nouvelle Cendrillon."s36 She was a white female 
figure holding a broom while a slipper was placed on her foot by a Black male 
figure with the anchor "Colonies N egres" on him. Both figures were smiling, and 
the anchor "le franc;ais" was placed next to the slipper to let viewers know that it 
was a common language that made the two compatible. The ugly stepsisters in 
the Cinderella fahle were played by the United States, Great Britain, and "Canada 
Anglais," all of whom appeared in the background looking sad and surprised at 
the success of "Canada Frarn;;ais." By using such a metaphor, LaPalme made a 
visual argument about decolonization and the Francophonie drawing part of 
Canada and the Congo into a closer and mutually beneficial relationship. 
536 Robert Lapalme, "Nouvelle Cendrillon," la Presse, Thursday 4 August 1960, 4. 
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Figure 5.9 La Presse 4 August 1960 
English Canadian cartoons, in contrast to their French counterparts, 
preferred to remind their viewers that Canada was a good country that undertook 
peacekeeping operations for the benefit of the world. A cartoon by John Collins, 
who had been working as a cartoonist at the Gazette since 1941, from 13 August, 
contrasted Canada's port.rayal as an "Aid to an Imperialist Aggressor" in Soviet 
propaganda with an "ave.rage" Canadian.s37 The Russian image of Canada was a 
domineering figure who carried a whip in his right hand, and had a snarl on his 
face. The "average" Canadian in the cartoon was a balding man with glasses who 
wore a Hawaiian shirt, socks to his knees, and had a heavy mid-section but 
skinny arms and legs. Both figures represented Canada as a man, but the elderly 
vacationer pointed to himself and declared, "Who, me?" upon seeing himself 
537John Collins, "Our Tum in the Distorting Mirror," Montreal Gazette, 13 August 1960, 6. 
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portrayed as an imperialist aggressor. Such an image drew upon the perception of 
Canada as a nation without a colonial past. It was Canada's actions as an 
independent nation, not simply the functional shared use of the French language, 
which made it suited for peacekeeping duty. 
While Canadian editorial cartoons generally lacked of images of Egyptians 
in 1956, most cartoons about ONUC featured cultural tropes about the Congolese 
people. These images dehumanized the Congolese, and constructed them as 
exaggeratedly simian-like. The cartoonists who employed this trope drew upon 
images that had populated numerous comic strips before the Second World 
War.s38 Such representations encouraged Canadians to differentiate themselves 
from the Congolese, which helped to further segregate Canada's peacekeepers 
from the host nation. 
A topless Black, male figure was the most common representation of the 
Congo. Figures like this were normally shown in tattered clothes or grass skirts. 
Equally prevalent were depictions of physical defects or portrayals of the Congo 
as a child. Cartoons often conflated the health of the depicted Black man with the 
Congo as a nation.539 A Leader-Post cartoon from 16 July showed a seemingly ill 
figure, with the words "Congolese Independence" written on his tattered pants, 
lying before a ·witchdoctor who was anchored "political unpreparedness."54° 
Cartoons used iimages that denoted backwardness in the Congo - including 
538 Bruce Lenthall, "Outside the Panel: Race in America's Popular Imagination: Comic Strips before and 
after World War II," Journal of American Studies 32, no. 1 (1998): 43. 
539 Other health defocts included being blinded after coming out oflife in the jungle, in John Collins, "The 
path out of the jungle," Montreal Gazette 2 August 1960, 6. 
540 
"The witchdoctor," Regina leader- Post, 16 July 1960, 15. 
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mystical forms of medicine- to make arguments that the Congolese were not 
ready for independence. In this case and many others, the physical health of the 
Congolese, as individuals and as a nation, was questioned. 
Popular songs about the Congo also influenced the content of editorial 
cartoons. "Civilization" was a song written in 1947 for the play Angel in the 
Wings.541 It was recorded by Danny Kaye and the Andrews Sisters and was 
periodically re-recorded in the years between then and 1960. The song was 
written from the point of view of a Congolese "savage" whose village had been 
visited by missionaries extolling the virtues of Western society. The "savage" was 
not interested, and intended to stay in "the jungle" rather than face the 
complications of modern life. The Chronicle- Herald printed a cartoon by 
Chambers that featured the chorus to "Civilization:" "Bongo, Bongo, Bongo, I 
Don't Want to Leave the Congo."542 It contained the omnipresent Black male 
figure bare-chested and beating the drums and singing the refrain. A cartoon 
appearing in the Globe and Mail on 2 August 1960, reprinted from the 
Indianapolis Star, quoted the same song lyric while showing a Belgian officer 
playing the bongos and letting out his sorrows.543 In the background, two Black 
male figures also half-naked appear through the grass. Their features were 
exaggerated -- their ears, noses and mouths were more simian than human. 
These cartoons invoked a popular song about the Congo to make a comment on 
the political situation there. In doing so, they over-simplified what was taking 
541 
"Civilization" was written by Bob Hilliard and Carl Sigman. 
542 Robert Chambers, "Popular Song Revival," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Wednesday 20 July 1960, 6. 
543 
"Bingo, Bango, Bongo, I Don't Wanna Leave the Congo!," Globe and Mail, Tuesday 2 August 1960, 6. 
place in the Congo, and made its people into those of the song: "savages" who 
were not willing to change to a modern life. 
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Figure 5.10 Globe and Mail 2 August 1960 
In cartoons the Congo's political leaders were also portrayed as different 
through animal analogies. These depictions oscillated between those which 
presented Lumumba as a danger to world peace and those which saw him as 
inferior to other world figures. A cartoon in Le Devoir on 13 September made 
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Lumumba a spider that had caught UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold in its 
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web.544 By September of 1960, Lumumba was being portrayed in the Western 
press as a Communist sympathizer, if not a Communist himself.545 Drawing him 
as a spider coded him as a dangerous figure. The implication of such a cartoon 
was that Canada and the UN needed to beware of the dangers of the Congo. Yet, 
just a few days earlier, Lumumba was portrayed as an infant in Le Devoir. This 
cartoon used animal imagery and depicted Hammarskjold and Lumumba as a 
kangaroo mother and her joey, implying that Lumumba relied upon 
Hammarskjold to survive .. Cartoons in both English and French Canada made 
Hammarskjold and the UN into mother figures who had to deal with infantilized 
Congolese.546 Making Lumumba an infant denoted the age of the Congo as a 
country, despite his being middle-aged at the time, and was also a visual marker 
of the Congolese being unfit to govern themselves. 
544 
"Lumumba vs. Hammarskjold," Le Devoir, 13 September 1960, 6. 
545 See Spooner, Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, Chapter Four. 
546 Some examples include "Canadian Soldiers in the Congo," Montreal Gazette, Saturday 20 August 1960; 
"La Congorou," Le Devoir, Wednesday 7 September 1960; "Permanent UN force Needed," Toronto Daily 
Star, Tuesday 19 July 1960; "Problem Child," Ottawa Citizen, Friday 22 July 1960. 
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Figure 5.11 Le Devoir 7 September 1960 
The perceived Soviet threat in the Congo also encouraged cartoonists to depict 
Khrushchev regularly. Through depictions of Khrushchev either "going native" or 
as an explorer, cartoons conveyed anxiety about the Congo's turning Communist. 
Several cartoons showed "Mr. K" dressed in a manner similar to the Congolese: in 
a grass skirt, shirtless, with a bone or skull accessory.s47 To the viewer, it would 
have been obvious that Khrushchev was not Congolese as his skin was not Black, 
547 
"Me Friendly Savage," Regina Leader- Post, 3 August 1960; "The Specialist," Globe and Mail, 19 July 
1960. 
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and he had an identifiable hammer and sickle on him. However, the Congolese 
were in one instance shown confused at this outsider, suggesting that it was 
possible Khrushchev would be able to fool the Congolese into thinking he was 
helping them. As an explorer, Khrushchev donned a pith helmet, always carried 
trade goods in the form of beads for the Congolese, and was sometimes armed 
with an elephant gun.s48 These depictions made Khrushchev a figure of danger by 
showing his infiltrating the Congo, just as Communism was said to be doing. The 
Soviet offers of trade and aid were depicted as enticements that had strings 
attached, or as nothing more than pretty beads, but the Congolese had to be told 
about such dangers before it was too late. 
Figure 5.12 Regina Leader- Post 3 August 1960 
548 John Collins, "The Big Game Hunters," Monreal Gazette, 16 July 1960; John Collins, ""Dr. 
Livingstone, I presume"," Montreal Gazette, 22 July 1960. 
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English Canadian cartoonists mobilized long-standing Western cultural 
images of Central .Africa to make statements a bout the political events of the 
summer of 1960. Viewers saw cartoons which envisioned the Congo as a land of 
grass skirts, cannibalism, dangerous animals, and people who were not ready for 
self- government. By having such tropes on hand, cartoonists did not need to give 
Canada a central role in their images, as was the case during the Suez mission. In 
contrast to such presentations, French Canadian cartoonists supported their 
papers' editorial positions regarding the need for the Francophonie to usher the 
Congolese into a larger world community. Overwhelmingly though, cartoonists 
depicted Congolese decolonization as something that could be dangerous, and 
likely beyond the cognitive abilities of the Congolese. This racial prejudice 
towards Africans, at a time of consensus about the appropriateness of Canada's 
peacekeeping efforts, serves as a reminder that Canada's status as a peacekeeping 
nation did not preclude people's making distinctions between the West and the 
colonized peoples of the world. Such distinctions would, however, disappear from 
the Canadian memory of ONUC, as cartoons about this mission were infrequently 
made after September 1960. 
Cyprus, 15 February to 15 May 1964 
Four years later, cartoonists rarely used cultural tropes to describe Cyprus 
when UNFICYP commenced. The leading figures of the crisis, Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin and UN Secretary- General U 
Thant, were instead depicted interacting with the Canadian peacekeepers in these 
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cartoons. Cartoonists seemed far more accepting of Canada's contingent of 
regular army units than they had been of the logistics units sent in 1956. Akin to 
the press coverage at this time, it was not the Canadians who were specifically 
targeted for criticism but the UN's operational mandate. These sources of 
contention provided cartoonists with an opportunity to again challenge the 
Canadian peacekeeping role despite the high level of support found in both 
government and media sources at this time. While peacekeeping had become an 
established duty for the Canadian Forces, cartoonists longed for a more assertive 
peacekeeping role that would permit the Canadians to behave like regular 
soldiers. 
Though the Canadian peacekeepers were the most common figures depicted 
in cartoons about Cyprus, several major political figures were also caricatured. 
Archbishop Makarios, the leader of Cyprus' government, was occasionally 
depicted, though ordinary Cypriots were not commonly included in cartoons. 
Paul Martin, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, appeared more often than 
any other politician. Martin was often shown in a military uniform, a visual 
marker of his status as the leader of External Affairs.549 His head was exaggerated 
in many dravvings, taking up most of his body size. Unlike the "Little Mike" 
caricatures, these depictions of Martin were not cute. They showed him vvith lines 
on his forehead, a curled upper lip, and a receding hairline. As an identifiable 
politician, Martin was a ready stand-in for the Canadian government. And while 
549 Two examples include "Let them first send us an engraved invitation," Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday 11 
March 1964; "What do you think? Should we help him?," Ottawa Citizen, Friday 6 March 1964. 
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most of the cartoons featuring Martin seemed to agree with his desire to create a 
peacekeeping force to enter Cyprus, these physical depictions of him suggest less 
confidence in his abilities than those of Pearson a decade earlier. 
As Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant also frequently appeared in 
Canadian cartoons. Thant's short stature was often exaggerated, perhaps because 
he was Burmese, and not a Scandinavian, as his predecessor Dag Hammarskjold 
had been. Hammarskjold was sometimes portrayed as a motherly character, but 
always a man of equal size, if not larger than, the leaders with whom he dealt. 
Relying on a pre-existing trope, cartoonists found it easy to make an Asian man 
small.55° His role as Secretary-General did not afford him any increase in height, 
and he was almost always shown as a small person, connoting his lack of power. 
Often shown begging for new troops or some form of guidance from Martin or the 
peacekeepers themselves, the Secretary- General was not kindly portrayed by 
cartoonists. 
The Canadian peacekeeper /policeman analogy would be employed for the last 
time during UNFICYP. A cartoon by Chambers, who had been depicting 
Canadian peacekeepers as policemen since 1956 in the Chronicle-Herald, showed 
an overworked policeman being told his beat was being increased.551 While the 
policeman of 1956 appeared in many papers as a strong, young white man, in 
1964 Canada was balding, wrinkled, and tired. One of his feet was labelled 
550 Some examples of Thant in cartoons include "Better give another blast on that jolly old bugle," Halifax 
Chronicle- Herald, Tuesday 24 March 1964; "High finance," Ottawa Citizen, 13 March 1964 1964; "What 
do you think? Should we help him?," Ottawa Citizen. 
551 This cartoon was depicted elsewhere as well. See "The role of peacekeeper," Ottawa Citizen, Saturday 
14 March 1964, 6. 
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"Congo," the other "Gaza," and both were called "aching dogs." U Thant delivered 
the bad news to the Canadian peacekeeper /policeman as a police chief without 
remorse. Rather than suggest Canadians were eager for another UN mission, 
Chambers depicted Cyprus duty as more of a necessity. This contradicted the 
editorial stance of most newspapers of the time, as well as the political opinions 
of all the major political parties in Canada, implying that cracks in the facade of a 
peacekeeping consensus could easily appear. 
As the policeman metaphor fell out of favour, cartoonists preferred to show 
the Canadian peacekeepers struggling in the midst of operational restrictions. 
Several cartoons showed bombed-out buildings, bullets flying through the air, 
and UN peacekeepers ducking to protect themselves.552 The potential dangers the 
Canadians faced iln Cyprus were a source of contention in Diefenbaker's speeches 
about "passive policemen" and in newspaper editorials that discussed "cardboard 
soldiers." These phrases provided cartoonists with ample material. A cartoon in 
the Globe and Mail, reprinted from the Montreal Star, showed a peacekeeper 
being carted to a medical tent by two other soldiers.553 The cause of the 
peacekeepers' injuries was "turning the other cheek,'' - a commentary on the 
inability of UNFICYP to disarm either the Greeks or the Turks. Another cartoon 
from the Chronicle-Herald showed a peacekeeper being struck in the head by a 
552 
"Dear Mom: Don't worry, this place is run by a kindly old clergyman," Globe and Mail, Tuesday 7 April 
1964; "War and Peace," Calgary Herald, 4 April 1964; Parker Kent, "A UN Force," Calgary Herald, 4 
May 1964. 
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'"Another one .. Same thing ... Turned the other cheek.'," Globe and Mail, Saturday 2 May 1964, 6. 
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rock.554 Although he held a gun in his right hand, UN restrictions dictated that he 
"use his head" instead of firing back against his attacker. Both of these cartoons 
took maxims that could be applied to UN peacekeeping and made them into 
terms of derision. Turning the other cheek and using one's head were lampooned 
as bad advice for a military unit entering an active situation regardless of its 
peacekeeping mandate and UN backing. 
Some cartoonists felt that the UN mandate of not shooting unless fired upon 
would lead to the peacekeepers' being humiliated. A cartoon captioned "UN 
police force salute" in the Citizen mocked the tactics of the UN force in Cyprus by 
depicting a group of UN soldiers standing in a line with their arms raised in 
surrender. Their shortcomings were made evident in this cartoon, as the 
cartoonist criticized the peacekeeping force's being more reactive than proactive. 
The peacekeepers were also drawn smiling at the captors, who were not visible in 
the panel. The police, or regular soldiers, would not surrender in such a fashion, 
but these forces gladly placed themselves at the mercy of another. Cartoons such 
as this questioned the larger peacekeeping role that the Canadian Forces were 
being asked to perform, and satirized any operation that prevented the Canadians 
from acting like proper soldiers. 
554 
"The Letter of The Law," Halifax Chronicle- Herald, Saturday 25 April 1964, 6. 
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Figure 5.13 Ottawa Citizen 10 April 1964 
Canada's domestic politics provided cartoonists with additional content for 
their depictions of UNFICYP. The French Van Doo's made up the majority of the 
force sent to the Mediterranean, and so the use of the French language in Canada 
became an important subject. A cartoon by Norris that appeared in the Sun and 
the Free Press depicted several soldiers boarding an RCAF plane loaded down 
with gear.sss Unlike the soldiers who were portrayed bringing household items to 
the Middle East in 1956, these soldiers wore full backpacks and unadulterated 
military uniforms. The soldiers were French Canadian, and were shown speaking 
555 Len Norris, "One goo ting I hear about dis Cyprus- she's bicultural.," Winnipeg Free Press, Monday 23 
March 1964, 21. 
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about one of the advantages of Cyprus: "she's bicultural." This cartoon referenced 
the feeling among many Quebeckers that there was not real biculturalism in 
Canada. In the English Canadian press at the time, peacekeeping was normally 
lauded as an activity that promoted the bicultural nature of Canadian society. 
Pointing out the flaws within Canada was yet another way for cartoonists to 
challenge the perceived value of UN service. 
While some cartoons sympathized with Quebecois grievances, another 
cartoon that appeared in the Sun found Canada's willingness to send troops 
overseas foolish because of tensions in Quebec. In it, a square-jawed white man 
in a UN uniform with a gun at his side and a bag of belongings over his shoulder 
walked past three figures, one of whom was a witch, the other a monkey who 
smoked cigarettes, and the third a fuzzy and unkempt man.ss6 These three figures 
were darker than the UN soldier, and were shown hunched over a device that was 
labelled "FLQ." The caption for the cartoon was "Off to solve Cyprus's bicultural 
dispute, mon brave? Au 'voir!" Such an image implied that dangers inside Canada 
needed the attention of the military before troops were sent to help Cyprus. By 
making such a statement, this cartoon gave readers an alternative view of the 
Canadian actions overseas which was far more critical. Unlike in 1960, when 
language issues were already prevalent in Quebec cartoons, by 1964 English 
Canadians were acknowledging that a considerable amount of unrest was 
556 
"Off to solve Cyprus's bicultural dispute, mon brave? Au 'voir!," Vancouver Sun, Monday 16 March 
1964, 4. 
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brewing in Quebec. Cartoonists wondered who would keep the peace at home if 
Canada's attention were perpetually turned elsewhere. 
Figure 5.14 Vancouver Sun 16 March 1964 
Cartoon renderings of the Cyprus mission once again made Canada's role in 
the crisis their central concern. By focusing on the Canadians, cartoonists also 
encouraged their audiences to think about themselves and not the troubles of the 
host nation. Most cartoons dealt with the shortcomings of the force, and raised 
domestic issues that seemed more pressing than helping in Cyprus. These 
unflattering depictions were consistent with the criticisms being made by some 
politicians and newspaper editorials at this time. As the situation in Cyprus 
returned to a relative calm, cartoonists redeployed their concerns about Canada's 
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national identity on more prescient topics. This left their criticisms of Canada's 
peacekeeping role to languish in the past. 
UNEF, 15 May to 15 June 1967 
When UNEF, operating in Egypt for over a decade, was brought to a 
premature end in 1967, peacekeeping as an institution appeared in various 
manifestations, as cartoonists echoed editorial declarations about its death and 
the end of Canada's premier international role along with it. Cartoonists found 
the UN lacking as an organization because of its refusal to stand up to Nasser's 
demand that UNEF be withdrawn from Egypt. One cartoon portrayed the UN as 
an older man with a suitcase, surrounded by notes telling him he was not 
welcome.557 This enfeebled the UN by ageing it well beyond its twenty-two years. 
Another image showed the UN building, anchored "UN peacekeeping," being 
broken apart by a massive crack, connoting that if the UN lost its peacekeeping 
role, its status as an organization would be jeopardized.558 During this time of 
crisis, cartoonists wondered if the UN would be able to survive this test, or end up 
going the way of the League of Nations. 
Nasser's forced eviction of the UN units led to depictions of him as a strong 
bully and a repentant weakling. Several cartoons caricatured his face on the 
Sphinx to mark him as Egyptian.559 As in 1956, Nasser stood as the 
personification of all Egyptians. His Sphinx persona was aggressive; it either 
557 
"No place to go," Regina Leader Post, Wednesday 7 June 1967, 19. 
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"The cracks are showing," Regina Leader-Post, 8 June 1967, 21. 
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"Do you sometimes get the feeling you're not wanted?," Winnipeg Free Press, Tuesday 23 May 1967; 
Duncan MacPherson, "Nasser Sphinx," La Presse, Saturday 27 May 1967. 
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stalked UN troops, or pinned a tiny U Thant under one of his legs. This latter 
image was done by Duncan MacPherson, who had been working at the Toronto 
Star since 1958, and was regarded by many as the best cartoonist in the country. 
Some cartoonists were not eager to give Nasser this strong image, and revived his 
earlier ''bully" persona used during the Suez Crisis. In these images, Nasser, 
dominated by his nose, was seen to be two-faced, capable of calling for UN help 
in one instance and forcing their departure in another.s6o When his war against 
Israel had gone awry, images of Nasser made him seem foolish for removing 
UNEF and repentant as he asked for its return.s61 As a prominent world leader for 
many years, Nasser was a popular character in cartoons about the eviction of 
UNEF. His portrayals in the media made him into the villain of the narrative, and 
cartoons eagerly depicted his getting his comeuppance. 
560 John Collins, "What a change a few years makes" Montreal Gazette, 29 May 1967, 6. 
561 
"Saturday 10 June 1967," Regina leader- Post, Saturday 10 June 1967, 19. 
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Figure 5.15 Toronto Star 25 May 1967 
Lester Pearson's attachment to UNEF and his being Canada's Prime Minister 
encouraged cartoonists to depict him during the crisis. Their renderings, 
however, were far less flattering than they had been a decade prior. Macpherson, 
in the Star, made Pearson into a modern-day Lawrence of Arabia for one 
cartoon.s62 Dressed in Bedouin robes and riding atop a camel, Pearson was 
shown galloping off towards Aqaba, a city in Egypt that Lawrence famously 
captured by land when many said it could not be done. This image drew upon the 
then-popular film Lawrence of Arabia which had been released in 1962, to 
562 Duncan Mac Pherson, "Cartoon," Toronto Star, 31 May 1967, 6. 
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satirize the efforts of the Prime Minister to bring peace to the Middle East. Both 
Lawrence and Pearson were men who claimed they could bring peace to a region 
that was considered too dangerous, and this cartoon captured the gallant, but 
somewhat futile, efforts of the Prime Minister to keep the peacekeeping forces in 
the Middle East. 
Figure 5.16Toronto Star 31 May 1967 
Pearson was also depicted as being out of touch with political realities in 
cartoons from this period. One image showed him swimming in a river with Paul 
Martin and Secretary of Defence Paul Hellyer while Nasser ran off with their 
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clothes, which had been anchored "Our peace keeping role."563 Another French 
Canadian cartoonist made Pearson into a weak, elderly man who was not in touch 
with the needs of Quebec.564 In all these images, Pearson was drawn as an old 
man, not the youthful Minister he had been in 1956. Pearson tried to keep 
Canada engaged in the world, but cartoonists questioned the futility of his efforts, 
and suggested tha1t someone more in touch with Canadian public opinion would 
have behaved differently. 
Canada's peacekeepers were not depicted nearly as often as Pearson, but they 
too were subject to satirizing. English cartoonists did not draw the Canadians 
returning home, presumably because they did not want to add further insult to 
what was taken to be an injury to Canadian pride. However, a cartoon in La 
Presse, by Berthio [Roland Berthiaume], showed a line of Canadian soldiers 
departing from a plane anchored "Force ONU."565 These forces were met by their 
superiors, with the leading soldier stating as the caption:« L'operation 'depart 
d'urgence' accomplie, Mon commandant ... » The Canadian plane had the words 
"Vive Nasser" painted on its side, yet another reference to the Canadian 
acquiescence in Egypt. The soldiers departing from the plane were drawn 
identically, a technique Berthio used often when drawing either soldiers or police 
officers.566 In their haste, the soldiers managed to lose their uniforms and appear 
naked except for the helmets on their heads. This cartoon once again chastised 
563 John Collins, "Stealing Their Clothes," Montreal Gazette, 31 May 1967, 6. 
564 
"Croyez-moi, pour maintenir la pa ix, je suis un expert..", la Presse, Tuesday 30 May 1967; Berthio, Les 
cents dessins du Centenaire (Montreal: Partis Pris, 1967). 
565 Berthio, ""L'operation d'urgence accomplie, mon commandant.."," la Presse, Thursday 1June1967, 2." 
566 See Berthio, Les cents dessins du Centenaire. 
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Canada's peacekeepers for being different from its regular forces, since the 
peacekeepers had left Egypt without firing a shot, and had been stripped of their 
uniforms and, metaphorically, of their identities as soldiers, as a result. Berthio 
was a Quebec nationalist who was never shy about criticizing the Canadian 
federal government. His depiction of Canada's peacekeepers should therefore be 
read as a statement about the impotence of the Canadian government as well. 
Figure 5.17 La Presse 1 June 1967 
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The end of UNEF caused many Canadians to reconsider the continued 
relevance of their country's peacekeeping role. Cartoonists did not offer messages 
of hope about peacekeeping's future, but rather found issue with the major 
political figures of the time and the overly-regulated UN conduct of UNEF. While 
Pearson tried to remedy this situation by using his diplomatic acumen, 
cartoonists preferred to portray him as old and out of touch with reality. Canada's 
peacekeepers were also lampooned for obeying the commands of this weak UN, 
and their role was framed as an unwelcome deviation from traditional soldiering. 
These criticisms were variations on those employed during the Suez crisis and the 
first months of Ul~FICYP. Yet, they had added relevance given the pervasiveness 
of criticism about Canada's peacekeeping present and future at this time in both 
the political rhetoric of people like Pierre Trudeau and frequently-appearing 
editorials announcing the death of UN peacekeeping. Negative cartoons about 
Canada's peacekeepers were, therefore, yet another blow to its status as a nation 
of "Blue Berets." But as \\rith earlier times of criticism, the negative depictions 
offered by cartoonists about the end of UNEF faded as attention turned to Expo 
'67 and other large news stories. This permitted these criticisms to be forgotten in 
the coming decades. 
Somalia, 1 March to 1 June 1993 
As with older missions, cartoonists' renderings of UNOSOM complicated 
Canada's peacekeeping efforts while keeping the focus squarely on Canada. 
Somalia was not the primary focus for cartoonists' attentions; the lack of a clearly 
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identifiable political leader also discouraged cartoonists from depicting Somalis. 
Many images depicted peacekeeping as a messier activity than many Canadians 
imagined. After members of the Airborne Regiment killed several Somalis, the 
Canadian peacekeepers were presented as soldiers who were "un-Canadian." 
These peacekeepers were not policemen, nor were they effeminate or bookish. 
They were, instead, white supremacists who were ruining Canada's international 
reputation through their actions. Canada's political leaders, particularly Minister 
of Defence Kim Campbell, were also harshly criticized in cartoons for sending the 
Airborne overseas and allowing white supremacists to be a part of the Forces. 
Cartoonists questioned whether it was wise for Canada to be engaged in 
peacekeeping at all, and the image of Canada as a peacekeeping nation was once 
again challenged. 
While newspapers actively encouraged the Mulroney government to volunteer 
Canadians for peacekeeping duty around the globe, cartoons across the country 
did not visually endorse these sentiments. Images appeared in December of 1992 
that mocked the media attention that had surrounded the landing of US marines 
on the beaches of Somalia. Three months later, local issues were far more likely 
to be depicted, whether they involved the Toronto Maple Leafs' and the Montreal 
Canadiens' being in the National Hockey League playoffs or the West Coast 
salmon stock being depleted. As always, individual cartoonists and their editors 
judged what issues would resonate with their readers. These preferences were the 
subject of a cartoon by Serge Chapleau in Le Devoir. Two men were shown at a 
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Montreal Expos game. The first expressed concern about South Africa, 
Yugoslavia, and Somalia, while the second was more concerned about the health 
of Expos second baseman Delino DeShields.s67 Chapleau's image was a 
commentary on the lack of interest shown by people in international crises. At 
the time though, Somalia was seen as a qualified success, and so positive cartoons 
about peacekeeping would not have had much resonance, particularly when other 
issues were taking up considerable space in newspapers, and stories about 
UNOSOM were being pushed from the front page. 
Figure 5.18 Le Devoir, 14 April 1993 
567 Serge Chapleau, "As-tu lu le journal a matin!?," Le Devoir, Wednesday 14 April 1993, AS. 
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Newspapers were confused by the lack of state structure when reporting on 
Somalia.s68 Unlike in Egypt, the Congo, and Cyprus, this meant that no single 
figure was able to stand as representative of Somalia as a whole. Cartoonists also 
did not choose to rely on the cultural tropes that had been so prevalent during the 
peacekeeping mission to the Congo in 1960. Upon being introduced into the 
country, members of UNOSOM were sometimes depicted next to starving or 
confused Somalis., who were normally shirtless male figures. These images were, 
however, far less prevalent than depictions of the Canadians or other members of 
UNOSOM. And by April of 1993, the Somalis were not given an active role in 
cartoons. In fact, the dead body of a Somali draped across Kim Campbell's back 
was one of the rare instances when a Somali figure, dead or alive, was depicted.569 
The absence of the Somalis was a different form of prejudice, and suggests that 
Canadian cartoonists remained tied to presenting images that were supposed to 
have a direct relationship to their readers, rather than showing alternative views 
of those stories. 
Cartoonists chose instead to depict the challenges that would await 
peacekeepers upon their arrival in trouble spots.57° One image from the Star 
showed a chaotic world that peacekeepers had to step into every day.s71 Relying 
on cultural tropes about: gender and work, this cartoon showed a male 
568Several examples of this appear in Chapter Four. The implications of the Western media focusing on the 
clan structure in Somalia is also discussed in Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, 
Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism. 
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peacekeeper being sent off to work by his wife, who stood on their front porch 
holding a mug of coffee. The peacekeeper held a briefcase in his right arm, not 
any sort of weapon, and his wife said: " ... have a nice day." Facing the peacekeeper 
was a wide arc of wreckage, with several signs strewn throughout, indicating 
where peacekeeping missions were taking place: Cambodia, Angola, the Balkans, 
and Somalia. Such images depicted peacekeeping as a difficult and perhaps 
impossible task, a very different message from what Mulroney's government was 
suggesting in its political rhetoric. They also emphasized the differences between 
countries that participated in peacekeeping operations, Canada foremost 
amongst them, and the host nations. 
When the news of the killings of several Somalis by the Airborne broke in 
Canada in April 1993, cartoonists responded by attacking the Canadian Forces. 
Several images showed the Canadian peacekeepers sick and in need of medical 
assistance.572 These Canadians were large men, physically bulky and very 
different from the bespectacled and rotund signallers that were caricatured on 
UNEF. Peacekeeping was not portrayed as an effeminate role for the Canadian 
Forces. Instead, it was seen as a job for men who were intimidating because of 
their size. That they were being attacked by the "virus" of public opinion, which 
they could not fight on their own, made them into even less-flattering figures. 
While the press was being lambasted by letters to the editor from families of 
those in the Canadian Forces who believed that undue attacks were being made 
572 
"'Medic'," Globe and Mail, Friday 21 May 1993, A26. 
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against their loved ones, cartoonists made visual statements about the duplicity 
of the Canadian peacekeepers. The military might attempt to bury the details, 
politicians could spin the events to their favour, but cartoonists believed the 
killings by the Airborne demanded action. 
What particularly drew the ire of cartoonists were the revelations about white 
supremacists serving in the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia.573 The 
apologetic tone present in many editorials across English Canada was not echoed 
amongst cartoonists. A cartoon appearing in the Winnipeg Free Press on 13 May 
depicted several rows of mounds which all looked identical, but for a single figure 
which stood out. It wore the headdress of the Ku Klux Klan, and had an armed 
forces helmet with a Canadian flag on its side.574 This cartoon took a news story 
and created an image that could speak as loudly as any article by clearly attacking 
the Canadian Forces for their permissive attitude to the white supremacist views 
of some of their members. 
Instead of depicting the peacekeepers as Klansmen, another cartoon, which 
appeared in the Ottawa Citizen on 13 May, showed four members of the Airborne 
goose-stepping past a raised platform on which several higher-ranking members 
of the military gave a Nazi salute.575 The artist, Alan King, implied that the 
military establishment should be held responsible for the presence of neo-Nazis 
within the Canadian military, and that the soldiers who held those views were not 
solely to blame. Some of the paper's audience took issue with King's 
573 See Chapter Four, "Peace is not front page news," for more details about these news stories. 
574 
"One in every barrel," Winnipeg Free Press, 13 May 1993, A6. 
575 Allan King, "Airborne" Ottawa Citizen, 13 May 1993, Al4. 
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characterization. A letter from the wife of a member of the Airborne described 
this cartoon as "disgusting." She wrote that the only thing giving her hope was the 
sentiments from friends across the country that also found this cartoon 
outrageous.576 Other letters from current and retired members of the military 
used words like "hate literature," "repugnant," "irresponsible" and "unjust" to 
describe the cartoon.577 To counter such views, the Citizen included a column 
from one of its writers which defended the image. It stated, "King's cartoon did a 
little ridiculing to point out a truth. The truth seems to hurt."578 The paper did 
not seem to object to the negative reaction this cartoon received, and used it as an 





Figure 5.19 Ottawa Citizen 13 May 1993 
576 Young, "Insults hit morale of a proud regiment," The Ottawa Citizen, Al 1. 
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While the Canadian Forces were targeted more often, cartoonists also 
attacked the Minister of Defence, Kim Campbell, for her role in covering up what 
had taken place.579 As detailed in earlier chapters, Campbell was a target for 
Liberals in the House of Commons and in many Liberal-supporting newspapers. 
The Chronicle-Herald published a cartoon about Campbell on 24 April that 
questioned her political future in the wake of the Somalia killings.sso Campbell 
was shown standing next to a bald man with a moustache and glasses who 
comments, " ... gee Kim, is it me, or have you put on some weight?" A dead body, 
anchored "Somali killings," draped across her shoulders visually placed the blame 
for the killings on Campbell. By making the comment into a joke about her 
weight, something which women were supposed to care about more than men, 
this cartoon also satirized the fact that she was a female politician in a 
traditionally male-dominated profession. While espousing a clear moral line on 
behalf of all Canadians against the killings in Somalia, this image was a further 
instance in which change, in this case having a female Prime Minister, was also 
being criticized. 
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Figure 5 .20 Halifax Chronicle - Herald 24 April 1993 
Canadian cartoonists made some of their harshest attacks against Canada's 
peacekeepers du.ring UNOSOM. As with other host nations in the past, the 
Somalis' struggle was ignored in favour of commentaries on Canada and its 
peacekeepers. Cartoon images of the Airborne chastised them for behaving in a 
manner unbecoming a peacekeeping nation. When it was revealed that several 
members were :in white supremacist groups, the unit as a whole was attacked for 
permitting behaviour that seemed unCanadian. As the stories about the 
behaviour of the Airborne became more complicated, figures up the chain of 
command all the way to the Minister of Defence became targets for cartoonists. 
314 
Some readers took issue with their family members' being portrayed as Klansmen 
or neo-Nazis. But newspapers supported the freedom of their cartoonists to 
comment upon the events in Somalia in whatever ways they saw fit. Similar to 
those of 1967, these images seemed to resonate more because they were in 
agreement with other critical opinions that were appearing in newspapers and 
the political rhetoric of the time. These voices continued to dispute Canada's 
suitability for the role of the world's leading peacekeeper, which had been so 
prevalent one year prior. 
The Somalia Inquiry, 1 June to 15 July 1997 
Unlike previous instances described in this chapter, cartoonists' criticisms of 
peacekeeping in the 1990s were more sustained because of the Inquiry into the 
conduct of the Airborne, the Canadian Forces leadership, and top government 
officials regarding Somalia. When the Inquiry's report was released in July 1997, 
Jean Chretien, Art Eggleton, and the head Judge of the Inquiry, Gilles 
Letourneau, were depicted more than any other figures. The female figure of 
Justice was also included in these images to remind viewers that Canada was a 
law-abiding country whose leaders were failing its people. Visual depictions of 
peacekeepers appeared less frequently, but their presence in these cartoons 
remained unsympathetic. In all these cases, cartoonists tried to make sense of the 
damning report about the conduct of the Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia, the 
subsequent withholding of evidence by the military, and what this meant for 
Canada's future peacekeeping efforts. They continued to employ imagery that had 
315 
been associated with the Airborne since 1993. But when newspapers shifted their 
attention elsewhere soon after the report was released, cartoonists moved on as 
well. 
Many cartoonists followed the testimonies given at the Somalia Inquiry with 
considerable interest in 1995 and 1996. General Jean Boyle, as the Chief of 
Defence Staff starting in December 1995, was a particularly popular figure to 
depict during these years.sB1 Boyle appeared for nine days at the Inquiry, and 
adamantly defended his actions after news of the Somalia killings became known. 
Many images had Boyle deflecting attention elsewhere. His excuses were not 
accepted, and cartoonists wondered how the Canadian Forces would be able to 
purge those responsible for the tragedy in Somalia. 
The week immediately following the release of the Inquiry's report saw 
numerous cartoonists across the country weigh in on the Somalia Affair. The 
most common figures to appear in these images were Jean Chretien and Art 
Eggleton. As Prime Minister, Chretien was singled out for his role in calling what 
many felt was a premature end to the Inquiry. Eggleton, then-Minister of 
Defence, was considered equally culpable in preventing the Inquiry report from 
having its maximum impact.sB2 Cartoons, similar to the newspapers from this 
time period, found these individuals, rather than Canadian society as whole, easy 
targets for criticism. Visually, Chretien was a leader with distinctive features that 
581 See, for example, Michel Garneau, "General Boyle, comment allez-vous convaincre le tiers de vos 
generaux de se retin::r?," Le Devoir, 16 July 1996; John Larter, "Somalia Inquiry," Calgary Sun, 
Wednesday 14 August 1996. 
582 Gamotte, "Affaire Somalienne," Le Devoir, Friday 4 July 1997. 
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cartoonists exaggerated, including large ears, a wrinkled face and throat, and a 
mouth twisted to one side of his face, as a result of the Prime Minister's facial 
muscle restriction from a childhood bout of Bell's palsy. The cartoons that 
appeared in 1997 normally gave Chretien an overly large head and a 
disproportionately small body. These body proportions often made him smaller 
than the other figures in these cartoons, which intimated that he was a figure to 
be derided for his handling of the Inquiry. 
While all the cartoons examined during this period believed the government 
mishandled the Somalia Inquiry, some played with the idea that there was a 
larger cover-up taking place.ss3 Chretien often appeared in cartoons alongside the 
figure of Justice, as her foible.584 Blindfolded and with scales in one hand, Justice 
was normally larger in stature than Chretien. A cartoon from the Leader- Post on 
3 July showed Chretien, who was half the size of the other characters, whistling 
while walking past both ,Justice and a Canadian soldier. 585 Chretien pinned a 
medal on the chest of the member of the Armed Forces labelled "Somalia." 
Justice, on the other hand, had the medal pinned to her mouth, implying that the 
government's premature ending of the Somalia Inquiry was unjust. In order for 
Canada to move on as country from the Somalia Affair, cartoonists argued that 
the government needed to provide people with all of the facts. This echoed the 
statements by the Inquiry heads which derided the Canadian Forces' destroying 
583 Terry Mosher, "Duh .. No cover up," Montreal Gazette, Saturday 5 July 1997. 
584 
"Emergency ward," Globe and Mail, 19 June 1997, A 18. 
585 
"Cartoon," Regina Leader- Post, 3 July 1997, A8. 
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documents and intentionally obstructing their work, and attacked the 
government for prematurely ending the Inquiry. 
While Chretien and Eggleton remained cartoonists' primary targets, they also 
employed well-known interpretations of the Canadian Forces and their 
leadership. Depictions of Canadian peacekeepers remained unsympathetic, as 
they had been in 1993. These large men were normally drawn stern-faced. They 
often had moustaches, thick necks, and visually evident muscles.s86 The 
peacekeepers were also not anchored "Canada," and no cartoonists tried to 
metonymically link Canada and its peacekeepers in these cartoons. 
Like their depictions of the ordinary Canadian soldiers, cartoon renderings of 
Canada's military leadership were far from sympathetic. Cartoonists did not 
anchor these men by name, nor did they give them features that resembled those 
of the actual Canadian military leadership. Instead, cartoonists relied on a 
cultural knowledge of what a military leader looked like to inform their images. 
Military dress uniforms and chests full of medals were two visual markers of 
leadership that were employed often, as were military berets.s87 In La Presse, 
Serge Chapleau depicted the Canadian Forces' reaction to the Inquiry's report as 
a different, and more offensive, kind of salute.sss Six generals, who were all 
identical to one another, were shown giving this salute, implying that the whole 
leadership held similar views. A cartoon by Aislin, who had been making highly 
586 Ibid. 
587 
"Cartoon," Globe and Mail, Friday 4 July 1997; "Somalia Inquiry report," Toronto Star, Friday 4 July 
1997. 
588 Serge Chapleau, "Les generaux canadiens saluent le rapport de la commission d'enquete sur la Somalie," 
la Presse, 3 July 1997. 
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regarded cartoons at the Gazette since 1972, showed a medal for the Armed 
Forces as a metaphor for those responsible for wrongdoing in the Somalia 
Affair.ss9 This medal was called the "Bullshooter," a thinly-veiled alteration of the 
word bullshit. The heads of the military had been public targets since the start of 
the Inquiry. Cartoonists showed that they, rather than the rank and file members 
of the Canadian military who had committed the crimes in Somalia, were the 
ones responsible for the failures there. The whole-scale changes in the military 
leadership called for in the Inquiry's report encouraged cartoonists to paint them 
as identically culpable figures. They showed no sympathy in their depictions, and 
hoped the report's recommendations would be followed. 
Figure 5.21 Montreal Gazette 4 July 1997 
589 Terry Mosher, "Bullshooter,," Montreal Gazette, Friday 4 July 1997. 
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The restraints of having a single panel in which to express an opinion about 
the Somalia Inquiry made it more likely that individual figures, as opposed to 
Canada as a whole, would make their way into a cartoon. As a result, Chretien, 
Eggleton, and the leadership of the Canadian Forces became specific targets for 
cartoonists' anger. These images were not sustained, however, and cartoonists 
quickly returned to other pressing issues such as the financial troubles of the 
Montreal Expos, the logging of British Columbia forests, and education reforms 
in Ontario. For a brief period though, the Somalia Inquiry was the leading story 
in newspapers across Canada, and cartoonists visually summarized the story in 
creative and powerful ways. Cartoonists did not speculate about Canada's 
peacekeeping future, and commented only on the problems that were taking 
place in the summer of 1997. Their attacks agreed with those found in editorials 
across the country, and challenged the utility of Canada's peacekeeping role. 
Cartoonists were angered at the seeming lack of accountability on the part of the 
government and military leadership, and found no reason to believe Canada's 
peacekeeping status would endure. 
Conclusion 
Editorial cartoons played a role in creating and disseminating images of 
peacekeeping in Canada that contained elements of the fantastic but that often 
resonated with their audiences. These depictions commented on the host nations, 
on Canada as a peacekeeping nation, and on the peacekeepers as identifiable 
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figures. Cartoonists quickly noted the differences between Canada and the 
countries where its peacekeepers were sent. The Middle East, the Congo, and 
Cyprus were all portrayed as being different from Canada. The Congo, in 
particular, offered cartoonists cultural images to borrow. In English Canada, 
tropes about the backwardness and inferiority of Africans were employed to make 
decolonization into a dangerous situation. French cartoonists, conversely, saw 
links between the Congo and Quebec because of the shared use of the French 
language and an aversion to imperialism. Cartoons about the mission to Somalia, 
thirty-three years later, used more-tempered versions of Africans, though live 
Somali figures rarely appeared. These images of the host nations did not permit 
Canadians to see them as places populated by individuals; instead, stereotypes 
were often employed to make visual metaphors about the inferiority of non-
Canadians. These views existed in Canada and amongst its peacekeepers, and 
contributed to the attitudes of many towards the Middle East, Cyprus, and Africa 
over the forty years covered in this chapter. They also make cartoonists' satires 
ambiguous, and worthy of criticism as well. 
Primarily, though, cartoonists focused on the Canadian peacekeeping 
connection to these countries. Cartoonists across the country depicted 
peacekeeping in remarkably similar ways. Different cultural allusions were 
employed in these depictions, and certainly differences between English and 
French Canadian cartoons existed. Despite this, a near-consensus seemed to exist 
amongst cartoonists regarding how to portray Canadians as peacekeepers. The 
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satirical nature of the editorial cartoon genre led to peacekeepers' being depicted 
as an ineffective police force, or derided because of their differences from 
traditional soldiers. These depictions remained in use throughout the first decade 
of peacekeeping's history, though particular missions often led to particular 
images being employed in favour of others. By the 1990s, Canada's peacekeepers 
were no longer imagined as policemen, nor were they shown to be weak or 
ineffective soldiers. Instead, as the public responded to the stories of the Airborne 
in Somalia, the peacekeepers became unsympathetic members of the Armed 
Forces. These soldiers were often shown engaged in unCanadian behaviour, 
acting in ways that led to Canadians' questioning peacekeeping's utility as a 
Canadian defence policy. 
Editorial cartoons must therefore be seen as sites of criticism about 
peacekeeping in Canada since 1956. But the nature of this medium limited the 
potential impact of these satires. Cartoonists were allowed to operate in editorial 
spaces that could differ from writers. By complicating Canada's international role 
with the UN, these cartoons often encouraged critical thinking about 
peacekeeping as a Canadian activity. The ephemeral nature of editorial cartoons, 
however, limited their potential impact. Images of the peacekeepers as effeminate 
men and bumbling policemen in 1956 did not dampen the enthusiasm many 
Canadians felt for this international action. Yet in 1967, 1993, and 1997, when 
images about peacekeeping reinforced ideas found elsewhere in Canada, their 
criticisms were particularly incisive, and offered Canadians alternatives to their 
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identity as a nation of "Blue Berets." Despite these brief periods, cartoonists 
ultimately could not overcome the nostalgic and progressive discourses which 
operated elsewhere, and encouraged Canadians to see peacekeeping primarily as 
a part of Canada's national symbology. 
323 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has sought to answer an important question: why did so 
many Canadians embrace peacekeeping as a symbol of their national identity 
from 1956 to 1997'.? Each chapter has highlighted varying ways that messages 
about peacekeeping were produced for, disseminated to, and received by 
Canadian audiences. They have also noted clear differences in how peacekeeping 
was portrayed in English and French Canada based upon conflicting 
understandings of Canada as a national project. At the same time, politicians, 
authors, and artists across Canada understood peacekeeping to be an activity in 
which, as Stompin' Tom wrote, "We're always proud to say," Canadians were 
actively engaged.s9° He and many other people saw peacekeeping as a Canadian 
activity in which the whole country should take pride. Yet Canada's identity 
problems in the latter half of the twentieth century were echoed in the 
discussions of peacekeeping found in each set of sources used in this dissertation. 
This meant that when people were uncertain about Canada's domestic policies, it 
was likely that they would also express such concerns when discussing 
peacekeeping's value as a policy. It was these domestic foci, despite the fact that 
peacekeeping was a multilateral undertaking done through the UN, that were 
primarily responsible for so many Canadians' associating their identities with 
peacekeeping between 1956 and 1997. 
59° Connors, The Blue Berets. 
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The vast amount of speeches, textbook contents, documentaries, newspaper 
articles, and editorial cartoons which focused on Canada's role in UN 
peacekeeping helped to make it a Canadian symbol. In all these various media, 
host nations receded into the background of every mission, while the Canadian 
contributions - whether large or small, logistics units or regular soldiers -
became more prominent. This pattern was established during UNEF when the 
Egyptians were rarely discussed, aside from blanket condemnations of President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, while the actions of Lester Pearson and Louis St. Laurent 
were made to stand as indicators of whether Canada was becoming a more 
independent nation or betraying Great Britain. Canadian independence was far 
less pressing an issue in 1960 when ONUC was undertaken, but most Canadians 
heard about the necessity of Canada's remaining a world leader in peacekeeping 
more than they did about the particularities of the Congo's federal system. Such 
understandings continued during UNFICYP, when politicians and media sources 
connected peacekeeping and Canada's bilingual issues more than they addressed 
the repercussions of Greeks and Turks battling on that island. UNEF's expulsion 
from Egypt in 1967 was likewise portrayed as a blow to Canada's internationalist 
foreign policies, rather than as a threat to international peace. At the end of the 
Cold War, when international peacekeeping went through its renaissance from 
1998 to 1993, Canadians were told that on UNOSOM the murders of three 
Somalis were less important than what this implied about Canada's ability to 
serve as the world's leading peacekeeper. Few people, particularly in English 
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Canada, would have been able to find sources which repositioned peacekeeping 
as a policy that should serve the needs of the host nations and not Canadian 
interests. And few politicians, authors, or artists encouraged their audiences to 
seek out such alternative perspectives. 
While these discussions of peacekeeping centred themselves on Canada's role 
in UN operations, this did not ensure its adoption as a national marker. It was, 
instead, the penchant of politicians, authors, and artists to employ nostalgic 
and/ or progressive language which permitted peacekeeping to constitute more 
than simply a governmental policy option, and become a part of the nation's 
symbology. Many people, particularly outside of Quebec, associated Canada's 
peacekeeping participation with their conceptions of a better world. This could 
manifest itself as a fixed vision of Canada's past that was bittersweetly recalled to 
contrast Canadian shortcomings in the present. These recollections began quite 
soon after the Liberals became the Opposition party in 1958. Lester Pearson, Paul 
Martin, and newspaper authors who supported the Liberal Party reminisced 
about the past Liberal record of success in foreign policy and the decline in 
Canada's stature during the Diefenbaker years. This belief in a "golden age" of 
Canadian foreign policy would appear in English high school history textbooks as 
well. Through the 1990s, it provided a nostalgic focal point for those who wished 
to justify Canada's participation in a peacekeeping operation or to criticize the 
government for taking a less active role in this UN duty. 
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Peacekeeping could also constitute a fluid vision of Canada's future potential 
to be a more peaceful, tolerant, and internationally active nation. In 1956 this 
meant portraying Canada as an independent actor who was not the "chore boy" of 
Great Britain or the United States. Through the 1960s, Canada was framed by its 
supporters as a nation that was well-positioned to assist peaceful African 
decolonization because of its historic lack of colonies and its ability to balance 
two language groups in a single state. In the late 1980s, Canada's peacekeeping 
acumen was set up as a counterpoint to increasing American bellicosity towards 
the Soviet Union and the rhetoric of then-president Ronald Reagan, which called 
for the "evil empire" to be defeated by any means. For most of the years covered 
by this dissertation, therefore, many Canadians looked at peacekeeping as a 
progressive policy that could, and should, affect positive change through the UN. 
They ignored the past failures of peacekeeping operations and focused instead on 
some of the positive gains that were accomplished on missions like UNEF or 
UNFICYP as being achievable in the future as well. By employing these symbolic 
discourses, in addition to discussing peacekeeping in functional language, 
politicians, authors, and artists all managed to temporally extend peacekeeping's 
reach. This made the outcomes of each operation less significant than the values 
commensurate with Canada as a peacekeeper. 
The existence of these more symbolic associations of peacekeeping blunted 
the impact of criticisms of its functional value in any medium discussed in this 
dissertation. Pearson, peacekeeping's leading figure, believed it to be a far-from-
327 
perfect policy,s91 and so a critical discourse about peacekeeping should have 
developed in turn. 'While there were numerous occasions when peacekeeping's 
shortcomings were discussed, flaws were only seen as sufficient to warrant a total 
rethinking of Canada's peacekeeping role from 1968 to 1970. Even during the 
Trudeau government's foreign policy review, Canada continued to participate in 
peacekeeping operations, and volunteered to be a part of every new operation 
undertaken in the 1970s. F~w commentators recognized that Canada's 
peacekeeping role could have negative effects on a host nation, which partially 
explains why the events in Somalia came as such a surprise. 
The political consensus about peacekeeping was a rare instance of political 
agreement in an age of considerable enmity. This did not mean peacekeeping's 
value was not debated regularly, as detailed in Chapter One. In 1956 Canadian 
participation in UNEF became a means to discuss Canada's independence vis-a-
vis Britain and the United States. But neither the Liberals nor the PCs found 
reason to question Canada's commitment to the UN as an organization. After 
Pearson won his Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, peacekeeping became firmly 
entrenched as a Canadian foreign policy for the next forty years. Interestingly, 
peacekeeping found only intermittent support from the Liberal Party, ranging 
from perhaps its strongest advocacy while Lester Pearson was Prime Minister, to 
its lowest point, excluding the present, while Trudeau was in office. The Liberals 
did, however, encourage Canadians to celebrate Canada's peacekeeping past or 
591 LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG 26 N9, volume 12. "Force For the United Nations," 1957. 
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opine about the possibilities of its peacekeeping future, which promoted its more 
symbolic connotations. Yet peacekeeping became a remarkably popular policy 
with the PC Party as well, and under Brian Mulroney, Canadians were 
volunteered in ever larger numbers for UN duty. Mulroney and his ministers 
lauded Pearson at many events, and told audiences that the Liberals' actions were 
some of the finest ever performed by Canadians in the name of unity and peace. 
This discursive flexibility was lost when the events of the 1990s forced 
peacekeeping to be sectioned off as an activity of the past, in contrast to the 
peacemaking operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. This considerably 
reduced its value while Jean Chretien was in office, and encouraged politicians to 
think of peacekeeping only as an activity to be commemorated. 
Textbooks, by contrast, are not sites where critical national narratives emerge, 
nor do they often challenge young people to question the foundations of their 
national identity .. As seen in Chapter Two, high school history textbooks 
promoted positive national narratives, which downplayed any domestic divides in 
favour of discussions of peacekeeping which centred upon its being indicative of 
Canadian independence .. They routinized discussions of peacekeeping for young 
Canadians, and made them familiar with Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy 
and Lester Pearson's importance in the creation of peacekeeping, as well as 
celebrating Canada's sustained efforts to help the UN promote the cessation of 
conflicts around the globe. Later, peacekeeping found an even larger role in these 
texts because of the desire of educators in English Canada to have young people 
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emulate the peacekeeping process in their everyday lives. By contrast, French 
Canadian educators used textbooks that became more focused on Quebec and 
had minimal discussions of Canadian foreign policies. These educators could still 
promote the issue of peace by using resources provided by the Pacijou group, 
which was more interested in systemic change than in celebrating and promoting 
Canada's irenic role in peacekeeping. 
NFB documentaries chose to stay out of any politically-charged debates, and 
focused instead on Canada's peacekeepers. Chapter Three demonstrated how 
early films about these men framed them as a synecdoche for Canada as a whole. 
Because of some governmental control, as well as an institutional culture which 
sought to promote a common Canadian citizenship, filmmakers consciously 
omitted discussions of politicians or any domestic divides back in Canada from 
their films. After 1980, however, the peacekeepers came to be portrayed as 
exceptional men who were working on behalf of a Canadian government and 
public that was oflten ignorant and dismissive of their accomplishments. These 
films encouraged viewers to valorize the work being done by the peacekeepers 
and to chastise the military leadership or those politicians who would 
unnecessarily restrict the ability of the peacekeepers to perform their duties. Such 
views could be political in nature, and are indicative of the heated debates about 
Canada's proper role in peacekeeping in the middle years of the 1990s. 
By contrast, at: the beginning of most missions and when events went astray 
for the Canadian Forces overseas, newspaper outlets were willing to offer 
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prescient and immediate analyses that were far from glowing. Yet in every case 
identified in Chapter Four, voices which challenged the value of peacekeeping at 
the time were forgotten in favour of simplified recollections of Canada's 
peacekeeping past and optimistic wanderings about the possibilities the future 
might hold because of the Canadian commitment to world peace through UN 
action. Some newspapers employed discussions of peacekeeping to make 
arguments about the need for Canada to side with Britain on matters of 
international importance, or questioned the UN mandate which forbade the 
peacekeepers from disarming the Cypriots in 1964. But these views normally 
spared the peacekeepers from direct criticism, and were never recalled when 
another mission commenced. The availability of Pearson as a totem for Canada's 
proud peacekeeping past encouraged journalists, editorialists, and letter-writers 
to forget the criticisms of the past in favour of glowing endorsements for any new 
operations. When this occurred in conjunction with a strong governmental desire 
to volunteer Canadians abroad, as was the case with Somalia, a lack of critical 
thinking about Canada's suitability for such service resulted. 
Editorial cartoonists offered the most critical views on peacekeeping, but as 
explained in Chapter Five, their work was also the most ephemeral. The 
challenges to Canada's peacekeeping role made by cartoonists were rarely 
sustained or coexistent with those in other media. In 1956, when cartoonists used 
popular culture images of plodding policemen and effeminate soldiers, they 
pushed further than other sources were willing to because they targeted the 
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Canadian contingent itself. In the Congo, by contrast, cartoonists saw 
decolonization as the folly, and encouraged Canadians to see Africans as 
backwards and inferior people who needed Canada's help to "civilize." UNFICYP 
brought renewed attention to Canada's peacekeepers and its bilingual status. 
Cartoonists challenged the UN's operational mandate, and wondered if Canada 
should not be addressing the FLQ and language rights issues before engaging in 
international "do-gooderism." In 1967, UNEF's expulsion provided cartoonists 
the opportunity to portray Pearson as out of touch, while in French cartoons 
Canada as a nation could be seen as impotent. Even when multiple media 
converged to question the military and the government, as was the case with 
Somalia in 1993, cartoonists were normally alone in their willingness to do more 
than section off "a few bad apples" in the Airborne and to chastise the Canadian 
Forces leadership and the Minister of Defence, Kim Campbell. They sought 
instead to discuss the broader question of whether Canadians were suited to 
peacekeeping duties, but their single panels made such arguments more difficult. 
While these portrayals of peacekeeping were often consistent across large 
geographic divides, language was a considerable factor in how peacekeeping was 
framed for audiences. Accordingly, the adoption of peacekeeping into English 
Canada's national symbology occurred alongside what could be better termed 
only an affection for it in French Canada. The addresses that politicians gave to 
French Canadian audiences, Quebec-approved textbooks, French-language 
newspapers, and French editorial cartoons examined in this dissertation make 
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clear the differences in how peacekeeping was presented to French-Canadian 
audiences in comparison to their English equivalents. Unlike audiences 
elsewhere, Quebecois audiences were more likely to hear peacekeeping discussed 
as a policy that was aiding decolonization or helping developing nations to 
internally stabilize. Clear in the newspaper coverage of Le Devoir and La Presse 
and the cartoons found in those publications, such understandings came from 
peacekeeping's not becoming symbolically attached to a conception of Canada's 
past and future. Textbooks, as mentioned, neglected discussing peacekeeping as a 
Canadian activity in their pages. Such understandings often led to more sober 
assessments of peacekeeping's potential value as a policy. The Parti Quebecois 
was ready to adopt peacekeeping as one of its primary foreign policies, should it 
have won either vote on separatism. In these discussions, there was no talk of 
peacekeeping's being indicative of the Quebecois character. It was rather framed 
as a functional policy that was suited to a middle power, though only when it 
could benefit the host nation. This afforded peacekeeping considerable support in 
Quebec between 1956 and 1997, but not of the deep symbolic sort found 
elsewhere. 
The emphasis on Canada's role in peacekeeping, the symbolic attachment to a 
vision of Canada's past and future, and the blunting of sustained and cross-media 
criticism provided peacekeeping with the means to become popular from 1956 to 
1997. These factors also have explanatory power regarding how peacekeeping has 
been presented :in Canada since 1997. As each chapter has demonstrated, the 
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utility of the functional and progressive narratives of peacekeeping was 
considerably diminished by the Inquiry into the Airborne's conduct in Somalia. 
Nostalgic discussions of Canada's peacekeeping past, therefore, became those 
with the most cultural purchase. 
The Garrison Green community in Calgary, Alberta shows how prevalent the 
association between peacekeeping and an idealized version of Canada's past has 
become. The community stands on the site of the former Canadian Forces Base 
[CFB] Calgary and its living quarters, Currie Barracks. The base was closed in 
1996 as part of the austerity measures that the federal Liberal government 
demanded of the Armed Forces. After the closing of CFB Calgary, the Canada 
Lands Company [CLC] was given the task of turning the Barracks into an 
economically viable area.592 The CLC sold parts of the Garrison Green location to 
developers, while insisting that the over-arching theme of the brand-new 
community be a celebration of peacekeeping. Nowhere outside of Canada could 
such a community exist. Garrison Green marks a synthesis of over four decades 
of peacekeeping discourse in Canada that encouraged Canadians to associate 
peacekeeping with a Canadian national identity.s93 In this space, peacekeeping's 
past is employed as a tool to sell housing. 
592 The CLC is a unique crown corporation, designated to manage, redevelop and/or sell what they describe 
as "surplus strategic Government of Canada properties across Canada." These sites, including the CN 
Tower in Toronto, are designed to bring in revenue to the federal government through the management of 
the lands or through their sale to the private sector. 
593 This development was also a success by almost all accounts. The developers, the federal government, 
and local businesses a.II benefited tremendously from the new community development. As of 2002, the 
CLC had brought in more than $250 million to its sole shareholder, the Canadian Federal Government. 
Marty Hope, "It's not just about the money," Calgary Herald, 18 May 2002, HS 1. 
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One of Garrison Green:'s official slogans is "home means an escape to 
yesteryear in the most modern of urban settings."594 The CLC sells its 
peacekeeping community as representing "[a] time when neighbours congregated 
on front porches, when your morning coffee was savoured at home, not on your 
long commute, when your family's safety and security extended beyond your 
front doorstep."59s Garrison Green employs an unmistakeably nostalgic 
conception of the past through its creation of an imagined state of mind that 
generates strong positive meanings in its physical spaces while allowing for the 
forgetting of unseemly aspects of the past. The commodification of the past to sell 
housing, therefore, affords peacekeeping a distinctly real present. 
In Garrison Green, thirteen streets named after peacekeepers or peacekeeping 
give the theme a formal presence throughout the community. Dallaire Avenue, 
Don Eth ell Boulevard, Joseph Marquis Crescent, and Peacekeepers' Way are 
some of the streets that people now live on. Street names "necessarily express 
something essential that has to be commemorated by means of an enduring 
mark. They may be linked to a well-known person or to a forceful abstraction or 
to the date of an event; the essential value embedded in these names comes 
through its designation [as] an emblematic sign of the community."596 Despite 
this, what remains of the official memory of a street name can very quickly 
disappear. Don Ethell Boulevard commemorates the head of the Canadian 
594 Canada Lands Company, "Welcome to Garrison Green," http://www.garrisongreen.com/en/default.php. 
595 Ibid. 
596 Georges Augustins, "Naming, Dedicating: Street Names and Tradition," History and Anthropology 15, 
no. 3 (2004): 289. 
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Association of Veterans of United Nations Peacekeeping [CA VUNP]. If, however, 
someone lives on Don Ethell Boulevard, its meaning as a signifier is altered from 
one of official remembrance to a residential marker. The street name becomes 
something that is seen and experienced every day, and passes from active-
memory. In this way, street-naming becomes an act of immediate and political 
significance but whose meaning is obscured over time. Such processes are 
indicative of how peacekeeping is being understood across Canada as well. As the 
government has moved further away from encouraging this role for the Canadian 
Forces, only memories of Canada's peacekeeping accomplishments remain. 
Official commemorations of Canada's peacekeeping past exist on Dallaire 
Avenue in Peacekeepers' Park. This i.85-acre green space features a "Wall of 
Honour" listing the names of all those who died on peacekeeping missions. In a 
clear instance of what Swift and McKay call the re-branding of Canada into a 
"Warrior Nation," these names have been joined by those of the soldiers who 
have died in Afghanistan.597 As of August 2008, there were 204 names on the 
wall, 89 of whom died in Afghanistan. The inclusion of their names on the Wall of 
Honour is an overtly political act that attempts to symbolically link the Afghan 
mission to the values of Canadian peacekeeping. 
Also located there is a bronze statue of a peacekeeper handing a doll to a 
young girl.s9B The soldier is Corporal Mark Isfeld, whose life and death were 
597 Swift and McKay have discussed Garrison Green in their text as part of the militarization of Canadian 
culture drawing upon my research. See Chapter Seven, "Yellow Ribbons and Indian Country: New 
Warriors on the Marc:h," in McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety. 
598 Marty Hope, "Peacekeepers Remembered at Garrison Green" Calgary Herald 14 August 2004, HS 14 
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detailed in the NFB documentary The Price of Duty.599 What makes this statue 
disconcerting is not the doll that is being handed to the girl - it is the large 
weapon that the soldier carries. The inclusion of the weapon is aggressive and 
phallic. It suggests an assertive identity for peacekeepers that was often denied in 
editorial cartoons about effeminate soldiers and editorials about passive 
policemen. It is, however, entirely consistent with the exceptional status afforded 
to peacekeepers in the documentaries made by Garth Pritchard. What it also 
suggests is a nostalgic longing for the male archetype of the 1950s-, a strong 
provider who could keep a family safe. Despite most of the members of the 
community never having seen such a large weapon in real life, appealing to the 
safety of the past through depictions of soldiers and children has proven to be a 
successful strategy. 
Figure 6.1 Peacekeeper and child statue, Garrison Green, Calgary 
599 Garth Pritchard, "The Price of Duty," (Canada: National Film Board, 1995). 
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Commemorations which speak to the Canadian Forces role in Afghanistan 
and the commercialization of Canada's peacekeeping past are the new norm. 
Peacekeeping's transition from a leading and respected Canadian international 
role to its current state did not occur overnight or without reason. As some 
Canadians rally in support of their country's being a peacekeeping and not a 
militant nation, the country's peacekeeping identity is being reconstructed and 
altered based upon present uncertainties about the direction of Canada's foreign 
commitments. Those who wish to celebrate or cast off Canada's peacekeeping 
identity would do well to recall why and how peacekeeping came to be so strongly 
associated with an English Canadian national identity. And perhaps they would 
do well to give mo:re attention to the views held by most Quebeckers from 1956 
and 1997. Peacekeeping can be, and has been, a constructive policy for a middle 
power like Canada. But unless we see it from the perspective of the host nation 
and refuse to dwell entirely in the nostalgic realm, peacekeeping will fail to live 
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Appendix A: High School Textbooks Approved for Use in Canada 
Title 
Canada: A Political and Social History 
La civilisation catholique etfrancaise au Canada 
Canada: A Modern History 
Ricker, John C. et al. The Modern Era 
Lambe1t, Richard The Twentieth Century: Canada, Britain, USA 
Hodgetts, A.B. Decisive Decades: A History of the Twentieth Century for Canadians 
The Winds of Change: A History of Canada and Canadians in the Twentieth 
Peait, Hugh and John Schaffter Century 
Three Nations: Canada, Great Britain and the United States in the Twentieth 
Nicholson, Gerald Wet al. Century 
McNaught, Kenneth and Ramsay Cook Canada and the United States: A Modern Study 
Cook, Ramsay, et al Canada: A Modern Study 
Careless, J.M.S. Canada: A Story of Challenge 
Morton, W.L. The Kingdom of Canada 
Mcinnis, Edgar The North American Nations 






Cornell. Paul et al. 
Le Canada au Xxie siecle 
Candian History in Documents 
Histoire du Canada 
The West and the Wider World 
The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967 




































Appendix A: High School Textbooks Approved for Use in Canada 
Careless, J.M.S. 
Maclcir, Kenneth A. et al 
Johnson, Patricia 
Brown,G.W. 
Vaugeois, Denis and Jacques 
Lacoursiere 
Moir, John S. and D.M.L Farr 
Granatstein, J.L. 
Bumstead, J.M. 
Cachat, Gerard and Giles Villemure 
Willows, Derald G. and Stewait 
Richmond 
Creighton, Donald 
Herstein, H.H., et. Al 









The Canadians: 1867-1967 
Changing Perspectives in Canadian History 
Canada Since 1867 
Building the Canadian Nation 
Canada-Quebec: Synthese historique 
The Canadian Experience 
Canadian Foreign Poiicy Since 1945: Middle Power or Sateiiite? 
Documentary Problems in Canadian History Voiume Two, Post-Cunfederalfon 
Cahier d'exercises en histoire moderne et contemporaine: livre de maitre 
Canada: Colony to Centennial 
Canada's First Century, 1867-1967 
Challenge and Survival: The History of Canada 
Northern Destiny: A History of Canada 
Canada and the USA: A Background Book about Internal Conflict and the New 
Nationalism 
Canada's Searchfor New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era 
Lester Pearson: Diplomat and Politician 
A Global History 1870 to the Present 
The Forked Road: Canada, 1939to1957 
The Pelican History of Canada 
Canada's Illustrated Heritage: The Booming Fifties 
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Finlay, J.L and D.N. Sprague 
Huntley, Ian 




Hall, Roger and Gordon Dodds 
Francis, R. Douglas and Donald B. 
Smith 
Granatstein, J.L. et al 
Granatstein, J.L. et al 
Bartlett, Gilian and Janice Gallivan 
Campbell, Allan and Derald Fretts 
Charbonneau, Francois et al 
Francis, Daniel and Sonia Riddoch 
The Maple Leaf Forever 
This Land, These People: An Illustrated History of Canada 
Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime.from the Great War 
to the Cold War 
Pearson: His Life and World 
Une histoire nationale pour l'eleve du secondaire 
Canada's Illustrated Heritage: The Years of Protest 
Histoire du Canada par les textes, tome II (1855-1960) 
The St111cture of Canadian J-I istory 
Canada: Builders of the Nation 
Years of Promise: 1945-63 
Canada and War: A Military and Political History 
Canada Past and Present 
Canada: A History in Photographs 
Readings in Canadian History Post-Confederation 
Twentieth Century Canadian History Second Edition 
Twentieth Century Canadian History 
Canada: History in the Making 
Canada in the World: Choosing A Role 
Mon Histoire 
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Lagasse, Robert 
Bouchard, Claude and Robert Lagasse 
Hux, Allan and Fred Jarman 
Auger, Christophe 
Centrale de l'enseignement du Quebec 
Scully, Angus L. et al 
Evans, Allan S. and LL. Ma1tinello 
Baldwin, Douglas et al 
Morton, Desmond 
Cresswell, Jack 
Clark, Bruce W. and John K. Wallace 
Kerrigan, Joan et al 
Mcfadden, Fred et al 
Huntley, Ian and Michael L. Magarrey 
Marsh, James H. 
Hundey, Ian 
Charpentier, Louise and Denise 
Menotte 
Christopher, James R. and George G. 
Wittlet 
Cadotte, Robert et al 
Histoire du Quebec et du Canada: Histoire nationale, cahier d'activites 
Nouvelle-France, Canada Quebec: Histoire du Quebec et du Canada 
Canada: A Growing Concern Revised Edition 
Cessez lefeu! Guide pedagogique 
Eduquer a la paix pour desarmer le monde: Guide d'intervention pedagogique 
Canada Today, Second Edition 
Canada's Century, Second Edition 
The Rise of the Global Village 
Towards Tomorrow: Canada in a Changing World 
Towards Tomorrow: Canada in a Changing World: History Teacher's Guide 
Canada: Land of Diversity, Second Edition 
Canada in a North American Perspective: A Curriculum Guide 
Canada: The Twentieth Century 
Canada: Understanding Your Past 
The Junior Encyclopedia of Canada 
Canada: Builders of the Nation, Second Edition 
A la decouverte de l'histoire du Quebec et du Canada 
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Dawood, Ishie 
Lunn, Janet and Christopher Moore 
Scott, Ma1vin 




Roy, Marcel and Domenic Roy 
Huntley, Ian and Michael L. Magarrey 
Canada: A History to the Twentieth Century 
The Story of Canada 
Of Many Times and Cultures: Fascinating Facts and Stories From World History 
Canada: A Nation Unfolding 
Canada: Pathways to the Present 
Histoire du Quebec: D'hier a l'an 2000 
The Prime Ministers of Quebec 
Je me souviens: Histoire du Quebec et du Canada 



















Appendix B: NFB Films Information 357 
Title Year Director Length Budget 
Blue Vanguard 19S7 Ian MacNeill 60 minutes $ s7,792.27 
The Thin Blue Line 19s8 A.W. Acland 29 minutes 10 seconds $ 9,910.00 
Overture 19s8 G.L. Polidora 9 minutes, 28 seconds N/A 
The Security Council 1963 V.R.Sarma 16 minutes, 6 seconds N/A 
You Are Welcome Sirs, to Cyprus 1964 Richard Gilbert 20 minutes, 28 seconds $28,s73.38 
Postmark UNEF 196s Richard Gilbert 27 minutes, 3S seconds $ 27,224.27 
A Life of Adventure 196s Graham Parker 14 minutes, 8 seconds $ 29,488.14 
Goodbye War 1983 Donna Dudinsky et al. s6 minutes, 26 seconds N/A 
Harder Than it Looks 1986 Tina Viljoen 28 minutes, 10 seconds N/A 
Keeping the Elephants Away 1986 Tina Viljoen 57 minutes, 8 seconds N/A 
Peacekeeper at War 1994 Ma1tin Duckwo1th 41 minutes, S4 seconds $ 8S8,466.oo 
Caught in the Crossfire 199S Garth Pritchard 47 minutes, so seconds $ 319,004.00 
In God's Command 199S Ga1th Pritchard 47 minutes, so seconds $ 111,3s3.oo 
The Price of Duty 199S Garth Pritchard 47 minutes, so seconds $ 109,9s4.oo 
Appendix C: NFB Films Sales Figures 358 
Revenues Generated and Number of Copies Sold Since 1982 (film, video, dvd)* 
TITLE REVENUE QTY SOLD 
The Thin Blue Line $ 49.55 3 
Ove1ture $ 959.73 136 
The Security Council $ 0 
You Are Welcome Sirs, to Cyprus $ 168.41 9 
Postmark UNEF $ 128-49 6 
A Life of Adventure $ 0 
Goodbye War $ 17,666.00 658 
Harder Than it Looks $ 4,420.92 290 
Keeping the Elephants Away $ 13,847.00 594 
Peacekeeper at War $ 11,264.91 265 
Caught in the Crossfire $ 6,717.07 190 
In God's Command $ 16,792.78 88 
The P1ice of Duty $ 9,188.57 153 
* The NFB only has data on revenues and the number of copies sold for its films since 1982. 
Appendix D: Cartoons Examined by Mission and by Newspaper 359 --~ 
Newspaper UNEF and Nobel Prize ONUC UNFICYP EndofUNEF UNOSOM Somalia Inquiry 
Calgary Herald 3 2 
Halifax Chronicle-Herald 11 5 2 
Montreal Gazette 6 6 3 4 
La Presse 3 3 
LeDevoir 2 3 2 3 
Ottawa Citizen 5 4 7 4 
Regina Leader-Post 5 3 2 3 
Toronto Star 8 4 
Globe and Mail 5 3 3 2 2 
Vancouver Sun 5 2 
Winnipeg Free Press 4 3 
Total 54 34 20 15 12 15 
